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ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)最新文献

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Neoliberalism and Economic Sovereignty: Property, Contracts, and Foreign Investment Relations 新自由主义与经济主权:财产、合同和外国投资关系
ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-11-17 DOI: 10.4324/9781315544106-9
Nicolás M. Perrone
{"title":"Neoliberalism and Economic Sovereignty: Property, Contracts, and Foreign Investment Relations","authors":"Nicolás M. Perrone","doi":"10.4324/9781315544106-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315544106-9","url":null,"abstract":"The objective of this chapter is to explore the proprietary and contractual techniques that serve to allocate control over resources in the context of neoliberal legality, using foreign investment relations as a case study. This chapter seeks to examine how the dominant legal techniques make possible ‘the impossibility of the existence of an economic sovereign’.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129085551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Governance Structures and Trust: A Study of Real Estate Networks 治理结构与信任:房地产网络研究
ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-09-01 DOI: 10.3920/JCNS2015.0008
J. Boaventura, Adriano Augusto Costa Carnauba, E. Todeva, A. Azevedo, Eduardo Armando
{"title":"Governance Structures and Trust: A Study of Real Estate Networks","authors":"J. Boaventura, Adriano Augusto Costa Carnauba, E. Todeva, A. Azevedo, Eduardo Armando","doi":"10.3920/JCNS2015.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3920/JCNS2015.0008","url":null,"abstract":"The present study aimed at verifying how different modes of governance structure are linked to different levels of interorganisational trust. Its theoretical grounding involves Transaction Cost Theory, which studies governance of interorganisational arrangements and research on trust in the business field. A descriptive and quantitative approach has been adopted to describe the relation between trust amongst business network participants and the mode of governance adopted by the surveyed networks. Hence, a detailed questionnaire has been employed, which was answered by 35 real estate agency managers, whose participation was directly linked to 11 business networks. By using Spearman methods of identification of non-parametric correlation and correspondence analysis, it was possible to verify that certain modes of governance structure associate with different levels of trust. Considering the scarcity of quantitative research on the theme, this paper contributes to the field by presenting results which point out that collectively-managed governance of regional cooperation networks is linked to high levels of trust; whereas governance of dispersed networks with the presence of a lead company are linked to low levels of trust. Medium levels of trust were observed in networks governed by an administrative organisation. Considering the practical aspect of administration in networks, one can conclude that the process of governance structure in such interorganisational arrangements should include deliberations about the influence of the adopted mode of governance on trust amongst participants. The paper does not allow generalizations of its conclusions beyond its chosen sample.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128710873","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
There are No Preconditions for the Investment Growth in Russia 俄罗斯的投资增长没有先决条件
ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-07-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2815445
B. Taganov
{"title":"There are No Preconditions for the Investment Growth in Russia","authors":"B. Taganov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2815445","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2815445","url":null,"abstract":"In the short term, Russia will have low investment activity both on the part of foreign and domestic investors due to the low quality of the institutional environment and high risks. Analysis of various indices movement demonstrates that so far there are no preconditions for wide scale private investment in Russia. Safeguarding of the total inviolability of property rights represents major precondition for the improvement of the investment climate in Russia. This basic for the civilized societies in the 21st century condition would have improved the investment climate in the country and would have put Russia on the path of long-term economic growth.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132729634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Short and Long Run Uncertainty 短期和长期的不确定性
ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-07-08 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2807456
Jose Maria Barrero, N. Bloom, Ian J. Wright
