Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference最新文献_第5页

Exploring the "Internet from space" with Hypatia 与希帕蒂娅一起探索“来自太空的互联网”

Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference Pub Date : 2020-10-27 DOI: 10.1145/3419394.3423635

S. Kassing, Debopam Bhattacherjee, A. Águas, Jens Eirik Saethre, Ankit Singla

引用次数: 76

Behind Closed Doors: A Network Tale of Spoofing, Intrusion, and False DNS Security 闭门不出:欺骗、入侵和虚假DNS安全的网络故事

Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference Pub Date : 2020-10-27 DOI: 10.1145/3419394.3423649

C. Deccio, Alden Hilton, M. Briggs, Trevin Avery, Robert Richardson

引用次数: 8

Putting DNS in Context 背景信息配置DNS

Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference Pub Date : 2020-10-27 DOI: 10.1145/3419394.3423659

M. Allman

引用次数: 10

Out of Sight, Not Out of Mind: A User-View on the Criticality of the Submarine Cable Network 眼不见心不烦:从用户角度看海底光缆网络的重要性

Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference Pub Date : 2020-10-27 DOI: 10.1145/3419394.3423633

Shucheng Liu, Zachary S. Bischof, Ishaan Madan, P. K. Chan, F. Bustamante

引用次数: 10

Cloud Provider Connectivity in the Flat Internet 平面互联网中的云提供商连接

Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference Pub Date : 2020-10-27 DOI: 10.1145/3419394.3423613

T. Arnold, Jia He, Weifan Jiang, Matt Calder, Ítalo F. S. Cunha, V. Giotsas, Ethan Katz-Bassett

{"title":"Cloud Provider Connectivity in the Flat Internet","authors":"T. Arnold, Jia He, Weifan Jiang, Matt Calder, Ítalo F. S. Cunha, V. Giotsas, Ethan Katz-Bassett","doi":"10.1145/3419394.3423613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3419394.3423613","url":null,"abstract":"The Tier-1 ISPs have been considered the Internet's backbone since the dawn of the modern Internet 30 years ago, as they guarantee global reachability. However, their influence and importance are waning as Internet flattening decreases the demand for transit services and increases the importance of private interconnections. Conversely, major cloud providers -- Amazon, Google, IBM, and Microsoft-- are gaining in importance as more services are hosted on their infrastructures. They ardently support Internet flattening and are rapidly expanding their global footprints, which enables them to bypass the Tier-1 ISPs and other large transit providers to reach many destinations. In this paper we seek to quantify the extent to which the cloud providers' can bypass the Tier-1 ISPs and other large transit providers. We conduct comprehensive measurements to identify the neighbor networks of the major cloud providers and combine them with AS relationship inferences to model the Internet's AS-level topology to calculate a new metric, hierarchy-free reachability, which characterizes the reachability a network can achieve without traversing the networks of the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs. We show that the cloud providers are able to reach over 76% of the Internet without traversing the Tier-1 and Tier-2 ISPs, more than virtually every other network.","PeriodicalId":255324,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115296110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 52

Easing the Conscience with OPC UA: An Internet-Wide Study on Insecure Deployments 用OPC UA放松良心:对不安全部署的全互联网研究

Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference Pub Date : 2020-10-26 DOI: 10.1145/3419394.3423666

M. Dahlmanns, J. Lohmöller, I. Fink, J. Pennekamp, Klaus Wehrle, Martin Henze

{"title":"Easing the Conscience with OPC UA: An Internet-Wide Study on Insecure Deployments","authors":"M. Dahlmanns, J. Lohmöller, I. Fink, J. Pennekamp, Klaus Wehrle, Martin Henze","doi":"10.1145/3419394.3423666","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3419394.3423666","url":null,"abstract":"Due to increasing digitalization, formerly isolated industrial networks, e.g., for factory and process automation, move closer and closer to the Internet, mandating secure communication. However, securely setting up OPC UA, the prime candidate for secure industrial communication, is challenging due to a large variety of insecure options. To study whether Internet-facing OPC UA appliances are configured securely, we actively scan the IPv4 address space for publicly reachable OPC UA systems and assess the security of their configurations. We observe problematic security configurations such as missing access control (on 24% of hosts), disabled security functionality (24%), or use of deprecated cryptographic primitives (25%) on in total 92% of the reachable deployments. Furthermore, we discover several hundred devices in multiple autonomous systems sharing the same security certificate, opening the door for impersonation attacks. Overall, in this paper, we highlight commonly found security misconfigurations and underline the importance of appropriate configuration for security-featuring protocols.","PeriodicalId":255324,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130803602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 24

A Characterization of the COVID-19 Pandemic Impact on a Mobile Network Operator Traffic 新冠肺炎疫情对移动网络运营商流量影响的表征

Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference Pub Date : 2020-10-06 DOI: 10.1145/3419394.3423655

Andra Lutu, Diego Perino, M. Bagnulo, E. Frías-Martínez, J. Khangosstar

引用次数: 86

Understanding Incentivized Mobile App Installs on Google Play Store 了解Google Play Store的奖励性手机应用安装情况

Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference Pub Date : 2020-10-04 DOI: 10.1145/3419394.3423662

