Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal最新文献

{"title":"Liberalism in Crisis and the Promise of a Reconstructed Liberalism","authors":"Peter J. Boettke, Rosolino A. Candela","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3539237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3539237","url":null,"abstract":"What explains the simultaneous critiques of economic theory and liberalism during the 1930s? Early neoclassical economists had a common understanding of the proper institutional context undergirding a liberal market order. From the marginal revolution emerged a growing emphasis on analyzing markets as equilibrium states rather than processes. Because the institutions that frame a liberal market order were taken as given, to the point of relative neglect, this resulted in the notion that markets operated in an institutional vacuum. The resulting association of liberalism with laissez-faire, therefore, prompted a restatement of the role institutions play in the operation of a liberal market order.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126240500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Role of Ignorance About Keynes’s Inexact, Approximation Approach to Measurement in the A Treatise on Probability in the Keynes-Tinbergen Exchanges of 1938–1940","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3353637","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3353637","url":null,"abstract":"There is no evidence that J. Tinbergen ever read the technical analysis provided by J. M. Keynes in Parts II and V of the A Treatise on Probability in the 1938-1940 time period or at any later time in his life. The same conclusion holds for econometricians in general. They simply do not understand what Keynes’s Inexact, Approximation Approach to Measurement in the A Treatise on Probability entails. \u0000 \u0000Tinbergen and Keynes held diametrically opposed positions on measurement. Tinbergen’s approach to measurement was guided by the Limiting Frequency interpretation of probability while Keynes’s approach followed the logical approach of George Boole. Tinbergen’s physics background led him to deploy an exact approach to measurement based on the specification of probability distributions, like the normal and lognormal, with exact and precisely defined measurements. All probabilities were assumed to be well defined, precise, exact, determinate, definite, additive, linear, independent single number of answers. Keynes’s approach was an inexact one to measurement based on his modification of Boole’s original approach in 1854 in The Laws of Thought in chapters 16-21. Probabilities for Keynes were, with a few exceptions, partially defined, imprecise, inexact, indefinite, indeterminate, nonadditive, nonlinear, and dependent. Probability estimates for Keynes required two numbers to specify the probability within a lower and upper bound(limit), and nor one like Tinbergen’s approach. Keynes called this approach Approximation. Keynesian probabilities are interval-valued. There are no more than a single handful of academics, worldwide today, who grasp the fact that Keynes’s approach to measurement in the A Treatise on Probability was an interval-valued approach that was covered by Keynes in chapters III and XV. \u0000 \u0000There was no economist alive in the late 1930’s-1940’s who understood Keynes’s approach in the A Treatise on Probability. An example of this ignorance is Lawrence Klein’s review in 1951 of Harrod’s biography of Keynes. \u0000 \u0000The assessments of the Keynes –Tinbergen exchanges in 1938-40 were practically identical to the assessment made of the A Treatise on Probability by Ronald Fisher in his 1923 Eugenics Review of the A Treatise on Probability, where Fisher completely overlooked the inexact approach to measurement that Keynes presented in Parts I –V of the A Treatise on Probability. He dismissed the A Treatise on Probability based on his belief that Keynes was arguing that probability could not be applied since it was, at best, ordinal in nature. \u0000 \u0000Only one economist in the 20th century understood exactly what it was that Keynes had done in the A Treatise on Probability. That economist was named F. Y. Edgeworth. However, Edgeworth died in 1926. His two 1922 book reviews of the A Treatise on Probability required a great deal of mathematical and statistical competence on the part of a reader. That mathematical competence was missing from the economics professi","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130715186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What Is So Extreme about Mises's Extreme Apriorism?: Reply to Scott Scheall","authors":"G. Zanotti, N. Cachanosky","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2875122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2875122","url":null,"abstract":"We reply to Scott Scheall’s What is so Extreme About Mises’s Extreme Apriorism. We restate the setting of the topic of our paper and we argue that Scheall is not providing a clear distinction between (a) Mises the person and his epistemological position and (b) praxeology and economics. We also clarify misrepresentations of our own positions in Scheall’s treatment of our paper.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"245 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131649095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Eclipsed Sun of Bastiat: Adjusted Look at Market Allocation in Imperfect World","authors":"Taddese Mezgebo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3063161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3063161","url":null,"abstract":"Even though neoclassical orthodox economists do reject Keynesian macro economics due to its lack of micro foundation, it is common knowledge within heterodox economic schools that the micro foundation of orthodox neoclassical economics is not sound either. However the fatal mistake of heterodox economics is to crown state as leading engine of economic development, after identifying failures of perfect market. Since imperfection of market does not grantee preference toward state intervention and since to reject an orthodox market theory is not the same as rejecting the virtue of market itself, evolutionary justification for virtue of market is given in this paper by heavily depending on existing literature of economics, other social sciences and natural sciences. Unless we are able to start from enlightened point of view to eliminate this never ending reincarnation of ignorance, our pendulum of economic policy will never stop swinging from market or state, one after another, as almighty institution which will solve every problem of development in vain.