{"title":"Information Acquisition During a Dutch Auction","authors":"Paavo Miettinen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2016011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2016011","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed of their valuations with probability 1-q and can acquire information about their valuation at a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in a setting where bidders are ex ante symmetric and have independent private values. We show that, if the number of bidders is large, the Dutch auction produces more revenue than would a first price auction.","PeriodicalId":239750,"journal":{"name":"Strategy & Microeconomic Policy eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115368389","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Are Real Investment Decisions Based on Risk Adjusted Performance Measures Consistent with Maximizing Shareholder Value?","authors":"Niklas Lampenius","doi":"10.21314/JOR.2012.254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21314/JOR.2012.254","url":null,"abstract":"We show that the usage of risk adjusted performance measures (RAPM), such as the RORAC or the RARORAC, as decision criterion for real investment decisions might favor projects that do not maximize shareholder value for project selection of mutually exclusive projects. We find that RAPM based on the CVaR are in general more consistent with the NPV-criterion than RAPM based on the VaR. In addition, measures that are based on the relative (C)VaR are more consistent with the NPV-criterion than measures based on the absolute (C)VaR. Overall we find that the RARORAC based on the relative (C)VaR outperforms all evaluated RAPM in this context.","PeriodicalId":239750,"journal":{"name":"Strategy & Microeconomic Policy eJournal","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124997154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Practices of Governance and Leadership and Their Effect on Capability Development and Performance of Strategic Alliances: Results of an Empirical Study","authors":"J. Schweitzer, S. Gudergan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1480441","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1480441","url":null,"abstract":"In this study we aim to verify whether heterogeneity in alliance capability development and performance can be attributed to the use of certain intra-firm governance practices and associated leadership behaviors. We suggest that transformational leadership behavior has a significant influence on the development of dynamic capabilities and subsequent alliance performance when it co-occurs with stewardship governance, whereas transactional leadership behavior has a significant influence on the alliance when partnering firms choose principal-agent type governance. Data from 369 alliances show that the positive relationship between transformational leadership and the development of dynamic capabilities is stronger with stewardship governance, and weaker with agency governance. In the case of stewardship governance, transactional leadership behavior too is significantly associated with dynamic and operational capability development.","PeriodicalId":239750,"journal":{"name":"Strategy & Microeconomic Policy eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126047655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Rent Creation Beyond Organizational Boundaries: The Role of Governance and Leadership for Capability Development at the Inter-Organizational Level","authors":"J. Schweitzer, S. Gudergan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1480485","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1480485","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops an integrated theory and provides an illustrative example to explain the effects of governance and leadership on the development of dynamic and operational capabilities in alliances and their resultant strategic performance. We use a dynamic capability perspective to explain alliance performance and embed our argument in stewardship theory and full-range leadership theory. According to our theoretical framework, co-existing stewardship governance and transformational leadership behaviors facilitate the creation of Schumpeterian rents through dynamic capabilities, while co-existing principal-agent governance and transactional leadership behaviors affect the creation of Ricardian rents through operational capabilities in alliances. Our integrated theory implies that it is critical for alliance partners to align their governance arrangements with the leadership practiced in the alliance team in order to realize improved alliance performance.","PeriodicalId":239750,"journal":{"name":"Strategy & Microeconomic Policy eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114780383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Monopolization via Voluntary Network Effects","authors":"Adi Ayal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1426804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1426804","url":null,"abstract":"Firms strategically investing in creating (or strengthening) network effects, are engaged in actively shifting market structure. From situations where standard competition may be possible, they shift the market towards monopoly, betting on their ability to win the 'competition for the market'. In this paper I set out to explain the nature of such voluntary (as opposed to exogenously determined) network effects, and their antitrust implications. A theoretical framework is presented, distinguishing between VNE based on technology and those stemming from pricing tactics alone. The market for video game consoles exemplifies technological VNE, while cellular calling plans allow for examining price-mediated VNE. After examining in detail each of these markets and the antitrust implications of voluntary network effects of various types, a variety of additional real-world applications are presented where VNE are (or could easily be) used. Discussion of policy implications and hazards of excessively zealous regulation concludes.","PeriodicalId":239750,"journal":{"name":"Strategy & Microeconomic Policy eJournal","volume":"168 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133432459","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Revisiting the Strengths and Limitations of Regulatory Contracts in Infrastructure Industries","authors":"R. Marques, S. Berg","doi":"10.1061/(asce)is.1943-555x.0000029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce)is.1943-555x.0000029","url":null,"abstract":"This paper evaluates regulation by contract in public-private partnerships (PPPs) in infrastructure services. Although the benefits of competition for the market and of regulatory contracts are widely acknowledged, the literature indentifies several failures in their design. These ‘flaws’ are present in both developed and developing countries and arise in all types of contracts. This study analyses both short and long term contracts, focusing on purely contractual PPPs and institutionalized PPPs (mixed companies). The evidence suggests that for all kinds of contracts, the major problems tend to arise in the preparation of public tender documents: the ‘best’ bidder is not often