J. Curhan, Hillary Anger Elfenbein, Noah Eisenkraft
{"title":"The Objective Value of Subjective Value: A Multi-round Negotiation Study","authors":"J. Curhan, Hillary Anger Elfenbein, Noah Eisenkraft","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.973384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.973384","url":null,"abstract":"A 2-round negotiation study provided evidence that positive feelings resulting from one negotiation can be economically rewarding in a second negotiation. Negotiators experiencing greater subjective value (SV) - that is, social, perceptual, and emotional outcomes from a negotiation - in Round 1 achieved greater individual and joint objective negotiation performance in Round 2, even with Round 1 economic outcomes controlled. Moreover, Round 1 SV predicted the desire to negotiate again with the same counterpart, whereas objective negotiation performance had no such association. Taken together, these results suggest that positive feelings, not just positive outcomes, can evoke future economic success.","PeriodicalId":239656,"journal":{"name":"MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper Series","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114571891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Madnick, Wee Horng Ang, Yang W. Lee, Dinsha Mistree, M. Siegel, D. Strong, Richard Y. Wang
{"title":"The House of Security: Stakeholder Perceptions of Security Assessment and Importance","authors":"S. Madnick, Wee Horng Ang, Yang W. Lee, Dinsha Mistree, M. Siegel, D. Strong, Richard Y. Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1012426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1012426","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we introduce a methodology for analyzing differences regarding security perceptions within and between stakeholders, and the elements which affect these perceptions. We have designed the €Uˆouse of Security€ݬ a security assessment model that provides the basic framework for considering eight different constructs of security: Vulnerability, Accessibility, Confidentiality, Technology Resources for Security, Financial Resources for Security, Business Strategy for Security, Security Policy and Procedures, and Security Culture. We designed and performed a survey of about 1500 professionals in various industries, levels, and functions resulting in a gap analysis to uncover differences (1) between the different constructs and aspects of security, (2) between different enterprise stakeholder roles, and (3) between different organizations. This paper briefly describes the development of the security constructs and some of the preliminary findings.","PeriodicalId":239656,"journal":{"name":"MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper Series","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124777164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Structured Contexts with Lightweight Ontology","authors":"Hongwei Zhu, S. Madnick","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.926605","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.926605","url":null,"abstract":"One of the challenges of dealing with multiple contexts is the significant effort required to provide all necessary lifting rules so that statements in one context can be viewed and understood in other contexts. In this paper, we introduce the notion of structured contexts, where a lightweight ontology is used to provide a structure for representing contexts. With structured contexts, specialized inference algorithms can be used to significantly reduce the number of lifting rules required. We use a semantic data integration example to illustrate the concept of structured contexts and the benefits of this novel use of lightweight ontology.","PeriodicalId":239656,"journal":{"name":"MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper Series","volume":"82 7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124028334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Adjustable Supply in Uniform-Price Auctions: The Value of Non-Commitment","authors":"David McAdams","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.657462","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.657462","url":null,"abstract":"In uniform-price auctions, the seller sometimes retains flexibility to adjust the total quantity sold after receiving the bids, or simply lacks the ability to commit to a schedule of reserve prices (or supply curve). In this paper, I show that the seller raises more revenue in equilibrium given such adjustable supply than by committing to any supply curve.","PeriodicalId":239656,"journal":{"name":"MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper Series","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115449305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Investor Protection and the Coasian View","authors":"Nittai K. Bergman, Daniel Nicolaievsky","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.517022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.517022","url":null,"abstract":"Some legal regimes leave gaps in the protection provided by the law to firm investors. This paper considers the decision by a firm to opt out of the law and bridge those gaps using contracts. Examining the charters of a sample of Mexican firms, we find that private firms often enhance significantly the protection offered by the law to their investors, but public firms rarely do so. Motivated by these findings, we construct a model that endogenizes the degree of investor protection that firms provide, using as springboard the assumption that legal regimes differ in their ability to enforce what we call precisely filtering contracts, namely, contracts that provide protection only in those cases where expropriation can occur. Our model generates predictions about the types of contracts that would be employed and the levels of investor protection that they would provide across different legal regimes in both private and in public firms.","PeriodicalId":239656,"journal":{"name":"MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper Series","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132414614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rachel T. A. Croson, K. Donohue, Elena Katok, J. Sterman
{"title":"Order Stability in Supply Chains: Coordination Risk and the Role of Coordination Stock","authors":"Rachel T. A. Croson, K. Donohue, Elena Katok, J. Sterman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.607321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.607321","url":null,"abstract":"The bullwhip effect describes the tendency for the variance of orders in supply chains to increase as one moves upstream from consumer demand. Previous research attributes this phenomenon to both operational and behavioral causes. Operational causes are features of the institutional setting that lead rational agents to amplify changes in demand, while behavioral causes arise from suboptimal decisionmaking. This paper examines causes of the bullwhip through experiments with a serial supply chain, using the Beer Distribution Game. Unlike prior studies, we control all four commonly cited operational causes of the bullwhip, including uncertainty about customer demand. We eliminate demand uncertainty completely by making customer demand constant and known to all participants. Despite these controls, order