Financial Stability, Systems and Regulation最新文献

{"title":"Emerging markets and the international financial architecture","authors":"J. Kregel","doi":"10.4324/9781315438290-13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315438290-13","url":null,"abstract":"If emerging markets are to achieve their objective of joining the ranks of industrialized, developed countries, they must use their economic and political influence to support radical change in the international financial system. This working paper recommends John Maynard Keynes’s “clearing union” as a blueprint for reform of the international financial architecture that could address emerging market grievances more effectively than current approaches. Keynes’s proposal for the postwar international system sought to remedy some of the same problems currently facing emerging market economies. It was based on the idea that financial stability was predicated on a balance between imports and exports over time, with any divergence from balance providing automatic financing of the debit countries by the creditor countries via a global clearinghouse or settlement system for trade and payments on current account. This eliminated national currency payments for imports and exports; countries received credits or debits in a notional unit of account fixed to national currency. Since the unit of account could not be traded, bought, or sold, it would not be an international reserve currency. The credits with the clearinghouse could only be used to offset debits by buying imports, and if not used for this purpose they would eventually be extinguished; hence the burden of adjustment would be shared equally—credit generated by surpluses would have to be used to buy imports from the countries with debit balances. Emerging market economies could improve upon current schemes for regionally governed financial institutions by using this proposal as a template for the creation of regional clearing unions using a notional unit of account. \u0000JEL Classification: E42; E52; F12; N44.","PeriodicalId":254964,"journal":{"name":"Financial Stability, Systems and Regulation","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129653755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Universal banking, US banking reform and financial competition in the EEC 1","authors":"J. Kregel","doi":"10.4324/9781315438290-3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315438290-3","url":null,"abstract":"Economists and policy makers in Europe and the United States have devoted increasing attention towards the German financial system. In the new Single European Market, the German financial system, characterised by universal banking with unrestricted entry into all types of financial market, is expected to become the dominant form. The German kind of financial system has also been suggested as an alternative to the segmented US financial system. It is argued that the success of the German system has less to do with the freedom granted to universal banks than with its approach to regulation and supervision.","PeriodicalId":254964,"journal":{"name":"Financial Stability, Systems and Regulation","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125310523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Yes, “it” did happen again—a Minsky crisis happened in Asia 1","authors":"J. Kregel","doi":"10.4324/9781315438290-10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315438290-10","url":null,"abstract":"The Asian financial crisis is doubly unfortunate, first of all because it has set income and wealth levels in these countries back some ten years. But, it is also unfortunate because Hy Minsky been alive to point out to policy makers that they were dealing with a debt deflation the worst excesses might have been prevented. Hy spent a good deal of time explaining why \"It\", that is, the Great Depression, Can't Happen Again. But, in this case of Asia it did. And this is also a lesson for why it might happen again, outside the Far East. First, Hy insisted on the beneficial impact of Big Government in providing a floor under aggregate demand. Free falls in asset prices could not happen if there was a guaranteed floor under incomes. The Bigger the Government, the firmer foundation and the stable the economy. Not that this didn't cause other problems, but it meant that you could only go down so far. If we take a look at the vital statistics of the Asian economies, we see in general that they have small governments. And those governments tend to run persistent surpluses. There are no firm foundations here. This is not to say that government played no role. We have heard a lot about ‘crony capitalism' in Asia. But, this sort of income support does not provide the kind of aggregate demand support that Hy thought was beneficial to avoiding instability. Hy also thought that a Big Bank, an active central bank willing to intervene actively by lending at the discount window in support of asset prices, and thus of bank solvency, was of crucial importance. Hy did not believe in tying one's hands or currency boards or other forms of shooting financial markets in the foot. It is true that central banks are common in Asia, and in some countries they are active on the policy front. But, in the current crisis a major portion of the lending to firms and financial institutions was in foreign currency, Yen and US dollars, which meant that the local central bank was constrained in its ability to act as lender of last resort by the size of its dollar reserves. They could not follow the Bagehot principle of lending without limit. Of course, they has the (non)-choice of adopting floating exchange rates, but this would have made their ability to act that much weaker.","PeriodicalId":254964,"journal":{"name":"Financial Stability, Systems and Regulation","volume":"582 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116068306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}