QE3, Treasury Style - Go Around, Not Over the Debt Ceiling Limit

Scott T. Fullwiler
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Abstract

The debt ceiling debate could be ended right now given that the US Constitution bestows upon the US Treasury the authority to mint coins. Further, this simple change would lift the veil on how current monetary operations work and thereby demonstrate clearly that a currency-issuing government under flexible exchange rates cannot be forced into default against its will and is not beholden to “vigilante” bond markets. This paper provides a description of how the process would work and the implications for monetary operations.
QE3,财政部风格——绕圈子,不要超过债务上限
鉴于美国宪法赋予美国财政部铸造硬币的权力,有关债务上限的辩论现在可以结束了。此外,这一简单的改变将揭开当前货币操作如何运作的面纱,从而清楚地表明,在灵活汇率下,货币发行政府不会被迫违背自己的意愿违约,也不会对“义务警察”债券市场负有责任。本文描述了这一过程是如何运作的,以及对货币操作的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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