Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy最新文献

{"title":"Improving Fiscal Policy in the EU: The Case for Independent Forecasts","authors":"L. Jonung, Martin Larch","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0327.2006.00162.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2006.00162.x","url":null,"abstract":"ARE OFFICIAL OUTPUT FORECASTS BIASED?\u0000\u0000We point out that official forecasts of output dynamics are crucial to the assessment of cyclically adjusted budget balances, and provide evidence that in some euro-area countries biased forecasts have played a thus far neglected role in generating excessive deficits. We suggest that the forecast bias may be politically motivated, and that forecasts produced by an independent authority would be better than in-house Ministry of Finance forecasts for the purpose of monitoring budget formation and budget outcomes.\u0000\u0000— Lars Jonung and Martin Larch","PeriodicalId":236508,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131343020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"European Monetary Union: The Dark Sides of a Major Success","authors":"Charles Wyplosz","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0327.2006.00158.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2006.00158.x","url":null,"abstract":"type=\"main\" xml:lang=\"en\"> This paper revisits the debates that have surrounded the launch of a unique experience: the adoption of a common currency among developed countries. A striking aspect of this history is that, pressed by what they correctly identified as a window of opportunity, policy-makers crafted this complex project in a short period of time, largely eschewing inputs from the academic profession. Academic research, in turn, developed its own views, which turned out to be critical of some ley orientations, yet it generally recognizes that, in the end, the launch of the euro has been a major success. Over time, many of the academic criticisms have been taken on board, but not yet fully. The monetary strategy has been slightly amended, but it remains the subject of disagreements between the European Central Bank and monetary economists. Events have confirmed that the Stability and Growth Pact was ill-designed; its reformulation goes some way to address some of the concerns but not all of them. Its ability to deliver fiscal discipline is in doubt. Another look at the experiment highlights the gap between the principles laid out by those who designed the monetary union and the pragmatism that has prevailed thereafter. The resulting tension between principles and actions sometimes obscures the fact that the Eurosystem has acted wisely so far. The widespread perception that monetary policy is not as transparent as it should be and suffers from a lack of adequate democratic accountability is not just annoying. The general public, including politicians, sometimes blames the Eurosystem for Europe's poor growth performance since the adoption of the euro. This is unfair and could dangerously undermine the monetary union if the Eurosystem were to become the scapegoat for the slow and incomplete reforms that are needed to revigorate the euro area's economies. — Charles Wyplosz","PeriodicalId":236508,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130338530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"International Competition in Corporate Taxation: Evidence from the OECD Time Series","authors":"K. G. Stewart, Michael C. Webb","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0327.2006.00156.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2006.00156.x","url":null,"abstract":"type=\"main\" xml:lang=\"en\"> Despite numerous studies, controversy remains about the impact of economic globalization on corporate taxation. Theoretical models of tax competition generate different predictions about trends in the level of tax burdens and the degree of convergence in tax burdens across countries. In this paper we present a purely empirical analysis of the evolution of tax burdens across OECD countries since the 1950s. Issues of measurement and methodology have contributed to the inconclusive character of studies to date, so we begin with an assessment of alternative measures of the burden. Problems with some commonly used measures of the tax burden are considered and the most plausible measures identified. Descriptive analysis of these time series reveals no evidence of a competitive ‘race to the bottom’ in corporate taxation and little evidence of even a harmonization of the tax burden. Many inferential studies of corporate taxation base their conclusions on cross-sectional analysis; in contrast, we adopt an explicitly time-series method to what are essentially time-series questions. Cointegration methodology originally developed to study issues of convergence of living standards is applied, and fails to reveal evidence of convergence of tax burdens for the OECD and Europe as a whole. It does, however, indicate that there has been some harmonization within smaller groups of countries, mainly in northern Europe. Important questions remain about the effectiveness and impact of corporate taxation in an increasingly open and integrated global economy, but we find little evidence to support fears that the burden of taxation is being lifted from corporations. — Kenneth Stewart and Michael Webb","PeriodicalId":236508,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129241148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Guide to Reform of Higher Education: A European Perspective","authors":"B. Jacobs, Rick van der Ploeg","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0327.2006.00166.