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PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic)最新文献

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Fiscal versus Monetary Stimulus: What Works? 财政刺激与货币刺激:哪个有效?
PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-09-30 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3045783
Rajarshi Ghosh
{"title":"Fiscal versus Monetary Stimulus: What Works?","authors":"Rajarshi Ghosh","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3045783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3045783","url":null,"abstract":"Actually both together work and can bring an economy on growth path, but general preference is towards Monetary Policy, because there is already a ‘Fiscal Overhang’ in the system. To satisfy interest groups, Governments across the world run Fiscal Deficits and hit the ceiling quickly, the ceiling which keeps inflation within control. But only when they raise the ceiling further and along with monetary policy, the economy turns around from recession or stagnation to growth. This only implies that there is still leakage in the system, in spite of best efforts in targeted spending.","PeriodicalId":241446,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic)","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131899945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Optimal Currency Area and European Monetary Membership: Economics and Political Economy 最优货币区与欧洲货币成员:经济学与政治经济学
PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-09-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3031786
D. Masciandaro, Davide Romelli
{"title":"Optimal Currency Area and European Monetary Membership: Economics and Political Economy","authors":"D. Masciandaro, Davide Romelli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3031786","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3031786","url":null,"abstract":"The recent Global Crisis are posing challenges to the stability of the European Monetary Integration process. The pillar of the European Monetary Integration is the evolution of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Being the EMU the establishment of a currency union, such as international agreement implies for the member countries the inability to use exchange rates and national monetary policy to deal with real and financial shocks. It is natural then to wonder under which conditions the net benefits of a currency union are likely to be positive, comparing the abovementioned limitations with the medium long term gains in having on the one side perpetual fixed exchange rates and on the other side the delegation of the monetary policy action to an independent and supranational central bank, i.e. the European Central Bank (ECB) that manages the European Monetary Union (EMU). A natural question arises: how to evaluate the economic pros and cons in having the EMU membership? The aim of this paper is to analyse the economics and the political economy of the EMU membership.","PeriodicalId":241446,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128717483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Quantitative Easing and the Price-Liquidity Trade-Off 量化宽松与价格-流动性权衡
PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic) Pub Date : 2017-02-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2917294
M. Ferdinandusse, Maximilian Freier, Annukka Ristiniemi, Annukka Ristiniemi
{"title":"Quantitative Easing and the Price-Liquidity Trade-Off","authors":"M. Ferdinandusse, Maximilian Freier, Annukka Ristiniemi, Annukka Ristiniemi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2917294","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2917294","url":null,"abstract":"We present a search theoretic model of over-the-counter debt with quantitative easing (QE). The impact of central bank asset purchases on yields depend on market tightness, which is determined by shares of preferred habitat investors. The model predicts that the impact of government bond purchases is higher in countries with a higher share of preferred habitat investors. Furthermore, there is a trade-off with liquidity, which is not present in other models of QE. We present a new index for the share of preferred habitat investors holding government bonds in Eurozone countries, based on the ECB's securities and holdings statistics, which we use to match the impact of QE on the observed yield changes in data and to test our model.","PeriodicalId":241446,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133328975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17
Dealing with Quantitative Easing Spillovers in East Asia: The Role of Institutions and Macroprudential Policy 应对东亚地区量化宽松溢出效应:制度和宏观审慎政策的作用
PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-10-21 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2892553
Ayako Saiki, P. Chantapacdepong, Ulrich Volz
