RFID协议的形式化计算不可链接性证明

Hubert Comon-Lundh, Adrien Koutsos
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引用次数: 16

摘要

我们在计算模型中建立了RFID协议形式化证明的框架。我们依赖于所谓的计算完备的符号攻击模型。我们的贡献是:1)设计(并证明合理的)公理,反映哈希函数的属性(抗碰撞,PRF)。2)形式化模型中的计算不可链接性。3)举例说明该方法,在计算模型中提供RFID协议不可链接性的第一个正式证明。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Formal Computational Unlinkability Proofs of RFID Protocols
We set up a framework for the formal proofs of RFID protocols in the computational model. We rely on the so-called computationally complete symbolic attacker model. Our contributions are: 1) to design (and prove sound) axioms reflecting the properties of hash functions (Collision-Resistance, PRF). 2) to formalize computational unlinkability in the model. 3) to illustrate the method, providing the first formal proofs of unlinkability of RFID protocols, in the omputational model.
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