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2006.00166.x","url":null,"abstract":"Although there are exceptions, most European universities and institutions of higher education find it difficult to compete with the best universities in the Anglo-Saxon world. Despite the Bologna agreement and the ambitions of the Lisbon agenda, European universities are in need of fundamental reforms. We look at structural reforms of higher education and propose more effective use of public subsidies, more efficient modes of financing institutions of higher education, more diversity, competition and transparency, and larger private contributions through income-contingent student loans. In the process we discuss the nature of an institution of higher education, grade inflation, fair competition, private and social returns to education, income-contingent loans, student poverty and transparency. We sum up with seven recommendations for reform of higher education.","PeriodicalId":236508,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","volume":"271 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131719182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Evaluation of Currency Regimes: The Unique Role of Sudden Stops","authors":"A. Razin, Yona Rubinstein","doi":"10.1111/j.1468-0327.2006.00155.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0327.2006.00155.x","url":null,"abstract":"This paper tackles two established puzzles in international macroeconomics literature. The first is the lack of systematic difference in the macroeconomic performance across exchange rate regimes. The second is the absence of a clear empirical relationship between macroeconomic performance and capital-account liberalization. We suggest that both may appear because empirical methodologies fail to account for a latent economic \"crisis state,\" influenced by exchange-rate and capital account regimes, and to allow the effects of a policy regime on growth to depend on whether the economy is in a crisis-prone latent state. In practice, we model and estimate the latent state of the economy as a crisis probability. In the framework we propose, exchange rate and capital market liberalization regimes can have both a direct effect on short-term growth, and an indirect effect on growth that is channelled through their effects on the crisis probability.","PeriodicalId":236508,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130406265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Pharmaceutical Parallel Trade in Europe: Stakeholder and Competition Effects","authors":"P. Kanavos, Joan Costa-Font","doi":"10.1111/J.1468-0327.2005.00150.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1468-0327.2005.00150.X","url":null,"abstract":"Pharmaceutical parallel trade in the European Union is a large and growing phenomenon, and hope has been expressed that it has the potential to reduce prices paid by health insurance and consumers and substantially to raise overall welfare. In this paper we examine the phenomenon empirically, using data on prices and volumes of individual imported products. We have found that the gains from parallel trade accrue mostly to the distribution chain rather than to health insurance and consumers. This is because in destination countries parallel traded drugs are priced just below originally sourced drugs. We also test to see whether parallel trade has a competition impact on prices in destination countries and find that it does not. Such competition effects as there are in pharmaceuticals come mainly from the presence of generics. Accordingly, instead of a convergence to the bottom in EU pharmaceutical prices, the evidence points at 'convergence to the top'. This is explained by the fact that drug prices are subjected to regulation in individual countries, and by the limited incentives of purchasers to respond to price differentials.","PeriodicalId":236508,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129168475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Parallel Trade, Price Discrimination, Investment and Price Caps","authors":"Stefan Szymanski, T. Valletti","doi":"10.1111/J.1468-0327.2005.00149.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1468-0327.2005.00149.X","url":null,"abstract":"type=\"main\" xml:lang=\"en\"> Parallel trade is the resale of a product by a wholesaler in a market other than that intended by the manufacturer. One of its consequences is that manufacturers may be prevented from price discriminating between markets that have different willingness to pay for the product in question. Some legal regimes give the manufacturer the right to prohibit parallel trade, but others do not. We examine the policy implications of parallel trade in a world in which manufacturers invest in product quality, and have the possibility to develop different quality variants of their goods. We also consider the possibility that the authorities may impose price caps and compulsory licensing (as commonly occurs for some pharmaceutical products). We find that taking investment incentives into account makes parallel trade much less likely to enhance overall welfare, which implies that parallel trade in products intensive in R&D, such as pharmaceuticals, is less desirable than in fields such as branded consumer products. We also find that, somewhat surprisingly, the threat of parallel trade does not induce firms to market inferior versions of their products in poor countries. However, parallel trade is less likely to be detrimental to welfare when there are price caps, since compulsory licensing can mitigate the major cost of parallel trade (namely a refusal to supply a poor country market). — Stefan Szymanski and Tommaso Valletti","PeriodicalId":236508,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122672144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Why are Europeans so Tough on Migrants?","authors":"T. Boeri, H. Brücker","doi":"10.1111/J.1468-0327.2005.00148.