Health Care Delivery & Financing最新文献

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The Effect of an Employer Health Insurance Mandate on Health Insurance Coverage and the Demand for Labor: Evidence from Hawaii 雇主健康保险授权对健康保险覆盖范围和劳动力需求的影响:来自夏威夷的证据
Health Care Delivery & Financing Pub Date : 2011-04-01 DOI: 10.1257/POL.3.4.25
T. Buchmueller, John E. Dinardo, Robert G. Valletta
{"title":"The Effect of an Employer Health Insurance Mandate on Health Insurance Coverage and the Demand for Labor: Evidence from Hawaii","authors":"T. Buchmueller, John E. Dinardo, Robert G. Valletta","doi":"10.1257/POL.3.4.25","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/POL.3.4.25","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past few decades, policy makers have considered employer mandates as a strategy for stemming the tide of declining health insurance coverage. In this paper we examine the long term effects of the only employer health insurance mandate that has ever been enforced in the United States, Hawaii's Prepaid Health Care Act, using a standard supply-demand framework and Current Population Survey data covering the years 1979 to 2005. During this period, the coverage gap between Hawaii and other states increased, as did real health insurance costs, implying a rising burden of the mandate on Hawaii's employers. We use a variant of the traditional permutation (placebo) test across all states to examine the magnitude and statistical properties of these growing coverage differences and their impacts on labor market outcomes, conditional on an extensive set of covariates. As expected, the coverage gap is larger for workers who tend to have low rates of coverage in the voluntary market (primarily those with lower skills). We also find that relative wages fell in Hawaii over time, but the estimates are statistically insignificant. By contrast, a parallel analysis of workers employed fewer than 20 hours per week indicates that the law significantly increased employers' reliance on such workers in order to reduce the burden of the mandate. We find no evidence suggesting that the law reduced employment probabilities.","PeriodicalId":238933,"journal":{"name":"Health Care Delivery & Financing","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130424025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Sophistication and Insurance: Asymmetric Information, the Ability to Game the System, and Prescription Drug Insurance 复杂性与保险:信息不对称、系统博弈能力和处方药保险
Health Care Delivery & Financing Pub Date : 2010-08-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1488195
K. Ericson
{"title":"Sophistication and Insurance: Asymmetric Information, the Ability to Game the System, and Prescription Drug Insurance","authors":"K. Ericson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1488195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1488195","url":null,"abstract":"In complex insurance contracts, individuals can use sophisticated strategies to avoid out-of-pocket expenses. Sophistication and expected claims are affected by similar factors, creating a systematic positive or negative correlation between them. Depending on this correlation, sophistication can lead to advantageous or adverse selection, and selection may differ between the intensive and extensive margin. Responding to sophistication, insurers may distort contracts by making them excessively simple or complex, to reduce or magnify enrollees' ability to game the system. I show two sophisticated prescription drug-related behaviors each reduce out-of-pocket prescription drug costs by half and are strongly associated with expected claims.","PeriodicalId":238933,"journal":{"name":"Health Care Delivery & Financing","volume":"194 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124399504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Development of Scenarios for Health Expenditure in the New EU Member States: Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia 制定欧盟新成员国保健支出方案:保加利亚、爱沙尼亚、匈牙利、波兰和斯洛伐克
Health Care Delivery & Financing Pub Date : 2009-05-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1411131
S. Golinowska, A. Sowa, E. Kocot
{"title":"Development of Scenarios for Health Expenditure in the New EU Member States: Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia","authors":"S. Golinowska, A. Sowa, E. Kocot","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1411131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1411131","url":null,"abstract":"The report is a result of the Ageing, Health Status and Determinants of Health Expenditure (AHEAD) project within the EC 6th Framework programme. The objective of the research was to present the model of future health care system revenues and expenditures in selected Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) which are now the New EU Member States, and to discuss projection assumptions and results. Selected countries include Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The projections are based on methodology adopted in the International Labour Organization (ILO) Social Budget model. The projection examines impact of demographic changes and changes in health status on future (up to 2050) health expenditures. Next to it, future changes in the labour market participation and their imact on the health care system revenues are examined. Results indicate that due to demographic pressures health expenditures will increase in the next 40 years and health care systems in the NMS will face deficit. Moreover, health revenues, expenditures and deficit/surplus are slightly sensitive to possible labour market changes. Health care system reforms are required in order to balance the disequilibrium of revenues and expenditures caused by external factors (demographic and economic), and decrease the premium needed to cover expenditures. Such reforms should lead, on the one hand, to the rationing of medical services covered by public resources, and on the other, to more effective governance and management of the sector and within the sector.","PeriodicalId":238933,"journal":{"name":"Health Care Delivery & Financing","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129638248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Why Don't Docs Digitize? The Adoption of Health Information Technology in Primary Care Medicine 为什么文档不数字化?卫生信息技术在初级保健医学中的应用
Health Care Delivery & Financing Pub Date : 2009-05-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1431202
A. S. Litwin