{"title":"Short and Long Run Uncertainty","authors":"Jose Maria Barrero, N. Bloom, Ian J. Wright","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2807456","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2807456","url":null,"abstract":"Uncertainty appears to have both a short-run and a long-run component, which we measure using firm and macro implied volatility data from options of 30 days to 10 years duration. We ask what may be driving uncertainty over these different time horizons, finding that oil price volatility is particularly important for short-run uncertainty, policy uncertainty is particularly important for long-run uncertainty, while currency volatility and CEO turnover appear to equally impact short- and long-run uncertainty. Examining a panel of over 4,000 firms from 1996 to 2013 we find that R&D is relatively more sensitive to long-run uncertainty than investment, and in turn investment is relatively more sensitive to long-run uncertainty than hiring. In a simulation model we investigate the channels underlying this pecking-order response to long-run uncertainty, and show that lower depreciation rates and higher adjustment costs lead R&D and investment to be more sensitive to longer-run uncertainty than hiring. Collectively, these results suggest that recent events that have raised long-run policy uncertainty may be particularly damaging to growth by reducing R&D and investment.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128108417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 80
Fundamentación De Los Derechos De Propiedad: Clásicos Y Modernos (Founding Property Rights: The Classics and the Moderns) 知识产权基础:古典与现代(知识产权基础:古典与现代)
ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-06-14 DOI: 10.18601/01245996.V18N34.02
Michel S. Zouboulakis
{"title":"Fundamentación De Los Derechos De Propiedad: Clásicos Y Modernos (Founding Property Rights: The Classics and the Moderns)","authors":"Michel S. Zouboulakis","doi":"10.18601/01245996.V18N34.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18601/01245996.V18N34.02","url":null,"abstract":"Spanish Abstract: La historia de un concepto a veces descubre representaciones mentales y expresiones particulares que revelan desarrollos teoricos distintos. Aunque el analisis economico de los derechos de propiedad fue iniciado a comienzos de los anos sesenta por Alchian, Coase y Demsetz, el concepto era conocido para los economistas clasicos. En su sentido amplio, la definicion de derechos de propiedad estaba presente en las Lecturas sobre jurisprudencia de Adam Smith. Evoluciono notablemente con Ricardo, Senior y J. S. Mill. Recordar las ideas de los clasicos acerca de los derechos de propiedad y del uso de los factores de produccion –trabajo, tierra y capital– y su producto mejorara en forma visible el debate actual.English Abstract: The history of a concept sometimes discovers mental representations and particular expressions that reveal distinct theoretical developments. Although the economic analysis in terms of “property rights” started in the early 1960’s by Alchian, Coase and Demsetz, the concept itself was familiar to Classical Political Economists. In its broad sense, the definition of property rights was present in Adam Smith’s Lectures of 1762-63. It evolved significantly with Ricardo (1817), Senior (1836), and J.S. Mill (1848). Recalling the ideas of the Classics about the rights to own and use the basic production factors -namely labour, land and capital- and their output, will considerably improve the current debate.)","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125208470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Piracy in Commercial vs. Open-Source Software Competition 商业软件与开源软件竞争中的盗版问题
ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-03-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2743290
A. Gramstad
{"title":"Piracy in Commercial vs. Open-Source Software Competition","authors":"A. Gramstad","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2743290","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2743290","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies pricing strategies for a commercial software provider who faces competition from both a free-of-charge open-source software substitute and illegal copies of its own product. When network externalities are present, the commercial software provider may choose to set a price sufficiently low such that a critical mass of users is not attainable for the open-source product, which consequently reduces the value of open-source software. I coin this pricing strategy “network limit pricing”. Due to lack of network benefits, network limit pricing leads to increased quality differences between the commercial and open-source products, which consequently leads to a market dominated by the commercial software product. Software piracy strengthens the incentives of imposing network limit pricing. This is because piracy takes over parts of the open-source product's market share, and because the price decrease to network limit pricing is lower, which reduces the opportunity cost of imposing this pricing strategy.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132487434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
An Incompatible Activities Mechanism 不相容活动机制
ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic) Pub Date : 2016-01-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2716218
J. Daniel
