{"title":"Pounds That Save: The Role of Preferences for Safety in Demand for Large Vehicles","authors":"Jonathan B. Scott","doi":"10.1086/720344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/720344","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides novel evidence that consumers choose larger vehicles as an investment in their safety. I test for this purchasing behavior by isolating the quasi randomness of death in accidents involving at least one fatality. Leveraging this variation as a shock that made driving risk more salient to the victims’ acquaintances, I test whether consumers consequently infer a link between safety and vehicle weight. Using detailed information about household vehicle purchases and the locations of the purchasers’ residences, I demonstrate that households neighboring an individual who dies in an accident respond by purchasing significantly larger vehicles than comparable households neighboring someone who survives an accident. These findings capture strategic purchases of heavier vehicles for safety, behavior that can ultimately lead to the inefficiencies of a vehicle arms race.","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"19 1","pages":"555 - 579"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73314364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Is Banning Corporate Contributions Enough? The Dynamics of Incomplete Campaign Finance Reform","authors":"Diego Aparicio, Carlos F. Avenancio-León","doi":"10.1086/718973","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/718973","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies whether banning corporate contributions suffices to curb firms’ efforts to influence politics. We examine Brazil’s 2015 campaign finance reform, which banned companies from making political contributions but did not ban political contributions made by individuals. Following the reform, overall contributions decreased significantly. However, this does not mean that influence in politics disappeared. Firms with high prereform contributions responded by increasing individual donations at both the intensive and extensive margins. More critically, individual contributions became more valuable after the reform: postban individual contributions to winning candidates increased firms’ valuation substantially, thereby replicating what only corporate donations achieved preban and partially offsetting the reform’s intent. Despite this, the reform reduced total contributions, increased shareholder protection by reducing excessive contributions, and leveled political participation among firms. Moreover, the reform increased market valuations for contributing firms. Overall, incomplete campaign finance reform does deliver notable successes but has critical loopholes. All contributions by corporations … for any political purpose should be forbidden by law; directors should not be permitted to use stockholders’ money for such purposes; and, moreover, a prohibition of this kind would be … an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts. (Theodore Roosevelt, President’s Annual Message, 1905, 40 Cong. Rec. 96 [1906]) A ban on direct corporate contributions leaves individual members of corporations free to make their own contributions, and deprives the public of little or no material information. (Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 [2003]) All contributions by corporations … for any political purpose should be forbidden by law; directors should not be permitted to use stockholders’ money for such purposes; and, moreover, a prohibition of this kind would be … an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts. (Theodore Roosevelt, President’s Annual Message, 1905, 40 Cong. Rec. 96 [1906]) A ban on direct corporate contributions leaves individual members of corporations free to make their own contributions, and deprives the public of little or no material information. (Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 [2003])","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"98 1","pages":"581 - 606"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83648833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Certificates of Public Advantage and Hospital Mergers","authors":"Christopher J. Garmon, Kishan Bhatt","doi":"10.1086/719661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/719661","url":null,"abstract":"Certificates of public advantage (COPAs) grant antitrust immunity to merging hospitals conditional on active state regulation. We investigate the long-run effects of the four horizontal hospital mergers shielded with COPAs prior to 2015. We find that COPA regulation, if properly designed, can effectively constrain prices in the absence of competition among providers. However, two of the four evaluated COPAs were poorly designed and allowed the merging hospitals to evade regulation and increase price during the period of COPA regulation. Furthermore, all but one of the COPAs expired or were repealed in response to lobbying by the regulated hospitals, which led to large, statistically significant price increases and, for the merger for which quality data are available, a reduction in quality of care. In the long run, hospital mergers shielded with COPAs often lead to higher prices and reduced quality from unconstrained provider market power.","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"19 1","pages":"465 - 486"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77021223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Inequality in the Provision of Police Services: Evidence from Residential Burglary Investigations","authors":"R. Goldstein","doi":"10.1086/719847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/719847","url":null,"abstract":"When crime victims call the police for help, what type of response do they receive? While scholars have extensively documented racial inequalities in the police’s punitive functions, this paper considers the police as service providers. It leverages uniquely granular data on over 2,500 residential burglary investigations in Tucson, Arizona, to consider the predictors of investigative thoroughness. Contrary to conventional wisdom about police behavior, the demographics of victims or officers do not consistently predict investigative thoroughness. Instead, the most important predictor of investigative thoroughness is whether the burglary involved a forced entry into the residence, since forced-entry cases feature more evidence and thus provide greater likelihood of case clearance. However, the probability of forced entry differs significantly by neighborhood, which means that the seemingly neutral decision to maximize clearance rates has unequal consequences.","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"16 1","pages":"487 - 513"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74278768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Post–September 11 War Deployments and Crime among Veterans","authors":"R. Cesur, Joseph J. Sabia, E. Tekin","doi":"10.1086/718352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/718352","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the impact