ERPN: Regulation (Topic)最新文献

App Stores, Aftermarkets & Antitrust 应用商店、售后市场和反垄断

ERPN: Regulation (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-10-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3942570

John M. Yun

{"title":"App Stores, Aftermarkets & Antitrust","authors":"John M. Yun","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3942570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3942570","url":null,"abstract":"App stores have become the subject of controversy and criticism within antitrust. For instance, app developers such as Spotify and Epic Games (creator of Fortnite) allege that Apple’s 30 percent cut of all sales in the App Store violates the antitrust laws and is indicative of monopoly power. The idea is that iPhone users are locked into Apple’s walled garden iOS platform, which frees Apple to engage in misconduct in the App Store “aftermarket” to the detriment of users and app developers. This Article challenges the recent economic and legal characterizations of app stores and the nature of the alleged harm. First, this Article builds an accessible, economic framework to illustrate how app stores do not represent the same type of aftermarkets that were condemned in the Supreme Court’s landmark Kodak case. Importantly, the differences between Kodak-like aftermarkets and app store aftermarkets raise serious questions whether the digital revival of the aftermarket doctrine conforms with the economic realities of these markets. Second, the complexity of the commercial relationships found in app stores has raised questions regarding who has standing to seek antitrust damages in this type of market setting. This Article provides an overview of the development of the current doctrine of antitrust standing—focusing on Illinois Brick and Apple v. Pepper. Further, this Article contends that Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion in Pepper, which gave iPhone users the right to sue Apple over the 30 percent commission, was right for the wrong reason. Instead, Justice Gorsuch’s dissent offers a much more economically sound approach to antitrust standing—as his “proximate cause” standard does not artificially focus on identifying the “direct purchaser,” which is unnecessarily limiting for more complex commercial relationships. As the number of antitrust claims against various app stores proliferate, the consequences of faulty characterizations of app stores will only grow.","PeriodicalId":243307,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121874027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Forgone Innovation: Regulatory Lock-in and Elimination of Economic Niches 被放弃的创新:监管锁定与经济利基的消除

ERPN: Regulation (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-10-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3937605

Marta Podemska-Mikluch

引用次数: 0

Tech Giant Exclusion 科技巨头的排斥

ERPN: Regulation (Topic) Pub Date : 2021-01-05 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3761448

J. Kirkwood

{"title":"Tech Giant Exclusion","authors":"J. Kirkwood","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3761448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3761448","url":null,"abstract":"Critics claim that Amazon, Apple, Google, and Facebook are monopolies that crush smaller competitors. Antitrust has failed to control them because it asks only whether consumers have been hurt, not whether small firms have been devastated or the political system corrupted. The only solution, the critics assert, is to break up the tech giants. This diagnosis is mistaken. While the tech giants have excluded rivals, the proper approach is not to break them up but expand the law to reach their conduct. \u0000 \u0000The tech giants compete with third parties selling on their platforms and sometimes take steps to disadvantage them. They demote them in search results, use confidential information about specific sellers to copy their products, or expel them because they are rivals. But because these tactics rarely, if ever, lead to monopoly power, they do not violate the Sherman Act. This gap should be closed. \u0000 \u0000The tech giants should not be broken up. Splitting them into smaller versions of themselves would raise prices or reduce quality for consumers. Preventing them from selling their own products on their platforms would deprive consumers of products they value. Likewise, the goals of antitrust law should not be changed. Its fundamental aim is to protect consumers and small suppliers from anticompetitive conduct. If courts also had to preserve small business and curb the political influence of large firms, the goals of antitrust would conflict. Courts would have no objective way of balancing them, the deterrent effect of antitrust enforcement would be blunted, and consumers and workers would be hurt. \u0000 \u0000Congress should amend the Sherman Act to prohibit exclusionary conduct that significantly reduces competition, whether or not it results in monopoly power or a dangerous probability of monopoly power. To minimize the impact on procompetitive conduct, the change should apply only to the tech giants and should contain strict proof requirements. But by exposing the tech giants to an array of sanctions, it would substantially reduce the incidence of unwarranted exclusion.","PeriodicalId":243307,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"489 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126827308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Anti-Competitive Mergers in Two-Sided Digital Platform Markets: The Case of Uber-Grab 双边数字平台市场中的反竞争兼并:以Uber-Grab为例

ERPN: Regulation (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-10-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3712823

Kenneth Khoo

引用次数: 0

Secondary Market Listings in Equity Crowdfunding: The Missing Link? 股权众筹的二级市场上市:缺失的一环?