{"title":"An Incompatible Activities Mechanism","authors":"J. Daniel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2716218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2716218","url":null,"abstract":"This paper designs a mechanism that generalizes Ronald Coase’s farmer-rancher example of nuisance law from his seminal article, “The Problem of Social Costs.” The mechanism incentivizes truthful reporting of the agents’ private net benefits and costs of bilateral activity levels, thereby addressing Coase’s concern that judges might not know how to determine the optimal activity levels. The model determines a property rights regime endogenously as a dominant strategy equilibrium that enables strategic agents with asymmetric information to arrive at efficient outcomes. Mechanism design encompasses the Pigouvian-social-planner and Coasean-transaction-cost paradigms as special cases, while accommodating alternative societal objectives, various equilibrium concepts, endogenous transaction costs, strategic agents, private information, truthful revelation of private costs and benefits, incentive compatibility, voluntary participation, and budgetary feasibility. These features extend previous paradigms and test their robustness in more sophisticated economic environments. The mechanism design paradigm provides modern theoretical foundations for economic analysis of law.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127165225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Patent Success, Patent Holdup, and the Structure of Property Rights 专利成功、专利劫持与产权结构
ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-09-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2662478
Heng Geng, H. Hau, Sandy Lai
{"title":"Patent Success, Patent Holdup, and the Structure of Property Rights","authors":"Heng Geng, H. Hau, Sandy Lai","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2662478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2662478","url":null,"abstract":"When innovation is cumulative, patent protection on early inventions can generate holdup problems if later complementary patents are owned by different firms. Consistent with the property rights literature, we show that shareholder ownership overlap across firms with patent complementarities helps mitigate such holdup problems and correlates significantly with higher R&D investment, more patent success, and lower patent infringement litigation risk for firms with follow-on innovations. The positive innovation effect is strongest for concentrated overlapping ownership and for the cases in which overlapping shareholders are dedicated investors, with long investment horizons and underdiversified portfolios.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127381057","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 13
Aggregate Consequences of Dynamic Credit Relationships 动态信用关系的综合后果
ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-08-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2874084
Stéphane Verani
{"title":"Aggregate Consequences of Dynamic Credit Relationships","authors":"Stéphane Verani","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2874084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2874084","url":null,"abstract":"Which financial frictions matter in the aggregate? This paper presents a general equilibrium model in which entrepreneurs finance a firm with a long-term contract. The contract is constrained efficient because firm revenue is costly to monitor and entrepreneurs may default. The cost of monitoring firms and the entrepreneurs' outside options determine the significance of moral hazard relative to limited enforcement for financial contracting. Calibrating the model to the U.S. economy, I find that the relative welfare loss from financial frictions is about 5 percent in terms of aggregate consumption with moral hazard, while it is 1 percent with limited enforcement. Reforms designed to strengthen contract enforcement increase aggregate consumption in the short-run, but their long-run effects are modest when monitoring costs are high. Weak contract enforcement contribute to aggregate fluctuations by amplifying the effect of aggregate technological shocks, but moral hazard does not.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130475808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
Rivalry Restraint as Equilibrium Behavior 竞争约束作为均衡行为
ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic) Pub Date : 2015-03-01 DOI: 10.1111/jems.12081
E. Dockner, Clemens Löffler
{"title":"Rivalry Restraint as Equilibrium Behavior","authors":"E. Dockner, Clemens Löffler","doi":"10.1111/jems.12081","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12081","url":null,"abstract":"type=\"main\"> Rivalry restraint has received a lot of attention as a theory of profits in recent research on business strategy. Its economic rationale is explained as the consequences of either exogenous or endogenous anticompetitive forces present in different industries. In this paper, we use a dynamic oligopolistic industry model and show that rivalry restraint emerges as equilibrium behavior among firm owners who delegate decisions to managers. In the corresponding two-stage game, managers choose optimal production rates in a dynamic Cournot market and owners set incentives for managers, acting sequentially rational. Equilibrium incentives correspond to rivalry restraint, that is, managers are less aggressive in the product market with lower outputs and increasing profits for all firms in the industry.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"119756707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
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