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1468-0327.2005.00148.X","url":null,"abstract":"type=\"main\" xml:lang=\"en\"> International migration can significantly increase income per capita in Europe. We estimate that at the given wage and productivity gap between Western and Eastern Europe, migration of 3% of the Eastern population to the West could increase total EU GDP by up to 0.5%. Yet on 1 May 2004, 14 EU countries out of 15 adopted transitional arrangements vis-a-vis the new member states and national migration restrictions vis-a-vis third country nationals are getting stricter and stricter. In this paper we offer two explanations for this paradox and document their empirical relevance in the case of the EU enlargement. The first explanation is that immigration to rigid labour markets involves a number of negative externalities on the native population. The second explanation is that there are important cross-country spillovers in the effects of migration policies, inducing a race-to-the top in border restrictions with high costs in terms of foregone European output. In light of our results, we discuss, in the final section, the key features of a desirable migration policy to be coordinated at the EU level. —Tito Boeri and Herbert Brucker","PeriodicalId":236508,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125299603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Educational Production in Europe","authors":"Ludger Woessmann","doi":"10.1111/J.1468-0327.2005.00144.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1468-0327.2005.00144.X","url":null,"abstract":"Available data and recently developed estimation methods make it possible to assess school performance in terms of a production process, where ’inputs’ of students, teachers, and resources are combined to create a very important ’output’: the cognitive skills of students. This paper estimates the education production function using representative samples of middle-school students in 15 West European countries. The size of teaching classes is a particularly important feature of the educational production process because it can be relatively easily manipulated by policy makers. However, no statistically and economically significant class-size effect is detected by any of the evidence considered in this paper. The results suggest that, at least in the context of the resources and organizational structure of West European lower secondary education systems, expensive across-the-board reduction of class sizes is extremely unlikely to foster student learning.","PeriodicalId":236508,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131474547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Impact of Rules of Origin on Trade Flows","authors":"P. Augier, Michael Gasiorek, Charles Lai-Tong","doi":"10.1111/J.1468-0327.2005.00146.X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1468-0327.2005.00146.X","url":null,"abstract":"type=\"main\" xml:lang=\"en\"> A great deal of post-war trade liberalization resulted from regional, preferential trade agreements. Preferential trade agreements cut tariffs on goods originating only in those nations that have signed the agreement. Therefore, they need ‘rules of origin’ to determine which goods benefit from the tariff cut. Rules of origin have long been ignored for two good reasons: they are dauntingly complex and at first sight appear mind-numbingly dull. The third standard reason for ignoring them – the assertion that they do not matter much – turns out to be wrong. We show that rules of origin are important barriers to trade. Moreover, such rules are emerging as an important trade issue for three additional reasons. First, preferential trade deals are proliferating worldwide. Second, the global fragmentation of production implies complex international supply chains which are particularly constrained and distorted by rules of origin. Third, the extent to which regionalism challenges the WTO-based trading system depends in part on incompatibilities and rigidities built into rules of origin. Our empirical results exploit a ‘natural experiment’ that was created by technical changes to Europe's lattice of rules of origin (ROOs) in 1997. This change, known as ‘diagonal cumulation’, relaxed the restrictiveness of rules of origin on trade among the EU's free trade agreement (FTA) partners without changing the degree of tariff preference. Our analysis allows us to establish a lower-bound and upper-bound estimate of trade impact of ROOs reduced trade among the EU's trade partners. The lower bound we find is something like 10% while the upper bound is around 70%. The second part of the paper draws the policy lessons that arise from considering the implications of our empirical findings. The most direct lessons are for FTA-writers. We argue that Europe's implementation of ‘cumulation’ is a good way of reducing the welfare-reducing impact of overlapping rules of origin without gutting their fraud-fighting ability. We also suggest a three-part procedure for establishing a more multilateral framework for rules of origin which would be more transparent, flexible, administratively feasible and negotiable. — Patricia Augier, Michael Gasiorek and Charles Lai-Tong","PeriodicalId":236508,"journal":{"name":"Wiley-Blackwell: Economic Policy","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123774656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}