SRPN: Carbon Trading (Politics) (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Are Emissions Trading Schemes a Pathway to Enhancing Transparency under the Paris Agreement?","authors":"Ling Chen","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3049064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3049064","url":null,"abstract":"The Paris Agreement (PA) provides the foundation and future for global carbon markets that country Parties can embrace to realize their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) in a transparent manner. The agreement references transparency throughout its text with article 13 specifically establishing an enhanced and flexible transparency framework. This framework requires all Parties to regularly submit a national greenhouse gas (GHG) inventory, provide information on progress in implementing and achieving their NDCs, as well as subject themselves to both expert and peer-to-peer review. Cooperative approaches in article 6.2 also offer a good opportunity for internationally transferred mitigation outcomes to be used by Parties to achieve their NDCs in a manner that ensures environmental integrity and enhances transparency.<br> <br>More discussions have focused on carbon markets as a pathway to reducing GHG emissions while generating economic, political, and strategic benefits. This Article further frames the argument that market-based approaches such as emissions trading schemes (ETSs) can also advance the transparency objectives of the PA. Insights are offered into how developing ETSs can promote transparency in tracking GHG emissions. I analyze some features of ETSs, especially their capacity building processes that can benefit the PA’s transparency framework. I also explore how linking transboundary ETSs can improve climate data reporting and facilitate information sharing on global climate action and progress.","PeriodicalId":237010,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Carbon Trading (Politics) (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129491112","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Ground Rules for Effective OBAs: Principles for Addressing Carbon-Pricing Competitiveness Concerns through the Use of Output-Based Allocations","authors":"S. Dobson, G. Fellows, Trevor Tombe, J. Winter","doi":"10.11575/SPPP.V10I0.42633","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11575/SPPP.V10I0.42633","url":null,"abstract":"The federal government’s decision to impose a minimum national price on carbon emissions has the potential to make certain businesses in the country less competitive. Specifically, there are emissions-intensive and trade-exposed industries across Canada that compete against producers from other jurisdictions where governments do not put a price on carbon. For these industries, the obligation to pay a carbon price creates a competitive disadvantage. Specifically, these businesses will face higher costs and may encounter a loss of market share to international competitors from jurisdictions that lack the same emission-control measures. That not only hurts Canadian businesses, it could also negate any emissions reductions that carbon pricing in Canada achieves on a global scale. The federal government has opted to protect such emissions-intensive, tradeexposed businesses using subsidies called output-based allocations (OBAs). This is the same system that Alberta is introducing through its forthcoming Carbon Competiveness Regulation. It also shares certain similarities with cap-and-trade programs, such as those in Ontario and Quebec, which provide free allocations of emissions permits to certain firms. OBAs are a desirable complementary policy to a carbon price as they maintain the incentive for producers to invest in production methods and facilities that are less emissions intensive. So while producers are still, nevertheless, subsidized to offset the tax burden of the carbon price, they will, under an OBA system, see greater benefits the more they work to reduce their emissions intensity. Still, to function most effectively and most efficiently, an OBA policy should follow certain key principles. The most critical principle in the design of an OBA policy is ensuring that OBAs are allocated to facilities independent of their individual emission levels, and allocated equally (on a per unit basis) to facilities producing the same product. One of the major flaws with Alberta’s current Specified Gas Emitters Regulation (SGER) is that it does not follow this principle. Rather, subsidies under SGER are allocated based on a facility’s historical emissions intensity. As a result, more generous subsidies are given to those facilities that are “dirtier” (that is, those with higher emissions intensities) than to “cleaner” facilities with lower emission intensities. Secondly, it is important for a well-designed OBA policy to have transparent costs. Including a clear accounting of OBAs in government finance reports will ensure the public is fully aware of the revenues being directed to the subsidies. Thirdly, OBAs for different facilities are best allocated using a classification system based on the product being produced, and not using more conventional industry-classification codes. Commonly used conventional industry classifications—for example, conventional oil and natural gas extraction—group together facilities that produce distinct products and compete i","PeriodicalId":237010,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Carbon Trading (Politics) (Topic)","volume":"99 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126253531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Window of Opportunity for GMO Regulation: Achieving Food Integrity Through Cap-and-Trade Models from Climate Policy for GMO Regulation","authors":"G. Steier","doi":"10.58948/0738-6206.1804","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.58948/0738-6206.1804","url":null,"abstract":"GMOs are the links of our centralized food system, largely dependent on international trade. GMOs are inherently unsustainable because they reduce biodiversity, harm the environment, and empower positive feedback loops between monocultures, industrial agriculture, and biodiversity depletion, thereby jeopardizing food safety, security, and sovereignty. Conglomerates of multi-national companies, in short BigAg, shape multi-lateral food trade and flood international markets with their small array and