{"title":"Dealing with Quantitative Easing Spillovers in East Asia: The Role of Institutions and Macroprudential Policy","authors":"Ayako Saiki, P. Chantapacdepong, Ulrich Volz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2892553","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2892553","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the impact of advanced countries’ quantitative easing on emerging market economies (EMEs) and how macroprudential policy and good governance play a role in preventing potential financial vulnerabilities. We used confidential locational bank statistics data from the Bank for International Settlements to examine whether quantitative easing has caused an appreciation of EMEs’ currencies and how it has done so, and whether this has in turn boosted foreign-currency borrowing, thus making EMEs vulnerable to balance sheet and maturity mismatch problems. While focusing our analysis on East Asian economies, we compare them with Latin American economies, which were also major recipients of quantitative easing capital inflows. We found that government effectiveness plays an important role in curbing excessive borrowing when the exchange rate is overvalued.","PeriodicalId":241446,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122877865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Estimating Monetary Policy Rules When Nominal Interest Rates Are Stuck at Zero 估计名义利率为零时的货币政策规则
PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-09-06 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2312821
Jinill Kim, Seth Pruitt
{"title":"Estimating Monetary Policy Rules When Nominal Interest Rates Are Stuck at Zero","authors":"Jinill Kim, Seth Pruitt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2312821","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2312821","url":null,"abstract":"Did the Federal Reserve's response to economic fundamentals change with the onset of the Global Financial Crisis? Estimation of a monetary policy rule to answer this question faces a censoring problem since the interest rate target has been set at the zero lower bound since late 2008. Surveys by forecasters allow us to sidestep the problem and to use conventional regressions and break tests. We find that, in the opinion of forecasters, the Fed's inflation response has decreased and the unemployment response has increased, which suggests that the Federal Reserve's commitment to stable inflation has become weaker in the eyes of the professional forecasters.","PeriodicalId":241446,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124966854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 15
Can a Bank Run Be Stopped? Government Guarantees and the Run on Continental Illinois 银行挤兑能被阻止吗?政府担保和伊利诺伊大陆的挤兑
PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-02-03 DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2016.003
M. Carlson, J. Rose
{"title":"Can a Bank Run Be Stopped? Government Guarantees and the Run on Continental Illinois","authors":"M. Carlson, J. Rose","doi":"10.17016/FEDS.2016.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2016.003","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the run on Continental Illinois in 1984. We find that the run slowed but did not stop following an extraordinary government intervention, which included the guarantee of all liabilities of the bank and a commitment to provide ongoing liquidity support. Continental's outflows were driven by a broad set of US and foreign financial institutions. These were large, sophisticated creditors with holdings far in excess of the insurance limit. During the initial run, creditors with relatively liquid balance sheets nevertheless withdrew more than other creditors, likely reflecting low tolerance to hold illiquid assets. In addition, smaller and more-distant creditors were more likely to withdraw. In the second and more drawn out phase of the run, institutions with relative large exposures to Continental were more likely to withdraw, reflecting a general unwillingness to have an outsized exposure to a troubled institution even in the absence of credit risk. Finally, we show that the concentration of holdings of Continental's liabilities was a key dynamic in the run and was importantly linked to Continental's systemic importance.","PeriodicalId":241446,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127295231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Adjustment Programs in Euro Countries: Why Ireland Succeeded While Greece Failed 欧元区国家的调整计划:为什么爱尔兰成功而希腊失败
PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-10-15 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2674818
A. Mateus
{"title":"Adjustment Programs in Euro Countries: Why Ireland Succeeded While Greece Failed","authors":"A. Mateus","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2674818","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2674818","url":null,"abstract":"At the close of the global financial crises, Greece, Ireland and Portugal, and later Spain, experienced severe economic and financial crises. This paper compares the adjustment programs undertaken by the four countries. The sudden-stop of capital flows led to substantial official assistance by the EU, ECB and IMF estimated at 1.4 Trillion Euros which demonstrated the solidarity among EU countries. The crises established other records: Ireland had one of the costliest banking crises and Greece a depression. We will discuss which factors – program design, structure of the economy, institutional and political capabilities and Government implementation capacity – contributed to the success of Ireland and the difficulties of Greece, with intermediate cases like Portugal and Spain. Contrary to a number of economists, the adjustment programs in these countries were largely in accordance with previous programs or with overall