{"title":"Why Don't Docs Digitize? The Adoption of Health Information Technology in Primary Care Medicine","authors":"A. S. Litwin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1431202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1431202","url":null,"abstract":"Reformers in the US have earmarked substantial resources towards encouraging the adoption of electronic health records (EHRs). However, studies have yet to explain why physicians resist adoption and why the investments resulting from a policy push may prove ineffective for improving the efficiency of healthcare delivery. I theorize that health information technology (IT) facilitates certain outcomes that bolster industry-level efficiency, but that the conventional, “fee-for-service” financing of primary care prevents many physicians from appropriating these benefits. Those physicians financing care delivery from a prepaid premium, on the other hand, are positioned to internalize what are otherwise external economies attendant to health IT investment. I find strong statistical support for this theory in a unique panel of US-practicing primary care physicians that allows us to examine health IT adoption as far back as 2001 - long before it garnered policymakers’ attention. The results imply that reformers should focus not on encouraging health IT adoption per se, but on reforms that enable physicians to internalize what are presently socialized benefits.","PeriodicalId":238933,"journal":{"name":"Health Care Delivery & Financing","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121351386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
A Presentation: Issues Pertaining to Part-Year and Full-Year Health Insurance Coverage Gaps 报告:有关部分年和全年健康保险覆盖差距的问题
Health Care Delivery & Financing Pub Date : 2009-04-20 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1392554
David P. Bernstein
{"title":"A Presentation: Issues Pertaining to Part-Year and Full-Year Health Insurance Coverage Gaps","authors":"David P. Bernstein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1392554","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1392554","url":null,"abstract":"This presentation uses MEPS data to compare and assess the part-year and full-year uninsured rates for different age groups. Four empirical questions are considered: (1) How and why do adult and child part-year and full-year insurance coverage rates and trends differ? (2) How does family income of uninsured adults differ from family income of uninsured children? (3) How does the health status of young-adult uninsured individuals differ from the health status of older-adult uninsured individuals for different insurance coverage definitions and age groups? (4)How does unemployment impact the size of the part-year and full-year uninsured populations? Policy questions pertaining to these empirical results include: (1) How successful has the State Child Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) been in reducing the number of children with full-year and part-year insurance coverage gaps? (2)What are the advantages and disadvantages of focusing health reform initiatives on children versus focusing health reform initiatives on adults? (3)Are policies that help young uninsured adults likely to help older uninsured adults? (4)What policies might help reduce the uninsured rate for families who temporarily lose their job due to layoffs?","PeriodicalId":238933,"journal":{"name":"Health Care Delivery & Financing","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127283932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Who Receives Offers of Employer Sponsored Health Insurance? 哪些人会获得雇主赞助的健康保险?
Health Care Delivery & Financing Pub Date : 2008-07-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1161180
David P. Bernstein
{"title":"Who Receives Offers of Employer Sponsored Health Insurance?","authors":"David P. Bernstein","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1161180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1161180","url":null,"abstract":"In the United States, over 90% of working-age adults with insurance receive their health insurance through their employer. However, not all employers offer employer sponsored insurance (ESI). Whether or not a worker receives an ESI offer is shown to be primarily impacted by family income and the size of the worker's employer. Other variables like age, health status, attitudes towards insurance, education, and whether a spouse has an ESI offer are significant but far less important than family income. A married worker with a spouse that does not have an ESI offer is more likely to have an ESI offer than a married worker with a spouse with an ESI offer. This ability to coordinate employment opportunities is an economic advantage for two-earner couples.","PeriodicalId":238933,"journal":{"name":"Health Care Delivery & Financing","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120923496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Who Cares for the Elderly? Intrafamily Resource Allocation and Migration in Mexico 谁来照顾老人?墨西哥家庭内部资源分配与移民
Health Care Delivery & Financing Pub Date : 2008-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1151830
Francisca M. Antman
{"title":"Who Cares for the Elderly? Intrafamily Resource Allocation and Migration in Mexico","authors":"Francisca M. Antman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1151830","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1151830","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers the question of the intrafamily allocation of elderly care in the context of international migration. To address this, I take a non-cooperative view of family decision-making and estimate best response functions for individual physical and financial contributions as a function of siblings contributions. I account for the endogeneity of siblings contributions by using siblings' characteristics as instrumental variables. I find evidence that children's financial contributions function as strategic complements while their time contributions operate as strategic substitutes, suggesting that giving may be based on both strategic bequest and public good motivations. In addition, the results from a simulation generating an exogenous switch in child's migrant status show a decrease in time and potentially even financial contributions for elderly parents.","PeriodicalId":238933,"journal":{"name":"Health Care Delivery & Financing","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127515123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Sixty Years On - Who Cares for the NHS? 60年过去了——谁关心NHS?