enormous volumes of crops, while controlling large aspects of agriculture and food production world-wide. Zooming in on the trans-Atlantic dispute about GE crops, this paper uses comparative law to explore how a cap-and-trade model borrowed from climate change policy might help to decentralize the current food system, thereby potentially restoring locally-oriented agriculture and food integrity.","PeriodicalId":237010,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Carbon Trading (Politics) (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123825902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Cash for Carbon: A Randomized Controlled Trial of Payments for Ecosystem Services to Reduce Deforestation","authors":"S. Jayachandran, Joost de Laat, E. Lambin, Charlotte Stanton","doi":"10.3386/w22378","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w22378","url":null,"abstract":"This paper evaluates a Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) program in western Uganda that offered forest-owning households cash payments if they conserved their forest. The program was implemented as a randomized trial in 121 villages, 60 of which received the program for two years. The PES program reduced deforestation and forest degradation: Tree cover, measured using high-resolution satellite imagery, declined by 2% to 5% in treatment villages compared to 7% to 10% in control villages during the study period. We find no evidence of shifting of tree-cutting to nearby land. We then use the estimated effect size and the social cost of carbon to value the delayed CO2 emissions, and compare this benefit to the program's cost.","PeriodicalId":237010,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Carbon Trading (Politics) (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114061530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Permits vs. Offsets Under Investment Uncertainty","authors":"Nicolas Koch, W. Reuter, S. Fuss, Godefroy Grosjean","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2711321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2711321","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates interaction effects between permit and offset schemes, using the framework on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) as a test bed for evaluating the cost and benefit of including low-cost offsets in mandatory emission trading schemes. We use a real options model of firm-level investment decisions under stochastic prices to compare alternative emission trading and permit-offset linkage schemes. By isolating the critical design factors that drive energy investments, we seek to identify policy regimes that balance the different concerns in the polarized debate for and against the inclusion of offsets. Our findings indicate that a moderate offset quota is sufficient to contain investment crowding-out effects, while it still has a positive effect on profit distributions. In contrast, the classical permit price collar will not effectively change investment behavior, precisely because in a framework with multiple compliance instruments the volatility of cheaper offsets is the driving force for investment. Under these conditions, a price collar for offsets emerges as a largely overlooked policy option to foster investment incentives. A combination of offset quota and offset price collar leads to investment patterns that are almost identical to a regime without access to offsets.","PeriodicalId":237010,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Carbon Trading (Politics) (Topic)","volume":"434 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122877003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Evaluating the Key Drivers of the US Government's Social Cost of Carbon: A Model Diagnostic and Inter-Comparison Study of Climate Impacts in DICE, FUND, and PAGE","authors":"Delavane Diaz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2655889","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2655889","url":null,"abstract":"The social cost of carbon (SCC) is a monetary estimate of the climate change damages to society from an additional emission of carbon dioxide (CO2). US agencies are now required to apply the SCC to assess the potential benefits of CO2 reductions in federal regulations, including rules and proposals affecting appliances, transportation, industry, and power generation. This paper presents the first in-depth model diagnostic and inter-comparison examination of the three integrated assessment models used to estimate the SCC – DICE, FUND, and PAGE – to reveal how they uniquely determine damages from climate change. Specifically, we reviewed the source code, published documentation, and underlying literature of each of the three models, and then performed controlled experiments to diagnose the contribution of particular sectors, regions, and other model assumptions (parametric and structural) to the resulting cost. We find that DICE and PAGE project substantially higher climate damages, and therefore higher SCC values, than FUND, which includes the potential for net benefits in the near-term. Despite the fact that FUND is highly-disaggregated sectorally and regionally, 95% of its SCC can be explained by a few damage function parameters related to cooling, agriculture, avoided heating, and water resources, particularly those for China. The DICE SCC can only be decomposed into sea level rise damages and an aggregation of all other damages, with the latter category being the dominant SCC driver. The PAGE SCC is mostly driven by non-economic damages, with all costs distributed globally though greatest in the US and least in the former Soviet Union. In all three models, impacts from sea level rise contribute less than one-tenth of the SCC. This study's diagnostic analysis improves public understanding of the SCC, informs future SCC estimation, and sets research priorities for climate impacts modeling.","PeriodicalId":237010,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Carbon Trading (Politics) (Topic)","volume":"191 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121860446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"EU Emissions Trading by Energy Firms","authors":"Thijs Jong, A. Zeitlberger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2496103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2496103","url":null,"abstract":"Do energy firms depend less on the EU carbon market (EU