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"141 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116432620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"After the ‘Great Half-Century’: Post-Crisis Economic Geography in Retrospect and Prospect","authors":"David S. Bieri","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3345700","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3345700","url":null,"abstract":"This review assesses the evolution of economic geography over the past two decades, picking up where Scott’s (2000) intellectual history of the field’s “great-half century” ends. It is part retrospective and prospective; as such, it aims beyond a historical review to outline some ideas about important factors that drove the recent developments of economic geography. Specifically, I identify three main themes: i) the “Methodenstreit” over the New Economic Geography and the alleged intellectual imperialism of geographical economics; ii) the search for engaged pluralism amid concerns of a dominance of Anglo-American economic geography; and—perhaps most strikingly—iii) the rapid (re)emergence of subfields after the Great Financial Crisis, such as the geography of money and finance and political economic geography, both with a particular focus on spatial disparities and inequality. Focusing on new developments in the geography of money and finance, I also illustrate how the three themes (economic imperialism, pluralism, and financialisation) have shaped the discipline’s most recent intellectual history. The review concludes by outlining elements of a vision for a pluralist post-crisis economic geography.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131219398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Islamic Mortgages: Principles and Practice","authors":"Muhammad Hanif","doi":"10.1108/IJOEM-02-2018-0088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOEM-02-2018-0088","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to present an analysis of current practices of Islamic mortgages in the light of the principles of Islamic financial system, to document divergences – if any. A subsidiary goal is to develop an Islamic Mortgage Model (IMM) based on Musharakah principles.,The author documents theoretical underpinnings of risk-return sharing from the Shari’ah perspective. A comparative study of conventional and Islamic mortgages is completed; existing practice of Islamic mortgages analyzed in the light of Musharakah principles and divergences identified. IMM is developed after taking divergences and Musharakah principles into considerations. A housing case is used to highlight differences (in financial terms) under multiple methods and scenarios.,Study documents multiple divergences from Musharakah principles in the existing practice of Islamic mortgages including ignorance of market pricing in the negotiation of rentals and trading of equity units, and transfer of all ownership risks and rewards (vacancy, damage, destruction and market) to one partner (i.e. customer). Practice is divergent from principles in the area of economic substance. Modified IMM is developed by taking into account Musharakah principles; and differences highlighted by calculating financial figures – to determine financial rights and liabilities of the parties.,Divergence from the principles of risk-return sharing leads to failure in the achievement of Islamic finance objective of equitable distribution of wealth. Moreover, protection of capital for financier reduces the market abilities to achieve financial stability by matching credit expansion with the rise in the real economy. Shari’ah boards and regulators, as well as, management of Islamic banking industry are expected to incorporate proposed changes in-practice for the realization of Islamic finance objectives.,This study contributes to Islamic finance literature in the area of risk-return sharing. Based on important objectives of Islamic finance – equitable distribution of wealth and financial stability – divergences identified and a modified IMM in the light of Musharakah principles is presented. Descriptive rules are transformed into financial figures to document financial rights and liabilities of the concerned parties.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115690009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Conjecture on the Efficacy of the Invisible Hand","authors":"Donald C. Keenan, Taewon Kim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3327073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3327073","url":null,"abstract":"Arguments are made that, for a typical economy with many goods, tatonnement dynamics can be expected to lead to a unique, globally stable equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"338 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123127247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"On J. M. Keynes’s Application of His IS-LM (LP) Model in His Reply to Viner in His Article the General Theory of Employment in February, 1937: Keynes Emphasized the Horizontal, Completely Elastic Range of the LM (LP) Curve","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3317346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3317346","url":null,"abstract":"Keynes used his IS-LM(LP) model to reply to Viner’s claims that he had drastically overestimated the role that liquidity preference played in the macro economy in explaining the events of 1929-1933 in the world economy. Viner claimed that liquidity preference could only play a very minor role in impacting the economy as a whole. This amounts to the claim that financial manipulation and stock market speculation can play a role that is, at best, of very minor significance. <br> <br>Viner’s assessment is identical to his claim made in his Journal of Political Economy paper in 1927 that Adam Smith’s criticisms of projectors, imprudent risk takers and prodigals, as illustrated by the very negative impact of the British East India Company on Scotland’s economy in the 18th century, could, at best, play only a very minor role. Viner’s answer was identical to that of Jeremy Bentham, who claimed that Smith’s projectors, imprudent risk takers and prodigals were really just inventors and innovating entrepreneurs. The government authorities should never interfere in the markets for any reason, should “be quite”, and “stay out of the sunshine” of the private sector economy. Of course, this Benthamite Utilitarian creed, taught at the University of Chicago’s Economics department in the 