the winner. The likely results include redistribution in favor of the private partner, weak incentives for high performance, and renegotiation of contracts. Moreover, risks are not allocated correctly nor is effective monitoring ensured. This review of contract procedures and design allows us to draw several implications for policy-makers and to present suggestions and recommendations for improving regulatory contracts.","PeriodicalId":239750,"journal":{"name":"Strategy & Microeconomic Policy eJournal","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121243261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Impact of China's Millennium Labor Restructuring Program on Firm Performance and Employee Earnings","authors":"Xiao-yuan Dong, L. Xu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1020271","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1020271","url":null,"abstract":"Around the turn of the century, China experienced perhaps the largest labour restructuring program in the world. This paper uses a new dataset of Chinese industrial enterprises to examine what leads to downsizing, and tries to understand the effects of labour downsizing on firms' technical efficiency, financial performance and employee wages. We find that downsizing is more prevalent in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and is more likely when enterprises are older, larger and have higher excess capacity. For both SOEs and private firms, downsizing is more likely when the prices of their products drop, but private firms respond more dramatically. Moreover, downsizing has serious short-term costs in terms of total factor productivity (TFP). For mild downsizing, private firms suffer more deterioration in productivity. The distribution of surplus after downsizing is more favourable to labour in SOEs. For severe downsizing, both SOEs and private firms exhibit lower TFP growth with similar magnitudes. Our findings imply that private firms emphasize profit goals, while SOEs place a greater weight on labour protection. Copyright (c) 2008 The Authors.","PeriodicalId":239750,"journal":{"name":"Strategy & Microeconomic Policy eJournal","volume":"111 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117199510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Profit Maximization and Social Optimum with Network Externality","authors":"U. Spiegel, Uri Ben-Zion, T. Tavor","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9957.2006.00485.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2006.00485.x","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a set of countries that wish to sign an international agreement to control pollution. The problem is studied from the perspective of cooperative games and three possible definitions of the characteristic function of the game are analyzed. We further address the issue of free riding and the stability of coalitions. The challenge is to find a possible reconciliation of the two approaches. In other words, we are looking for a payment function which ensures the formation and stability of a large coalition, even if we consider that different countries are playing non-cooperatively and are acting only in their own interest. Our results suggest that it is difficult to deter free riding and that no large coalition can emerge if countries decide to play non-cooperatively.","PeriodicalId":239750,"journal":{"name":"Strategy & Microeconomic Policy eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114472616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Export of National Varieties of Capitalism: The Cases of Wal-Mart and Ikea","authors":"S. Konzelmann, C. Craypo, R. Aridi, F. Wilkinson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1930862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1930862","url":null,"abstract":"'This is an excellent compendium of the ongoing research into global retailing across a range of disciplines within the social sciences. . . the collection deserves a place on the bookshelf of academics who research and teach this interesting and rapidly emerging research field.' \u0000– Steve Wood, Business History \u0000 \u0000‘Coe and Wrigley have assembled a most impressive collection of key writings on the globalization of retailing. It will be of great value to students, researchers and policymakers in this rapidly growing, and extremely important field.’ \u0000– Peter Dicken, University of Manchester, UK and author of Global Shift \u0000 \u0000This path-breaking collection, edited by two leading scholars in the field, brings together seminal contributions from the burgeoning multidisciplinary literature on the globalization of retailing. In addition to focusing on the retail corporations and their expansionary strategies, it explores the multi-faceted impacts of retail globalization on host economies and profiles the store and sourcing dimensions of transnational retail activity.","PeriodicalId":239750,"journal":{"name":"Strategy & Microeconomic Policy eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124903084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Re-Engineering Insurance Supervision","authors":"L. Savage","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-2024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-2024","url":null,"abstract":"The insurance industry is underdeveloped in many of the world's emerging markets and transition economies, sometimes because of restrictive regulations or inadequate supervision of insurance companies. Many countries are considering reforming regulation of their insurance systems and strengthening supervision. The author's analysis is designed to help them choose the program of regulation and supervision that best fits their circumstances. He draws on experience in industrial countries that have examined the reasons financial institutions failed. He concludes that the old approach to supervising the financial sector--covering a broad range of issues and devoting considerable energy to verifying data--must be replaced by a more focused approach that targets insurer solvency by getting supervisors to pay attention to management performance and business strategy. Financial supervisors in jurisdictions that have updated their systems with this approach in mind now see their main task as gauging the financial risk or risk profile of each company and allocating most of their resources to the higher-risk situations. In doing so, their objective will be to understand a firm's business strategy, to assess the firm management's competence and appetite for risk, and to assess the firm's outlook and financial viability. The author highlights the special role played in supervision by industry specialists such as the auditors and actuaries who support insurance companies. He identifies the priorities needed in the reform of insurance supervision and suggests steps needed for change--and helpful ways for officials to organize. He discusses not only issues associated with the supervision of solvency and financial strength but ways to protect consumers.","PeriodicalId":239750,"journal":{"name":"Strategy & Microeconomic Policy eJournal","volume":"143 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122851046","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}