{"title":"Derivatives in the Wake of Disintermediation: A Simultaneous Equations Model of Commercial and Industrial Lending and the Use of Derivatives by US Banks","authors":"Dawood Ashraf, J. Goddard","doi":"10.1504/IJBAAF.2012.051618","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1504/IJBAAF.2012.051618","url":null,"abstract":"Before the financial crisis of 2007-2009, the search for new revenue and profit streams by US banks contributed to a long-term trend towards disintermediation. Trading in derivatives might offer an alternative to traditional deposit-taking and lending business as a source of revenue and profit; or it might enable banks to increase their lending more rapidly, through improved risk management. A simultaneous equations model is developed for the growth in commercial and industrial lending, and the use of derivatives. Lending by derivatives users grew more slowly on average, and the likelihood of using derivatives was inversely related to the growth of lending. This suggests the use of derivatives was a substitute for traditional lending business. Dealing in derivatives creates new forms of systemic risk through complex and opaque patterns of exposure. The empirical results suggest a continuing need for careful regulatory oversight, and more transparent disclosure of banks' derivatives exposures.","PeriodicalId":241446,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic)","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130098746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The European Deposit Guarantee Directive: An Appraisal of the Reforms","authors":"Dalvinder Singh, David K. Walker","doi":"10.4324/9781003122876-10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003122876-10","url":null,"abstract":"The international financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 exposed some crucial deficiencies in the European deposit protection arrangements as set out in the 1994 Directive. The recent financial turmoil once again highlighted the importance of deposit protection to contribute to financial stability and reduce the risk of depositor panic as banks experience problems. The crisis concomitantly exposed the cross-border risks in the EU’s integrated financial marketplace.This chapter explores the rationale behind deposit protection to safeguard financial stability and protect depositors. It will review the introduction of deposit protection in the EU and particularly explore the limits of its ‘model’ in light of the wider literature on deposit protection. The reform to the 1994 Directive was introduced in March 2009. 1 The principal conclusion is while the 2009 reforms have abolished co-insurance, increased the coverage level and reduced the delay in reimbursements, they have not dealt with some of the underlying issues that underpin the efficiency with which these reforms can ultimately be satisfied, namely how the Member states will formally fund their deposit protection schemes to meet any proposed payout. Moreover, the lack of consideration of this means Member states will still need to intervene in future crises to bridge the gap.","PeriodicalId":241446,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114617676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How the Crisis Has Changed the Economic Policy Paradigm","authors":"Scott T. Fullwiler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1658234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1658234","url":null,"abstract":"In the midst of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, policy makers in the U. S. and in other nations have reduced interest rates, expanded central bank balance sheets, increased deficits to levels generally not seen since World War II, and begun seriously rethinking financial regulation. This may come as no surprise to any student of macroeconomics prior to, say, the 1980s. However, the current crisis follows a period during which the vast majority of economists had come to a consensus (referred to by economists and hereafter in this paper as the “New Consensus”) regarding macroeconomic and regulatory policy, while the policy initiatives undertaken since the crisis began are almost entirely, and often violently, at odds with most of the New Consensus. This has led at the very least the return of some previously spirited debates that most might have thought had been settled. For now, at least, it appears that most economists fall into two different camps: the first group considers the current crisis to be a one-time “shock” after which policy can return to “normal”; the second group, on the other hand, is highly critical of the first group and of policy makers for deviating from the New Consensus. Finally there are others, some of them high-ranking members of the “consensus” view, who suggest that nearly everything needs to be rethought. The purpose of this paper is to describe some of these re-opened debates being driven by the current crisis, and then also to present the foundations of an alternative macroeconomic paradigm backed by some economists and economic research institutes that coherently incorporates the current crisis as well as the impact of current and proposed policy responses, which the previous consensus does not.","PeriodicalId":241446,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic)","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129271790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Early Warning System for Contagious Currency Crisis","authors":"Gongpil Choi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2524237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2524237","url":null,"abstract":"Despite widespread skepticism concerning the feasibility of building an EWS for the currency crisis, our empirical evidence suggests that the prudent monitoring of the contagion effect as well as key macroeconomic and financial variables is an essential measure to guard against the fragile nature of creditor panic, which can easily trigger a crisis phenomenon. While fundamentals matter for determining the vulnerability of an economy against various shocks, the contagion proved to be important in precipitating crises dynamics through various links. As such, the degree of vulnerability and the relative importance of various channels suggested for contagion are important to understand the shock-propagation mechanism in the Asian region. In this paper, we investigate the role of contagion in explaining currency crises in terms of the contagion vulnerability index. Incorporating this additional piece of information would allow us to expect improvements in the predictability of an EWS. Predicting exogenous shocks would be an impossible task, but measuring vulnerability to contagious currency crises can be done with reasonable accuracy.","PeriodicalId":241446,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic)","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129965113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ролята На Торнтън и Багехот За Развитието На Концепцията За Кредитор От Последна Инстанция (The Role of Thornton and Bagehot Development of the Concept of Lender of Last Resort)","authors":"Bojidar V. Bojinov","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2789759","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2789759","url":null,"abstract":"Bulgarian Abstract: В статията се разглежда появата и еволюцията на концепцията \"кредитор от последна инстанция\".English Abstract: The article examines the emergence and evolution of the concept of \"lender of last resort\".","PeriodicalId":241446,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115834904","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Quantitative Easing, Portfolio Rebalancing and Credit Growth: Micro Evidence from Germany","authors":"Johannes Tischer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3234184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3234184","url":null,"abstract":"This paper sheds light on the effect of quantitative easing (QE) on bank lending. Using data on German banks for 2014-2016, I show that QE encourages banks to rebalance from securities to loans. For identification, I use bond redemptions as exogenous variation in banks' need to rebalance their portfolio and hence their exposure to QE. I find that more exposed banks increase their loan growth during QE relative to other banks. The growth differential is larger when bond market yields decrease stronger than loan market yields and for banks with equity constraints. These results imply that QE can affect bank lending even if banks do not hold assets purchased under the QE program, by increasing incentives to invest in higher-yield assets.","PeriodicalId":241446,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic)","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123646277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}