禁止企业捐款就够了吗?不完全竞选财务改革的动力

Diego Aparicio, Carlos F. Avenancio-León
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摘要

本文研究禁止公司捐款是否足以遏制公司影响政治的努力。我们研究了巴西2015年的竞选资金改革,该改革禁止公司提供政治捐款,但没有禁止个人提供政治捐款。改革后,捐款总额大幅减少。然而,这并不意味着对政治的影响消失了。改革前贡献高的企业的反应是在集约化边际和粗放化边际上增加个人贡献。更关键的是,个人捐款在改革后变得更有价值:禁令后个人对获胜候选人的捐款大大增加了公司的估值,从而复制了禁令前只有公司捐款才能实现的目标,并部分抵消了改革的意图。尽管如此,改革减少了总捐款,通过减少过度捐款增加了股东保护,并使公司之间的政治参与平等。此外,改革提高了贡献企业的市场估值。总的来说,不完整的竞选资金改革确实取得了显著的成功,但也存在严重的漏洞。任何出于政治目的的公司捐款都应被法律禁止;董事不应被允许将股东的钱用于此类目的;此外,这种禁止将是……制止腐败行为所针对的邪恶的有效方法。(西奥多·罗斯福,总统年度讲话,1905,40 Cong. Rec. 96[1906])禁止公司直接捐款使公司的个人成员可以自由地作出自己的捐款,并使公众很少或根本得不到实质性的信息。(联邦选举委员会诉博蒙特案,539 U.S. 146, 161[2003])公司……出于任何政治目的的一切捐款都应被法律禁止;董事不应被允许将股东的钱用于此类目的;此外,这种禁止将是……制止腐败行为所针对的邪恶的有效方法。(西奥多·罗斯福,总统年度讲话,1905,40 Cong. Rec. 96[1906])禁止公司直接捐款使公司的个人成员可以自由地作出自己的捐款,并使公众很少或根本得不到实质性的信息。(联邦选举委员会诉博蒙特案,539 U.S. 146, 161 [2003])
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Is Banning Corporate Contributions Enough? The Dynamics of Incomplete Campaign Finance Reform
This paper studies whether banning corporate contributions suffices to curb firms’ efforts to influence politics. We examine Brazil’s 2015 campaign finance reform, which banned companies from making political contributions but did not ban political contributions made by individuals. Following the reform, overall contributions decreased significantly. However, this does not mean that influence in politics disappeared. Firms with high prereform contributions responded by increasing individual donations at both the intensive and extensive margins. More critically, individual contributions became more valuable after the reform: postban individual contributions to winning candidates increased firms’ valuation substantially, thereby replicating what only corporate donations achieved preban and partially offsetting the reform’s intent. Despite this, the reform reduced total contributions, increased shareholder protection by reducing excessive contributions, and leveled political participation among firms. Moreover, the reform increased market valuations for contributing firms. Overall, incomplete campaign finance reform does deliver notable successes but has critical loopholes. All contributions by corporations … for any political purpose should be forbidden by law; directors should not be permitted to use stockholders’ money for such purposes; and, moreover, a prohibition of this kind would be … an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts. (Theodore Roosevelt, President’s Annual Message, 1905, 40 Cong. Rec. 96 [1906]) A ban on direct corporate contributions leaves individual members of corporations free to make their own contributions, and deprives the public of little or no material information. (Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 [2003]) All contributions by corporations … for any political purpose should be forbidden by law; directors should not be permitted to use stockholders’ money for such purposes; and, moreover, a prohibition of this kind would be … an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts. (Theodore Roosevelt, President’s Annual Message, 1905, 40 Cong. Rec. 96 [1906]) A ban on direct corporate contributions leaves individual members of corporations free to make their own contributions, and deprives the public of little or no material information. (Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 [2003])
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