amplification, instability, and supply line underweighting remain pervasive. We propose a new behavioral cause of the bullwhip, coordination risk, that arises when players place excessive orders to address the perceived risk that others will not behave optimally. We test two strategies to mitigate coordination risk: (1) holding additional on-hand inventory, and (2) creating common knowledge by informing participants of the optimal policy. Both strategies reduce, but not eliminate, the bullwhip effect. Holding excess inventory reduces order amplification by providing a buffer against the endogenous risk of coordination failure. Such coordination stock differs from traditional safety stock, which buffers against exogenous demand uncertainty. Surprisingly, neither strategy reduces supply-line underweighting. We conclude that the bullwhip can be mitigated but its behavioral causes appear robust.","PeriodicalId":239656,"journal":{"name":"MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132529705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Heterogeneity and Network Structure in the Dynamics of Diffusion: Comparing Agent-Based and Differential Equation Models","authors":"H. Rahmandad, J. Sterman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.607302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.607302","url":null,"abstract":"When is it better to use agent-based (AB) models, and when should differential equation (DE) models be used? Whereas DE models assume homogeneity and perfect mixing within compartments, AB models can capture heterogeneity across individuals and in the network of interactions among them. AB models relax aggregation assumptions, but entail computational and cognitive costs that may limit sensitivity analysis and model scope. Because resources are limited, the costs and benefits of such disaggregation should guide the choice of models for policy analysis. Using contagious disease as an example, we contrast the dynamics of a stochastic AB model with those of the analogous deterministic compartment DE model. We examine the impact of individual heterogeneity and different network topologies, including fully connected, random, Watts-Strogatz small world, scale-free, and lattice networks. Obviously, deterministic models yield a single trajectory for each parameter set, while stochastic models yield a distribution of outcomes. More interestingly, the DE and mean AB dynamics differ for several metrics relevant to public health, including diffusion speed, peak load on health services infrastructure, and total disease burden. The response of the models to policies can also differ even when their base case behavior is similar. In some conditions, however, these differences in means are small compared to variability caused by stochastic events, parameter uncertainty, and model boundary. We discuss implications for the choice among model types, focusing on policy design. The results apply beyond epidemiology: from innovation adoption to financial panics, many important social phenomena involve analogous processes of diffusion and social contagion.","PeriodicalId":239656,"journal":{"name":"MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper Series","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121775565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ownership Biases and FDI in China: Two Provinces","authors":"Yasheng Huang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.721201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.721201","url":null,"abstract":"Jiangsu and Zhejiang are of two of China most prosperous and dynamic provinces. This paper first presents a factual account of two empirical phenomena: 1) FDI has played a more substantial role in the economic development of Jiangsu than in Zhejiang, and 2) ownership biases against domestic private firms in Jiangsu were more substantial than in Zhejiang. The paper hypothesizes that there is a connection between these two empirical phenomena. Specifically, ownership biases against domestic private firms increase preferences for FDI because FDI provides a measure of relative property rights security. Thus a biased domestic private firm has an incentive to move its assets and/or future growth opportunities to the foreign sector. The paper uses two private-sector surveys - one conducted in 1993 and the other in 2002 - to provide an empirical test of this hypothesis. Our analysis shows, controlling for a variety of firm-level attributes and industry and regional characteristics, those private firms which perceive ownership biases to be more severe are more likely to form joint ventures with foreign firms.","PeriodicalId":239656,"journal":{"name":"MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper Series","volume":"15 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123269933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why Do We Have Managers?","authors":"B. Wernerfelt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.583323","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.583323","url":null,"abstract":"Economic actors have to make lots of decisions, and the paper is based on the premise that it takes time to be involved in any one of them. Attempts to economize on decision-making time imply that groups of peers may abdicate decision-making authority to a small set of managers even though this means that the information and preferences of the uninvolved players are neglected. We find that players are more likely to be managers if they have better information and more representative, but stronger, preferences. The possibility of ex post intervention may force managers to take the preferences of others into account and can lead to smaller management teams. On the other hand, the threat of intervention may reduce managers' incentives to use their private information. We proceed to suggest that the argument may explain employees' willingness to let their bosses decide, and thus throw some light on the theory of the firm.","PeriodicalId":239656,"journal":{"name":"MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper Series","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123557158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Symmetry Points of a Convex Set: Basic Properties and Computational Complexity","authors":"A. Belloni, R. Freund","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.574084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.574084","url":null,"abstract":"Given a convex body S and a point x in S, let sym(x,S) denote the symmetry value of x in S: sym(x,S):= max{t : x + t(x - y) is in S for every y in S}, which essentially measures how symmetric S is about the point x, and define sym(S):=max{sym(x,S) : x in S}. We call x* a symmetry point of S if x* achieves the above supremum. These symmetry measures are all invariant under invertible affine transformation and/or change in norm, and so are of interest in the study of the geometry of convex sets. In this study we demonstrate various properties of sym(x,S), including relations with convex geometry quantities like volume, distance and diameter, and cross-ratio distance. When S is polyhedral of the form {x : Ax","PeriodicalId":239656,"journal":{"name":"MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper Series","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130829052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}