ERPN: Regulation (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-09-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3725498

Anna Lukkarinen, Armin Schwienbacher

{"title":"Secondary Market Listings in Equity Crowdfunding: The Missing Link?","authors":"Anna Lukkarinen, Armin Schwienbacher","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3725498","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3725498","url":null,"abstract":"While equity crowdfunding has grown in prevalence, investors have had very few opportunities to exit their investments. To address this, several equity crowdfunding platforms have started considering developing secondary markets for buying and selling shares. Using detailed data from the world’s first secondary market for equity crowdfunding, we investigate whether committing to list on the secondary market after the fundraising campaign leads to greater investor participation and thus helps entrepreneurs to raise more money during the campaign. We find that in the early days of the secondary market, making a pre-commitment to list attracted more investors and larger investment sums. However, this positive effect disappeared after the first 18 months of secondary market operation, most likely because investors realized the lack of liquidity on the secondary market and thus the fact that secondary markets are currently unlikely to constitute a viable exit route. Our findings offer valuable insights to platforms aiming at launching secondary markets and regulators responsible for validating such initiatives. In particular, equity crowdfunding would benefit greatly from liquid secondary markets, which however are difficult to achieve due to high information asymmetries, price formation difficulties, reputational concerns, and competition effects from the primary market.","PeriodicalId":243307,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125821038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 9

E-commerce & (The Future of) Competition Regulation in Ethiopia 埃塞俄比亚的电子商务和竞争监管(未来)

ERPN: Regulation (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-08-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3772095

Yohannes Mebrate

{"title":"E-commerce & (The Future of) Competition Regulation in Ethiopia","authors":"Yohannes Mebrate","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3772095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3772095","url":null,"abstract":"Competition regulation in Ethiopia is relatively a recent phenomenon. With the introduction of a free market economy, Ethiopia has made considerable attempt s to design a modern legal framework for market competition. The Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation is currently the omnibus piece of legislation that govern s regulation of market competition generally, potentially including competition in online marketplaces. Recent years have seen the rise of e - commerce platforms of various sorts in Ethiopia. But it is unclear the extent to which and whether current Ethiopian competition law is fit for purpose of regulating this emerging marketplace. T he advent of e - commerce gives rise to a number of novel issues that warrant proper competition regulation , including concerns such as the Big Data, network effect, platform neutrality, free offer of products and disruptive innovations. This article examines whether and the extent to which current Ethiopian law attends to these novel issues of market competition in mushrooming online marketplaces. It argues that while the Competition Proclamation and draft laws regulate anti - competitive conducts to an extent, there are still drawbacks with regard to capturing the aforementioned non price competition concerns and other tacit anti - competitive conducts.","PeriodicalId":243307,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130931546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Acing the Labyrinth - A Paper On Implementing Competition Law In Today’s Digital Economy. 穿越迷宫——数字经济时代竞争法的实施研究。

ERPN: Regulation (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-06-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3640160

E. Mensah

引用次数: 0

Language, Internet and Platform Competition 语言、网络和平台竞赛

ERPN: Regulation (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-04-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3655055

Doh-Shin Jeon, B. Jullien, Mikhail Klimenko

引用次数: 4

La estrategia de la Regulación basada en el Riesgo (Risk-based Regulation as a Regulatory Strategy) 基于风险的监管策略(作为监管策略的基于风险的监管)

ERPN: Regulation (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-03-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3530609

Ligia Catherine Arias-Barrera

{"title":"La estrategia de la Regulación basada en el Riesgo (Risk-based Regulation as a Regulatory Strategy)","authors":"Ligia Catherine Arias-Barrera","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3530609","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3530609","url":null,"abstract":"Spanish Abstract: Este capítulo se ocupa de la regulación basada en el riesgo (RBR) y sus principales elementos. El propósito es resaltar los beneficios, límites y complejidades asociadas a la adopción de la RBS en diferentes mercados . A pesar de que en épocas de reforma suele criticarse a la RBS por ser inadecuada y lenta para identificar y administrar oportunamente riesgos sistémicos , la estrategia es suficientemente amplia y flexible. La RBR expone una realidad innegable: la constante limitación en los recursos con los que se cuenta para controlar cierto tipo de riesgos y, en esa medida, la necesidad de priorizar tanto los riesgos como el uso de los recursos disponibles. Además, facilita el análisis sobre cómo y en qué medida cuerpo normativo satisface las expectativas de transparencia y determinación de responsabilidad de los involucrados en el proceso regulatorio ó accountability. English Abstract: This chapter analyses risk-based regulation (RBR) and its core elements. The purpose is to highlight the benefits, limits and complexities associated with adopting RBS in different markets. Although RBS is often criticized in times of reform for being inadequate and slow to identify and manage systemic risks in a timely manner, the strategy is sufficiently comprehensive and flexible. The RBR exposes an undeniable reality: the constant limitation on the resources available to control certain types of risks and, to that extent, the need to prioritize both risks and the use of available resources. In addition, it facilitates the analysis of how and to what extent the regulatory body satisfies the expectations of transparency and determination of responsibility of those involved in the regulatory process or accountability.","PeriodicalId":243307,"journal":{"name":"ERPN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129819223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Disclosure and lawsuits ahead of IPOs ipo前的信息披露和诉讼

ERPN: Regulation (Topic) Pub Date : 2020-03-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3548863

Burcu Esmer, N. B. Ozel, Suhas A. Sridharan

引用次数: 1