of post–September 11 (post-9/11) combat deployments on crime among veterans. We exploit the administrative procedures by which US armed forces senior commanders conditionally randomly assign active-duty servicemen to overseas deployments to estimate the causal impact of modern warfare on crime. Using data from two national surveys and a unified framework, we find that post-9/11 combat deployments substantially increase the probability of crime commission among veterans. Combat exposure increases the likelihood of gang membership, trouble with the police, punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, property crime, and violent crime. [P]eople in war had so inured themselves to corrupt and wicked manners, that they had taken a delight and pleasure in robbing and stealing; that through manslaughter they had gathered boldness to mischief; that their laws were had in contempt, and nothing set by or regarded. (More [1516] 2005, p. 45) The [unit’s] soldiers who survived all exhibited signs of posttraumatic stress disorder and other psychological conditions. Twelve of them have been arrested for murder or attempted murder. (Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 405, 412n7 [2013] [Sotomayor, J., dissenting]) [P]eople in war had so inured themselves to corrupt and wicked manners, that they had taken a delight and pleasure in robbing and stealing; that through manslaughter they had gathered boldness to mischief; that their laws were had in contempt, and nothing set by or regarded. (More [1516] 2005, p. 45) The [unit’s] soldiers who survived all exhibited signs of posttraumatic stress disorder and other psychological conditions. Twelve of them have been arrested for murder or attempted murder. (Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 405, 412n7 [2013] [Sotomayor, J., dissenting])","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"58 1","pages":"279 - 310"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88264169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corporate Ownership and Antitrust Violations","authors":"M. Amore, Riccardo Marzano","doi":"10.1086/717642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/717642","url":null,"abstract":"We study the relationship between corporate ownership and anticompetitive actions. Using data from Italy, we find that family firms are less likely than other firms to be involved in antitrust indictments. This result holds after controlling for several factors that are different across family and nonfamily firms and may correlate with anticompetitive behavior. Family control reduces the likelihood of antitrust indictments, especially among larger companies, which are generally more likely to be prosecuted. However, conditional on being prosecuted, family firms face the same likelihood of monetary sanctions as nonfamily firms. Collectively, our results provide new insights into the role of corporate ownership in firms’ anticompetitive behavior.","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"61 1","pages":"369 - 394"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88768686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Food Aid Cargo Preference: Impacts on the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Emergency Food Aid Programs","authors":"Philip G. Hoxie, S. Mercier, V. Smith","doi":"10.1086/718859","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/718859","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the impact of cargo preference requirements, which create market power for US-flagged ships, on the effectiveness of the Food for Peace emergency food aid program of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). We find that cargo preference requirements increase real ocean transportation costs per metric ton by 68 percent for packaged-goods shipments and 101 percent for bulk-commodity shipments. These differences in cost impacts appear to be associated with differences in the impacts of the mandate on market concentration in the packaged-goods and bulk-commodity shipment markets. These higher costs reduce USAID’s capacity to serve millions of families each year.","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"16 1","pages":"395 - 421"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77070300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Study of Umbrella Damages from Bid Rigging","authors":"El Hadi Caoui","doi":"10.1086/717755","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/717755","url":null,"abstract":"If noncartel firms adjust their pricing to the supracompetitive level sustained by a cartel, purchasers from noncartel firms may suffer umbrella damages. This paper examines the bidding behavior of noncartel firms against the Texas school milk cartel between 1980 and 1992. The largest noncartel firm bid less aggressively when facing the cartel. Structural estimation reveals that, per contract, damages due to noncartel firms bidding higher are at least 35 percent of damages caused by the cartel. Inefficiencies raise the winner’s cost by 5.9 percent. These results shed light on the importance of umbrella damages from a civil liability perspective.","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"118 1","pages":"239 - 277"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88056251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Changing Property Rights in the Family: Evidence from an Inheritance Reform","authors":"G. Bruze, Emma von Essen","doi":"10.1086/717785","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/717785","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze a Swedish reform that shifted the right to inherit an estate from children to parents. If parents are altruistic toward children and there are no transaction costs, a change of property rights in the family has no impact on the consumption of parents and children. We test and reject this prediction with new hand-collected data on wills and estates linked to panel data on labor supply and durable consumption. Our results show that the inheritance reform increased parents’ car ownership, increased the fraction of parents living in a house, and reduced parents’ labor supply. The magnitude of this response suggests that parents reacted to the reform as if all wealth previously inherited by children expanded their own budget constraint. The frequency and contents of parents’ wills reveal that many parents, especially the wealthy, used wills to protect their spouses from claims on the estate made by children.","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"144 1","pages":"343 - 368"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86196586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Organizations with Power-Hungry Agents","authors":"Wouter Dessein,Richard Holden","doi":"10.1086/718852","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/718852","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":22657,"journal":{"name":"The Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"6 1","pages":"S263-S291"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138529334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}