IMF experience, except for Greece. We discuss why this was a special case and the factors that contributed to the failure of the previous two adjustment programs. The lessons drawn for the future are in sharp contrast with most “official” reports, by emphasizing the role of “common factors” versus idiosyncratic factors in the Euro zone, problems caused by procrastination in adopting the programs, lack of program ownership, the difficulties of simultaneous contractionary policies of the core, the importance of expectations formation and the role of targeted credit policies. We also criticize the lack of substantive supply policies, like innovation and resource switching policies that could have speeded-up adjustment and mitigated the impact on potential growth.","PeriodicalId":241446,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124675236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Power of Opinion: More Evidence of a GIPS-Markup in Sovereign Ratings During the Euro Crisis 意见的力量:欧元危机期间主权评级中gips加价的更多证据
PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2655947
Steffen Nauhaus
{"title":"The Power of Opinion: More Evidence of a GIPS-Markup in Sovereign Ratings During the Euro Crisis","authors":"Steffen Nauhaus","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2655947","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2655947","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines whether the Big Three credit rating agencies actually played as active a role in the Euro Crisis as previously asserted. On the basis of panel data methods for a set of 11 EMU countries, the analysis reveals significant evidence for an arbitrary markup on the GIPS group of countries across agencies. This markup, which ranges from 1.5 notches for Moody’s to 2.2 notches for S&P, suggests that GIPS countries were treated worse than other EMU members since the start of the Eurozone crisis in 2009, irrespective of economic and institutional fundamentals. A subsequent analysis of the markup’s effect on yield spreads shows that this markup had significant effects on financial markets, leading to risk premiums for these countries of up to 1.6 points.","PeriodicalId":241446,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114532795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Was the Cyprus Crisis Banking or Sovereign Debt? 塞浦路斯危机是银行危机还是主权债务危机?
PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-12-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2536727
Efrosyni Panayi, S. Zenios
{"title":"Was the Cyprus Crisis Banking or Sovereign Debt?","authors":"Efrosyni Panayi, S. Zenios","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2536727","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2536727","url":null,"abstract":"The complexity of the Cyprus crisis makes answering the question of the title difficult, while the policy implications make the question important. However, the answer to this question unavoidably points the finger to those responsible, and as a result the quest for an answer is clouted by political considerations. In this paper we use a systematic analysis of the data to find answers. Relying on literature of Early Warning Systems we build a model to determine: (1) When did it become apparent that the Cyprus economy was headed for a crisis, and (2) Could the crisis have been averted if either public finances or banking sector balance sheets were managed differently? The results show, first, that there were indeed early warning signals for the crisis. These came as early as 2009-2010, much before the Cyprus sovereign was cutoff from international markets. Second, there were signals for a banking crisis starting in 2009-2010, and signals for a sovereign debt crisis starting in 2010-2011. Both sovereign and banks were headed for a crisis, independently of each other, although, of course confounding factors were also present.","PeriodicalId":241446,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic)","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131971211","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
From Karlsruhe, with Love? Questioning the Constitutionality of Unconventional Monetary Policy 来自卡尔斯鲁厄，带着爱?质疑非常规货币政策的合宪性
PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic) Pub Date : 2014-10-31 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2524349
Michael A. Wilkinson
{"title":"From Karlsruhe, with Love? Questioning the Constitutionality of Unconventional Monetary Policy","authors":"Michael A. Wilkinson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2524349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2524349","url":null,"abstract":"Does the European Central Bank (ECB) have a mandate to do ‘whatever it takes’ to save the Euro? Not according to the German Constitutional Court, which in February this year delivered its judgment from Karlsruhe on the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions programme (OMT). Will the European Court of Justice concur, or will it attempt to resist the might of the most powerful domestic Court in Europe?","PeriodicalId":241446,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Response to Financial Crisis (Comparative - Monetary) (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124444357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
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