{"title":"RFID协议的形式化计算不可链接性证明","authors":"Hubert Comon-Lundh, Adrien Koutsos","doi":"10.1109/CSF.2017.9","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We set up a framework for the formal proofs of RFID protocols in the computational model. We rely on the so-called computationally complete symbolic attacker model. Our contributions are: 1) to design (and prove sound) axioms reflecting the properties of hash functions (Collision-Resistance, PRF). 2) to formalize computational unlinkability in the model. 3) to illustrate the method, providing the first formal proofs of unlinkability of RFID protocols, in the omputational model.","PeriodicalId":269696,"journal":{"name":"2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"389 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"16","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Formal Computational Unlinkability Proofs of RFID Protocols\",\"authors\":\"Hubert Comon-Lundh, Adrien Koutsos\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/CSF.2017.9\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We set up a framework for the formal proofs of RFID protocols in the computational model. We rely on the so-called computationally complete symbolic attacker model. Our contributions are: 1) to design (and prove sound) axioms reflecting the properties of hash functions (Collision-Resistance, PRF). 2) to formalize computational unlinkability in the model. 3) to illustrate the method, providing the first formal proofs of unlinkability of RFID protocols, in the omputational model.\",\"PeriodicalId\":269696,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)\",\"volume\":\"389 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-05-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"16\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2017.9\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2017 IEEE 30th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2017.9","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Formal Computational Unlinkability Proofs of RFID Protocols
We set up a framework for the formal proofs of RFID protocols in the computational model. We rely on the so-called computationally complete symbolic attacker model. Our contributions are: 1) to design (and prove sound) axioms reflecting the properties of hash functions (Collision-Resistance, PRF). 2) to formalize computational unlinkability in the model. 3) to illustrate the method, providing the first formal proofs of unlinkability of RFID protocols, in the omputational model.