ETS) when they are better able to pool their in-house pollution abatement potential? Expected is that cost-minimizing firms behave self-sufficiently by allocating production, emissions and, hence, allowances within firm boundaries. Therefore, the allowance trade of more self-sufficient firms on the carbon market is expected to be less responsive to allowance demand factors, by being better able at absorbing shocks within the firm. Contrary to our expectations, we find that self-sufficient firms conducted less allowance trade across their subsidiaries than on the carbon market. Pollution abatement capacity outside firm boundaries may therefore be less expensive and/or more cost-effectively coordinated through the market. We also find that self-sufficient firms actually purchase during electricity demand declines, and with higher coal and/or lower gas prices, and vice versa. These opposing findings point to allowance hedging. This conjecture is reaffirmed since we found their trades to be systematic repurchases and resales (instead of unidirectional trades) and to be responsive to market arbitrage opportunities. Besides the hedging against carbon risks, the cost savings by applying external abatement options suggest that self-sufficient firms actually depend more on the EU ETS market than less self-sufficient firms do.","PeriodicalId":237010,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Carbon Trading (Politics) (Topic)","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131986933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Spatial Competitive Analysis: The Carbon Leakage Effect on the Cement Industry Under the European Emissions Trading Scheme","authors":"E. Allevi, G. Oggioni, R. Riccardi, M. Rocco","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2221883","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2221883","url":null,"abstract":"The European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is a cap and trade system to curb CO2 emissions. It has caused both direct costs (CO2 allowances) and indirect costs (higher electricity prices) to energy-intensive industries. Moreover, as there is no global CO2 agreement, the ETS could distort the European economy, prompting energy-intensive industries to relocate production to unregulated countries: the i?½carbon leakagei?½ effect. This paper investigates the impact of ETS on the cement industry, focusing on Italy, the second European producer, analyzing a Cournot oligopolistic partial equilibrium model with a detailed technological representation of the market. Simulation results show that the European and Italian cement markets are subject to carbon leakage, especially where carbon regulation is more stringent and where plants are located near the seacoast. Further, transportation costs - particularly high in the cement sector - significantly affect the rate of carbon leakage.","PeriodicalId":237010,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Carbon Trading (Politics) (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128554694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"For the Benefit of California Electricity Ratepayers: Electricity Sector Options for the Use of Allowance Value Created Under California’s Cap-and-Trade Program","authors":"D. Burtraw, David J. Mclaughlin, S. Szambelan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2076639","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2076639","url":null,"abstract":"California will implement a cap-and-trade program to limit emissions of carbon dioxide covering industry and electricity sector emissions in 2013, expanding to cover transportation and natural gas in 2015. Although cap-and-trade would increase annual electricity costs for the average customer by $30 to nearly $100, the allowance value created under the program can offset all of these costs and even reduce electricity bills. California’s Air Resources Board has directed electricity regulators to ensure this allowance value is used for the benefit of electricity ratepayers. This paper surveys four options: (1) reducing electricity bills; (2) sending equivalent revenue directly to households in proportion to costs; or (3) as equal payments per customer account; and (4) making investments to improve the electricity system and help reduce emissions. Under special consideration is this question: Who will receive the allowance value associated with the electricity sector? We explore the implications of three specific proposals.","PeriodicalId":237010,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Carbon Trading (Politics) (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128789670","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Designing Markets for Carbon Offsets: A Field Experiment in Malawi","authors":"B. K. Jack","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1638563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1638563","url":null,"abstract":"Revealing private information to improve allocation and pricing in carbon offset projects can help improve the competitiveness of developing country offsets on global carbon markets. This study provides the first evidence from a developing country to directly compare alternative allocation mechanisms: a uniform-price, sealed bid procurement auction and a posted offer market. The field experiment was conducted in Malawi for the allocation of tree planting contracts. Results reveal highly divergent outcomes for the two strategically equivalent mechanisms. The auction set the clearing price for both mechanisms and enrolled the 38 percent of the auction treatment group that bid below the price. In the posted offer treatment group, 99.5 percent of participants accepted the contract at the auction clearing price. Compliance results show significantly more trees surviving per contract allocated under the auction. At the clearing price, the auction achieves a better selection of high compliance landholders, but potentially at greater cost than the posted offer market. Results confirm the presence of information asymmetries in these markets and demonstrate that project design affects both the cost effectiveness and the environmental effectiveness of carbon offset projects.","PeriodicalId":237010,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Carbon Trading (Politics) (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130931167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}