{"title":"Investing Responsibly: A Financial Puzzle The Limited Scope of Sustainable Asset Management","authors":"Maaike Kokke, Roos van Os, Kristof Racz","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1683960","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1683960","url":null,"abstract":"The financial sector has gone through tough times recently, after it became clear that banks had been taking irresponsible financial risks. This has not only had far-reaching negative consequences for the banks themselves, but also for the global economy and, therefore, for millions of people in both developed and developing countries. In addition to financial risks, banks are also faced with the environmental, socioeconomic and political risks of their business operations, and for many years stakeholders have been trying to draw attention to this. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is now well recognised in the financial sector in most European countries, with wide-ranging CSR reports and sustainable investment products becoming commonplace. Research by SOMO into the scope of the CSR policies of a selection of European banks reveals, however, that these policies have serious limitations. In particular, the CSR policies of large banks generally only apply to a very small part of the banks’ activities. Transparency regarding the policies applied is often lacking as well: While consumers can choose sustainable investment products at any bank, it is often difficult to determine the extent to which banks apply their CSR policy to their mainstream investment portfolio. This paper aims to contribute to a public debate about a more consistent and transparent application of CSR policies in the financial sector, especially with regard to asset management.","PeriodicalId":241681,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Firms & Other Social Institutions (Topic)","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127009648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ethical Imperatives of CEOS: Creating the Virtuous Corporation","authors":"Hershey H. Friedman, L. Friedman, Frimette Kass","doi":"10.15209/JBSGE.V3I4.146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.15209/JBSGE.V3I4.146","url":null,"abstract":"Companies that are going to thrive must have a soul. Those that are only concerned with “maximizing shareholder wealth” or “maximizing profit” will find themselves going the way Enron went. CEOs will have to lead the revolution and should be the ones exhorting executives to make spiritual values or virtue, not just profit, the core values of a firm. A true measure of corporate performance is multidimensional and has to include the short-term, the long-term, risk, environmental issues, society, employees, customers, suppliers, and government. This paper shows how a firm can acquire a soul and even be profitable doing it.","PeriodicalId":241681,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Firms & Other Social Institutions (Topic)","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125980624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Optimal Cleanup and Liability after Environmentally Harmful Discharges","authors":"A. Polinsky, S. Shavell","doi":"10.3386/W4176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W4176","url":null,"abstract":"This article studies how liability for environmentally harmful discharges affects the incentives of firms to engage in cleanup and invest in precautions, as well as the incentives of consumers to purchase the goods whose production leads to discharges. Our main conclusion is that making firms responsible for cleanup and strictly liable for any remaining harm will lead to the socially optimal outcome. We also show that under the negligence approach -- whereby a firm is liable for damages only if it fails to take appropriate precautions or to engage in proper cleanup -- the outcome will not be optimal: too much of the good will be purchased.","PeriodicalId":241681,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Organizations & Markets: Firms & Other Social Institutions (Topic)","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1992-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131477154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}