PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic)最新文献_第4页

PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2537491

F. Bianchi, Leonardo Melosi

引用次数: 142

The Euro-Crisis and the Courts: Judicial Review and the Political Process in Comparative Perspective 欧元危机与法院:比较视角下的司法审查与政治进程

PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2328060

F. Fabbrini

{"title":"The Euro-Crisis and the Courts: Judicial Review and the Political Process in Comparative Perspective","authors":"F. Fabbrini","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2328060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2328060","url":null,"abstract":"The Euro-crisis and the legal responses to it have profoundly changed the constitutional architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) leading to the introduction of tighter budgetary rules, new mechanisms of financial stabilization and a comprehensive framework of economic adjustment for states in fiscal troubles. Yet, during the last years, the legal measures enacted by the European Union (EU) and the member states to respond to the crisis have increasingly fell prey to the scrutiny of courts, both at the national and supranational level. This paper provides a first comprehensive analysis of decisions by high courts in Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Portugal and the EU with the aim to discuss the role of the judiciary in fiscal affairs. The paper identifies a trend of increasing judicial involvement in EMU and explains it in light of the intergovernmental approach followed to respond to the Euro-crisis. As the paper argues, the choice of an intergovernmental management of the crisis, with frequent resort to international agreements outside the framework of EU law, has paradoxically produced greater judicialization than what would have occurred had the member states acted within the EU legal order. As the paper suggests, though, constitutional arguments related to expertise, voice and rights still plead in favor of letting the political branches take the lead in fiscal affairs. Hence, the paper concludes by indicating that future reforms of the EMU should be carried out through EU legislation – which is more legitimate in democratic terms (because of the political guarantees that surround law-making in the EU) and more secure in judicial terms (because of the more limited space for judicial overreach). Yet, the paper also underlines how the EU political process needs urgently to be reformed in order to improve its legitimacy and democracy.","PeriodicalId":241446,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128486667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 48

Economic Uncertainty and the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy 经济不确定性与货币政策有效性

PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2353008

K. Aastveit, G. Natvik, S. Sola

引用次数: 147

Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Risks: An Example 货币政策与金融稳定风险:一个例子

PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-05-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2303887

J. Clouse

引用次数: 8

Early Warning for Currency Crises: What is the Role of Financial Openness? 货币危机预警:金融开放的作用是什么?

PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-03-12 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2232014

Jon Frost, Ayako Saiki

引用次数: 20

Arresting Financial Crises: The Fed Versus the Classicals 遏制金融危机:美联储与古典主义

PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-02-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2212175

T. M. Humphrey

{"title":"Arresting Financial Crises: The Fed Versus the Classicals","authors":"T. M. Humphrey","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2212175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2212175","url":null,"abstract":"Nineteenth-century British economists Henry Thornton and Walter Bagehot established the classical rules of behavior for a central bank, acting as lender of last resort, seeking to avert panics and crises: Lend freely (to temporarily illiquid but solvent borrowers only) against the security of sound collateral and at above-market, penalty interest rates. Deny aid to unsound, insolvent borrowers. Preannounce your commitment to lend freely in all future panics. Also lend for short periods only, and have a clear, simple, certain exit strategy. The purpose is to prevent bank runs and money-stock collapses--collapses that, by reducing spending and prices, will, in the face of downward inflexibility of nominal wages, produce falls in output and employment. In the financial crisis of 2008-09 the Federal Reserve adhered to some of the classical rules--albeit using a credit-easing rather than a money stockâ€“protection rationale--while deviating from others. Consistent with the classicals, the Fed filled the market with liquidity while lending to a wide variety of borrowers on an extended array of assets. But it departed from the classical prescription in charging subsidy rather than penalty rates, in lending against tarnished collateral and/or purchasing assets of questionable value, in bailing out insolvent borrowers, in extending its lending deadlines beyond intervals approved by classicals, and in failing both to precommit to avert all future crises and to articulate an unambiguous exit strategy. Given that classicals demonstrated that satiating panic-induced demands for cash are sufficient to end crises, the Fed might think of abandoning its costly and arguably inessential deviations from the classical model and, instead, return to it.","PeriodicalId":241446,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126298250","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Policy Transmissions, External Imbalances, and Their Impacts: Cross-Country Evidence from BRICS 政策传导、外部失衡及其影响:来自金砖国家的跨国证据

PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1619463

Ruo Chen, Chunming Yuan

引用次数: 18

A (Voluntary) Offer They Can't Refuse: Restructuring Italy's Sovereign Debt 一个他们无法拒绝的(自愿)提议:重组意大利主权债务

PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-06-07 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2079715

Melissa Boudreau, M. McGuire, Logan Starr, Andrew Yates

引用次数: 0

The Global Financial Crisis and Resilience of the Thai Banking Sector 全球金融危机与泰国银行业的韧性

PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2001152

B. Nidhiprabha

引用次数: 9

QE3, Treasury Style - Go Around, Not Over the Debt Ceiling Limit QE3，财政部风格——绕圈子，不要超过债务上限

PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-07-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1883083

Scott T. Fullwiler

引用次数: 0