银行挤兑能被阻止吗?政府担保和伊利诺伊大陆的挤兑

M. Carlson, J. Rose
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引用次数: 8

摘要

本文分析了1984年伊利诺斯州大陆州的挤兑情况。我们发现,在政府进行了非同寻常的干预后,挤兑有所放缓,但并未停止。政府干预包括为银行的所有负债提供担保,并承诺提供持续的流动性支持。大陆的资金外流是由众多美国和外国金融机构推动的。这些都是经验丰富的大型债权人,持有的资产远远超过保险限额。在最初的挤兑中,拥有相对流动性资产负债表的债权人比其他债权人撤出的资金更多,这可能反映出对持有非流动性资产的容忍度较低。此外,规模较小、距离较远的债权人更有可能退出。在挤兑的第二个、也是更漫长的阶段,持有大陆银行相对较大敞口的机构更有可能退出,这反映出即便在没有信贷风险的情况下,投资者普遍不愿对陷入困境的机构持有过大敞口。最后,我们表明,大陆集团负债的集中持有是一个关键的动态,并与大陆集团的系统重要性有重要联系。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Can a Bank Run Be Stopped? Government Guarantees and the Run on Continental Illinois
This paper analyzes the run on Continental Illinois in 1984. We find that the run slowed but did not stop following an extraordinary government intervention, which included the guarantee of all liabilities of the bank and a commitment to provide ongoing liquidity support. Continental's outflows were driven by a broad set of US and foreign financial institutions. These were large, sophisticated creditors with holdings far in excess of the insurance limit. During the initial run, creditors with relatively liquid balance sheets nevertheless withdrew more than other creditors, likely reflecting low tolerance to hold illiquid assets. In addition, smaller and more-distant creditors were more likely to withdraw. In the second and more drawn out phase of the run, institutions with relative large exposures to Continental were more likely to withdraw, reflecting a general unwillingness to have an outsized exposure to a troubled institution even in the absence of credit risk. Finally, we show that the concentration of holdings of Continental's liabilities was a key dynamic in the run and was importantly linked to Continental's systemic importance.
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