SRPN: Carbon Trading (Politics) (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Intrinergy: Carbon Offsets (a)","authors":"S. Bodily, Brandon Ogilvie, Brett Brohl","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1585669","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1585669","url":null,"abstract":"The A case describes the decision the BurMills textile company will make regarding whether to change from producing their own steam to outsourcing their steam production to Intrinergy. BurMills can calculate the present value of cost flows for three alternatives: producing their own steam from burning natural gas, outsourcing to Intrinergy with either a fixed price contract, or with a price contract that floats with the natural gas price at Henry Hub. In addition to the standard costs associated with steam production the case adds depth by providing the possibility of revenue from carbon credits. These credits are earned because the energy in the Intrinergy plant is created from biomass. A proper analysis will include a Monte Carlo simulation based on an arithmetic random walk for carbon credit pricing, a mean-reverting arithmetic random walk for Henry Hub natural gas spot prices, and other distributions. (A student spreadsheet is available to accompany this case: UVA-S-QA-0737.)","PeriodicalId":237010,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Carbon Trading (Politics) (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123769851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Pricing CO2 Permits Using Approximation Approaches","authors":"G. Gruell, Ruediger Kiesel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1527378","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1527378","url":null,"abstract":"Equilibrium models have been widely used in literature with the aim of showing theoretical properties of emission trading systems. This paper derives first a new equilibrium model. Second, it is shown that the theoretical permit price is related to changes in the expectation about how long regulated companies will need to exhaust the remaining permits. Third, by application to real data it demonstrates that emission trading systems are inherently prone to jumps.","PeriodicalId":237010,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Carbon Trading (Politics) (Topic)","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133869714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Carbon, Trade Policy and Carbon Free Trade Areas","authors":"Yan Dong, J. Whalley","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9701.2010.01272.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2010.01272.x","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses both the potential contribution that trade policy initiatives can make towards the achievement of significant global carbon emissions reduction and the potential impacts of proposals now circulating for carbon reduction motivated geographical trade arrangements, including carbon free trade areas. We first suggest that trade policy is likely to be a relatively minor consideration in climate change containment. The dominant influence on carbon emissions globally for next several decades will be growth more so than trade and its composition, and in turn, the size of trade seemingly matters more than its composition given differences in emission intensity between tradables and nontradables. We also note that differences in emissions intensity across countries are larger than across products or sectors and so issues of country discrimination in trade policy (and violations of MFN) arises. We next discuss both unilateral and regional carbon motivated trade policy arrangements, including three potential variants of carbon emission reduction based free trade area arrangements. One is regional trade agreements with varying types of trade preferences towards low carbon intensive products, low carbon new technologies and inputs to low carbon processes. A second is the use of joint border measures against third parties to counteract anti-competitive effects from groups of countries taking on deeper emission reduction commitments. A third is third country trade barriers along with free trade or other regional trade agreements as penalty mechanisms to pressure other countries to join emission reducing environmental agreements. We differentiate among the objectives, forms and possible impacts of each variant. We also speculate as to how the world trading system may evolve in the next few decades as trade policy potentially becomes increasingly dominated by environmental concerns. We suggest that the future evolution of the trading system will likely be with environmentally motivated arrangements acting as an overlay on prevailing trade and financial arrangements in the WTO and IMF, and eventually movement to linked global trade and environmental policy bargaining.","PeriodicalId":237010,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Carbon Trading (Politics) (Topic)","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126849777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Modeling the Price Dynamics of Co2 Emission Allowances","authors":"E. Benz, S. Trück","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.903240","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.903240","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we analyze the short-term spot price behavior of carbon dioxide (CO2) emission allowances of the new EU-wide CO2 emissions trading system (EU ETS). After reviewing the stylized facts of this new class of assets we investigate several approaches for modeling the returns of emission allowances. Due to different phases of price and volatility behavior in the returns, we suggest the use of Markov switching and AR-GARCH models for stochastic modeling. We examine the approaches by conducting an in-sample and out-of-sample forecasting analysis and by comparing the results to alternative approaches. Our findings strongly support the adequacy of the models capturing characteristics like skewness, excess kurtosis and in particular different phases of volatility behavior in the returns.","PeriodicalId":237010,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Carbon Trading (Politics) (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124697708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Effects on Developing Countries of the Kyoto Protocol and Carbon Dioxide Emissions Trading","authors":"A. Ellerman, H. Jacoby, A. Decaux","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-2019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-2019","url":null,"abstract":"The trading of rights to emit carbon dioxide has not officially been sanctioned by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, but it is of interest to investigate the consequences, both for industrial (Annex B) and developing countries, of allowing such trades. The authors examine the trading of caps assigned to Annex B countries under the Kyoto Protocol and compare the outcome with a world in which Annex B countries meet with their Kyoto targets without trading. Under the trading scenario the former Soviet Union is the main seller of carbon dioxide permits and Japan, the European Union, and the United States are the main buyers. Permit trading is estimated to reduce the aggregate cost of meeting the Kyoto targets by about 50 percent, compared with no trading. Developing countries, though they do not trade, are nonetheless affected by trading. For example, the price of oil and the demand for other developing country exports are higher with trading than without. The authors also consider what might happen if developing countries were to voluntarily accept caps equal to Business as Usual Emissions and were allowed to sell emission reductions below these caps to Annex B countries. The gains from emissions trading could be big enough to give buyers and sellers incentive to support the system. Indeed, a global market for rights to emit carbon dioxide could reduce the cost of meeting the Kyoto targets by almost 90 percent, if the market were to operate competitively. The division of trading gains, however, may make a competitive outcome unlikely: Under perfect competition, the vast majority of trading gains go to buyers of permits rather than to sellers. Even markets in which the supply of permits is restricted can, however, substantially reduce the cost to Annex B countries of meeting their Kyoto targets, while yielding profits to developing countries that elect to sell permits.","PeriodicalId":237010,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Carbon Trading (Politics) (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130082039","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Risk Aversion and Institutional Information Disclosure on the European Carbon Market: A Case-Study of the 2006 Compliance Event","authors":"Julien Chevallier, F. Ielpo, L. Mercier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1117184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1117184","url":null,"abstract":"This article evaluates the impact of the 2006 compliance event on changes in investors' risk aversion on the European Carbon Market using the newly available option prices dataset. Thus, we aim at capturing the specific event that occurred on April 2007 as the European Commission disclosed the 2006 verified emissions data. Following the methodology existing for stock indices, we recover empirically risk aversion adjustments on the period 2006-2007 by estimating first the risk-neutral distribution from option prices and second the actual distribution from futures on the European Climate Exchange. Our results show evidence of a dramatic change in the market perception of risk around the 2006 yearly compliance event that has not been assessed yet.","PeriodicalId":237010,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Carbon Trading (Politics) (Topic)","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132661161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}