1920’s, is why American government authorities did nothing in the years between 1929-1933 to stop the Great Depression. They had been taught Laissez Faire from University of Chicago economists. Everything was supposed to improve by itself on its own. The economy was guaranteed to recover only if government did nothing. <br> <br>Viner’s argument, then, is that it is impossible to have a liquidity trap (Keynes’s absolute liquidity preference).Keynes challenged Viner’s argument using IS-LM(LP)analysis in his reply in February, 1937. <br> <br>Keynes emphasized in his reply to Viner in February,1937, that he was very concerned about the highly elastic range of the LM(LP) curve. Keynes combined this with an emphasis on the highly inelastic range of the IS curve, as Keynes’s IS curve is the opposite of Viner’s ,since, given Viner’s highly inelastic LM(LP) curve, he needs an IS curve that is highly elastic in order to get “…a small decline in money-income would lead, as stated above, to a large fall in the rate of interest.” <br> <br>Keynes thus is very concerned with the parameters of the IS-LM(LP) curves, although he clearly views the major problem with the IS curve as being its instability and shift ability, due to the impacts of confidence on mec calculations involving expectations. <br> <br>Keynes not only provided the first IS-LM model, but also explicitly considered the elasticity of the curves as well both in the GT in 1936 and in the GTE in 1937. <br> <br>Paul Krugman’s twenty five years of emphasis on the necessity of basing macroeconomics on IS-LM(LP) is correct. A minor point is that it is primarily Keynes, and not Hicks, who was responsible for the explicit development and ap","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114143019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Social Pressure Explains Ethical Voting: A Methodological Contribution to the Scientific Endeavor in the Social Sciences","authors":"David Jimenez-Gomez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3291484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3291484","url":null,"abstract":"Models of ethical voting, in which individuals derive intrinsic utility from “doing their part�? by voting in elections, have been proposed as an explanation for the “voting paradox�? (why people vote if the probability of being pivotal is negligible). I show that the set of equilibria of the ethical voting model of Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) is identical to that of a model of social pressure in which only a negligible fraction of individuals are ethical. This has the crucial methodological implication that if people actually vote out of social pressure (as the empirical evidence suggests), then the ethical voting model cannot be falsified: even if the model is false, it will be consistent with any empirical evidence.","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131453844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Using A. Greenspan’s Continuum to Generalize J.M. Keynes’s Evidential Weight of the Argument (Evidence), W, Where W Was Defined on the Interval 0 ≤ W ≤ 1, so that 0 Denotes Complete Ignorance and 1 Denotes Complete Knowledge","authors":"M. E. Brady","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3310046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3310046","url":null,"abstract":"J. M. Keynes made the concept of uncertainty a fundamental part of his rate of the interest theory of liquidity preference. Uncertainty was defined by Keynes on page 148 of the General Theory as an inverse function of the weight of the argument (evidence), where “argument” refers to logical considerations based on propositional logic and evidence refers to an analysis of a mathematical function and the variables that define the function. Thus, Uncertainty, U, is defined as a function of w, so that U =h(w). The weight of the argument was discussed in chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability, 1921. The weight of the evidence was discussed in chapter 26 using the term w to measure the completeness of the relevant evidence. Formally, the evidential weight of the evidence, V(a/h), =w, where w is defined on the interval 0 ≤ w ≤ 1. It is only in chapter 26 that Keynes formally defines V(a/h) =w.<br><br>Keynes’s logical and mathematical constructions are, however, very difficult for economists to grasp, since an economist must first grasp that chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability, 1921 provides only a purely, formal, symbolic, logical treatment that only a single handful of economists has been able to grasp correctly since 1921. Keynes does not integrate the concept of weight into a decision theory combined with probability that deals with expectations. Keynes does integrate probability and weight into a decision theory, however, in chapter 26 of the A Treatise on Probability, 1921 Keynes called this specific, simplified version of his overall interval valued approach a “conventional” coefficient of risk and weight. Only F Y Edgeworth and Bertrand Russell recognized the fundamental of chapter 26 of the A Treatise on Probability, 1921. Keynes uses this chapter for the theoretical foundation for his discussions of investment expectations about the mec and D2 in chapters 3, 12, 20 and 21 of the General Theory (1936).<br><br>Greenspan’s concept of a Continuum allows an economist to bypass Keynes’s correct, but very difficult and involved logical and mathematical discussions of the concept of weight, and simply define a Continuum that exists that spans continuously situations involving a complete lack of knowledge (ignorance) to a situation where the decision maker has complete knowledge and can assign precise, exact numerical probabilities. The decision maker must then decide for himself whether he is facing a situation of uncertainty, a situation of risk, or some mixture of the two. One could assume that in this intermediate situation that risk and uncertainty could be regarded as some linear combination of the two different types of situations. It was Greenspan’s unique ability to be able to apply his intuition and correctly judge what type of uncertainty he was facing at particular time. If one is facing uncertainty, then a proactive approach is required. Greenspan’s understanding of uncertainty was why Greenspan was proactive while Bernanke, who ","PeriodicalId":226815,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy & Methodology of Economics eJournal","volume":"334 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122835060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}