{"title":"To Know or Not To Know: Strategic Inattention and Endogenous Market Structure","authors":"Roberto Cellini, L. Lambertini, G. Ottaviano","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2549458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2549458","url":null,"abstract":"We model an industry in which a discrete number of firms choose the output of their differentiated products deciding whether or not to consider the impact of their decisions on aggregate output. We show that two threshold numbers of firms exist such that: below the lower one there is a unique equilibrium in which all firms consider their aggregate impact as in standard oligopoly; above the higher threshold there is a unique equilibrium in which all firms disregard that impact as in standard monopolistic competition; between the two thresholds there are two equilibria, one in which all firms consider their aggregate impact and the other in which they do not. We then show that our model of “strategic inattention” is isomorphic to a model of “strategic delegation” with managerial compensation based on relative profit performance.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117113652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Metaphorical Synthesis of the Impact of Ownership on Consumer Behavior","authors":"B. Kamleitner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2770609","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2770609","url":null,"abstract":"The experience of ownership is a constituent of the human condition and is woven into the entire spectrum of consumer behaviors. Despite its overarching impact, the literature on the experience of ownership and, in particular, on its consequences on consumer behavior presents a rather fragmented picture. This review focuses on the way in which ownership brings about measurable consumer perceptions and behaviors. It synthesizes the main existing streams of research on the effects of ownership and advances the state of the art by deriving basic tenets of ownership and condensing existing knowledge into the conceptual metaphor of a person holding a balloon (symbolizing the ownership target) on a leash. The theory-generating potential of the metaphor is established by using it to propose that ownership can be viewed in terms psychological distance and by showcasing how the metaphor can be used to address multiple open questions around the experience of ownership. The result is a fresh perspective on a fundamental human phenomenon. Applying this perspective leads to theoretically and practically relevant implications and may prove useful in coming to grips with socio-economic developments such as a surge in virtual goods.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128957981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Heuristic Rules in the Field: Evidence from Royalty Shares in Scientific Teams","authors":"Reddi Kotha, D. Lovallo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2488423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2488423","url":null,"abstract":"Using field data from a large U.S. technology transfer organization with over $50 million in annual revenue, we investigate four related issues regarding the sharing of licensing revenues by academic teams. First, we find that the main empirical regularity is a heuristic-based allocation of shares 1/n, equal shares to all unique inventors in a single invention team, and the use of the partition dependence (PD) rule, whereby inventors receive equal share within an invention and shares across inventions included in the same contract are equal. Second, when we examine the performance consequences of such equal sharing, we find it is negatively related to performance. Third, using both matched sample estimations and examining strategic switchers, i.e., the case of inventors who switch between equal and unequal sharing, we find that self-selection rather than shirking explains the negative performance. Finally, the pattern of their switching is random in time — i.e., there is no movement toward unequal rules over time so inventors are not learning to use unequal rules.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124791457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Predicting R&D Investment with Ex-ante Productivity","authors":"Ziemowit Bednarek","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1695270","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1695270","url":null,"abstract":"In this article I demonstrate the relationship between research and development expenditure and firm productivity. Using data envelopment, I construct a measure of the firm-level distance from the industry-wide productivity frontier. Firms ex ante further from the productivity frontier invest more in R&D. On average, a 1% larger distance from the frontier causes a 0.6% to 1.2% increase in the R&D intensity next quarter. The effect is statistically and economically significant.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128242787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Dividend Policy: A Cross-Country Analysis","authors":"Wolfgang Breuer, M. Rieger, Can K. Soypak","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1804265","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1804265","url":null,"abstract":"We study a model that relates dividend payout policy to behavioral issues based on the ideas of mental accounting. A panel analysis across 29 countries and over 43,000 firm-years demonstrates that our model studying the relation between dividends and patience, loss aversion, and ambiguity aversion can be verified empirically. Our paper seems to be the first that highlights empirically in a straightforward way the relevance of behavioral patterns as important determinants for corporate dividend policy, while previous empirical studies could tackle this issue only indirectly. With several robustness tests we also address potential doubts concerning the quality of our data and analyze further implications of our theory.