Health Care Delivery & Financing Pub Date : 2008-06-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1207325
H. Evans
{"title":"Sixty Years On - Who Cares for the NHS?","authors":"H. Evans","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1207325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1207325","url":null,"abstract":"Politicians will go to any lengths to persuade the voting public that the National Health Service is safe in their hands. Alternative policy models cannot be placed before the electorate unless political parties take huge risks. Yet, at the same time, we see even a Labour government drawing private finance into the health service and giving patients rights to use the private sector. This groundbreaking new study shows that, although politicians do not feel confident in proposing radical new models of healthcare, elite opinion in the media, in political circles, in academia and in policy think tanks has fallen out of love with the idea of a centrally planned health service provided and financed by government. Elite opinion does not, as yet, warm to a free market in healthcare. Although aspects of a market-based system are accepted, ideas of 'market failure' loom large - especially amongst the political class. Nevertheless, the author shows how some groups of opinion formers are prepared to be more radical. These groups, she believes, may in time be effective in promoting a vision of a market in healthcare that is free from government interference and from the stifling power of government-granted professional monopolies.","PeriodicalId":238933,"journal":{"name":"Health Care Delivery & Financing","volume":"413 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123864895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Collusion in the Private Health Insurance Market: Empirical Evidence for Chile 私人健康保险市场的合谋:智利的经验证据
Health Care Delivery & Financing Pub Date : 2008-05-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1149928
Claudio A. Agostini, Eduardo H. Saavedra, M. Willington
{"title":"Collusion in the Private Health Insurance Market: Empirical Evidence for Chile","authors":"Claudio A. Agostini, Eduardo H. Saavedra, M. Willington","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1149928","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1149928","url":null,"abstract":"In September 2005, the Chilean Competition Authority filed a complaint against the 5 largest private health insurance providers for violation of antitrust laws. The 5 providers were accused of colluding to reduce the coverage of the plans offered to customers between March 2002 and March 2003. The main fact is that during that period these 5 providers reduced the coverage offered from 100% for hospitalization and 80% for ambulatory care to 90% and 70% respectively. As usual the observation of parallel conduct is not enough to infer collusion and it is required to observe additional factors that allow us to reject the hypothesis of providers behaving competitively. In this paper, we show that some specific characteristics of the health insurance markets generate barriers to entry and switching costs that allow the possibility of a collusive agreement. Then, we adapt an imperfect competition model of product differentiation to derive some testable propositions that allow us to distinguish between competition and collusion outcomes in the health insurance market in Chile. Finally, we show econometric evidence consistent with a collusive agreement among the 5 largest providers and inconsistent with a competitive equilibrium. . In particular, by comparing the prosecuted and non-prosecuted open Isapres before and during the collusive period, we show that sales efforts of the accused Isapres were reduced during the transition period toward lower-quality plans, that the profitability of the two groups of Isapres increased, and that the rate of transfers within the group of accused Isapres fell during the transition period.","PeriodicalId":238933,"journal":{"name":"Health Care Delivery & Financing","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132311342","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
External Referencing and Pharmaceutical Price Negotiation 外部参考和药品价格谈判
Health Care Delivery & Financing Pub Date : 2008-05-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1168822
B. Mariñoso, I. Jelovac, Pau Olivella
{"title":"External Referencing and Pharmaceutical Price Negotiation","authors":"B. Mariñoso, I. Jelovac, Pau Olivella","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1168822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1168822","url":null,"abstract":"External referencing (ER) imposes a price cap for pharmaceuticals, based on prices of identical or comparable products in foreign countries. Suppose a foreign country (F) negotiates prices with a pharmaceutical firm, whereas a home country (H) can either negotiate prices independently or implement ER, based on the foreign price. We show that country H prefers ER if copayments in H are relatively high. This preference is reinforced when H's population is small. Irrespective of relative country sizes, ER by country H harms country F. Our model is inspired by the wide European experience with this cost-containment policy. Namely, in Europe, drug authorization and price negotiations are carried out by separate agencies. We confirm our main results in two extensions. The first one allows for therapeutic competition between drugs. In the second one, drug authorization and price negotiation take place in a single agency.","PeriodicalId":238933,"journal":{"name":"Health Care Delivery & Financing","volume":"535 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127345883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
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