Shehroze Farooqi, Álvaro Feal, Tobias Lauinger, Damon McCoy, Zubair Shafiq, N. Vallina-Rodriguez

{"title":"Understanding Incentivized Mobile App Installs on Google Play Store","authors":"Shehroze Farooqi, Álvaro Feal, Tobias Lauinger, Damon McCoy, Zubair Shafiq, N. Vallina-Rodriguez","doi":"10.1145/3419394.3423662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3419394.3423662","url":null,"abstract":"\"Incentivized\" advertising platforms allow mobile app developers to acquire new users by directly paying users to install and engage with mobile apps (e.g., create an account, make in-app purchases). Incentivized installs are banned by the Apple App Store and discouraged by the Google Play Store because they can manipulate app store metrics (e.g., install counts, appearance in top charts). Yet, many organizations still offer incentivized install services for Android apps. In this paper, we present the first study to understand the ecosystem of incentivized mobile app install campaigns in Android and its broader ramifications through a series of measurements. We identify incentivized install campaigns that require users to install an app and perform in-app tasks targeting manipulation of a wide variety of user engagement metrics (e.g., daily active users, user session lengths) and revenue. Our results suggest that these artificially inflated metrics can be effective in improving app store metrics as well as helping mobile app developers to attract funding from venture capitalists. Our study also indicates lax enforcement of the Google Play Store's existing policies to prevent these behaviors. It further motivates the need for stricter policing of incentivized install campaigns. Our proposed measurements can also be leveraged by the Google Play Store to identify potential policy violations.","PeriodicalId":255324,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114781950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 11

Reading In-Between the Lines: An Analysis of Dissenter 字里行间的阅读:对异议者的分析

Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference Pub Date : 2020-09-03 DOI: 10.1145/3419394.3423615

Erik C. Rye, Jeremy Blackburn, Robert Beverly

{"title":"Reading In-Between the Lines: An Analysis of Dissenter","authors":"Erik C. Rye, Jeremy Blackburn, Robert Beverly","doi":"10.1145/3419394.3423615","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3419394.3423615","url":null,"abstract":"Efforts by content creators and social networks to enforce legal and policy-based norms, e.g. blocking hate speech and users, has driven the rise of unrestricted communication platforms. One such recent effort is Dissenter, a browser and web application that provides a conversational overlay for any web page. These conversations hide in plain sight -- users of Dissenter can see and participate in this conversation, whereas visitors using other browsers are oblivious to their existence. Further, the website and content owners have no power over the conversation as it resides in an overlay outside their control. In this work, we obtain a history of Dissenter comments, users, and the websites being discussed, from the initial release of Dissenter in Feb. 2019 through Apr. 2020 (14 months). Our corpus consists of approximately 1.68M comments made by 101k users commenting on 588k distinct URLs. We first analyze macro characteristics of the network, including the user-base, comment distribution, and growth. We then use toxicity dictionaries, Perspective API, and a Natural Language Processing model to understand the nature of the comments and measure the propensity of particular websites and content to elicit hateful and offensive Dissenter comments. Using curated rankings of media bias, we examine the conditional probability of hateful comments given left and right-leaning content. Finally, we study Dissenter as a social network, and identify a core group of users with high comment toxicity.","PeriodicalId":255324,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132232491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 11

A Haystack Full of Needles: Scalable Detection of IoT Devices in the Wild 一堆针:物联网设备的可扩展检测

Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference Pub Date : 2020-09-03 DOI: 10.1145/3419394.3423650

Said Jawad Saidi, A. Mandalari, Roman Kolcun, H. Haddadi, Daniel J. Dubois, D. Choffnes, Georgios Smaragdakis, A. Feldmann

{"title":"A Haystack Full of Needles: Scalable Detection of IoT Devices in the Wild","authors":"Said Jawad Saidi, A. Mandalari, Roman Kolcun, H. Haddadi, Daniel J. Dubois, D. Choffnes, Georgios Smaragdakis, A. Feldmann","doi":"10.1145/3419394.3423650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3419394.3423650","url":null,"abstract":"Consumer Internet of Things (IoT) devices are extremely popular, providing users with rich and diverse functionalities, from voice assistants to home appliances. These functionalities often come with significant privacy and security risks, with notable recent large-scale coordinated global attacks disrupting large service providers. Thus, an important first step to address these risks is to know what IoT devices are where in a network. While some limited solutions exist, a key question is whether device discovery can be done by Internet service providers that only see sampled flow statistics. In particular, it is challenging for an ISP to efficiently and effectively track and trace activity from IoT devices deployed by its millions of subscribers---all with sampled network data. In this paper, we develop and evaluate a scalable methodology to accurately detect and monitor IoT devices at subscriber lines with limited, highly sampled data in-the-wild. Our findings indicate that millions of IoT devices are detectable and identifiable within hours, both at a major ISP as well as an IXP, using passive, sparsely sampled network flow headers. Our methodology is able to detect devices from more than 77% of the studied IoT manufacturers, including popular devices such as smart speakers. While our methodology is effective for providing network analytics, it also highlights significant privacy consequences.","PeriodicalId":255324,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128527900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 48