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"7 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120997950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Preemptive Bidding, Target Resistance, and Takeover Premiums","authors":"T. Dimopoulos, Stefano Sacchetto","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1945837","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1945837","url":null,"abstract":"We evaluate empirically two sources of large takeover premiums: preemptive bidding and target resistance. We develop an auction model that features costly sequential entry of bidders in takeover contests and encompasses both explanations. We estimate the model parameters by simulated method of moments for a sample of US takeovers. Our estimates imply that target resistance explains the entire magnitude of the premium in 74% of successful single-bidder contests. Simulation experiments show that initial bidders have, on average, a higher valuation for the target than rival bidders, so that a relatively low initial bid is sufficient to deter a rival from entry.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134408113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Gas Network and Market: À La Carte?","authors":"M. Vázquez, M. Hallack, J. Glachant","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2378838","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2378838","url":null,"abstract":"The institutional setting of open gas networks and markets is revealing considerably diverse and diverging roads taken by the US, the EU or Australia. We will show that this is explained by key choices made in the liberalization process. This liberalization is based on a redefinition of the property rights associated with transmission grid usage. That leads to different systems for the transmission services, as well as for the gas commodity trade, which in turn depends on the network services to get any market deal actually implemented. Not only do those choices depend on the physical architecture of the network, but also the perceived difficulties and costs to coordinate the actual transmission services through certain market arrangements.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115029752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Minghua Chen, Adam D. Rennhoff, Konstantinos Serfes
{"title":"Bundling, A La Carte Pricing and Vertical Bargaining in a Two-Sided Model","authors":"Minghua Chen, Adam D. Rennhoff, Konstantinos Serfes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1748564","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1748564","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a two-sided market model with an upstream–downstream structure. More specifically, the platform consists of two rival upstream firms and a downstream monopolist. Each upstream firm negotiates the input price (license fee) with the downstream monopolist and also chooses the amount of advertising that is embedded in the good it sells to the downstream monopolist. The downstream monopolist can offer the two goods either on an a la carte basis or as a bundle. We use this model to understand the incentives to bundle and the welfare properties of bundling in a two-sided market framework. We also contribute to the ongoing debate on a la carte pricing in the TV industry, where the two upstream firms can be viewed as two rival TV networks and the downstream monopolist as a cable operator. We show that an a la carte regulation will raise consumer surplus and downstream profit, while it will decrease the profits of the upstream TV networks.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133236294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Price-Setting Behavior with Menu Costs – Experimental Evidence","authors":"Andreas Orland, Michael W. M. Roos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2325290","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2325290","url":null,"abstract":"We experimentally test the price-setting behavior of firms in the Rotemberg (1982) model in order to explain puzzles in the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC). By constructing categories and a quantitative measure that compare behavior with optimum we find heterogeneous price-setting behavior by degree of information acquired about the future. Subjects rarely use past information, but overweight their own past price. We study the impact of heterogeneous price-setting behavior on estimated theoretically derived and hybrid Phillips curves. We find support for features of both NKPCs in our findings at the micro level. But the hybrid NKPC has a superior fit.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121673884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hedge Fund Replication: Putting the Pieces Together","authors":"Vincent Weber, Florian Peres","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2202270","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2202270","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we aim to bring together into one common framework various advances in factor-based hedge fund replication. Our replication methodology relies on a set of investable dynamic risk factors extracted from futures contract prices and on an automatic variable and model selection procedure. The methodology is then validated by creating out-of-sample replicating portfolios for the monthly returns of more than 7,000 hedge funds ranging from 2006 to 2012 and under the assumption of transaction costs. Our results suggest that hedge fund replication is on average possible and works best for liquid strategies.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122824524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}