ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Waves of Infrastructure Making: Winds of Change and Streams of Research","authors":"Gianluca Miscione","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3912193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3912193","url":null,"abstract":"Contemporary world faces increasing complexity also because all societies are increasingly bound together by information infrastructures, so research on them gains explanatory power beyond infrastructures themselves. The problems addressed by this paper are, first the extension of the empirical boundaries beyond “the North”, usually confining what is studied about information technologies, although they exceed it by far. Second, the long term evolution of infrastructures is put in relation to the variety of social contexts and accountabilities that shape them. The tensions between practice and research are presented in their open-ended unfolding. Finally, technological fashions are proposed as a key to interpret how “waves” of infrastructure making create and sediment in these artefacts. The fifteen years of the large project presented here, coincidental with the “information age”, reveal aspects of the globally dispersed contexts affected.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116785758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Dark Side of Patents: Strategic Patenting, Product Market Entry and Competitor Innovation","authors":"M. Kurakina","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3900690","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3900690","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses how strategic patenting effects market concentration, entry, and competitor productivity and patenting. We introduce a new market-based classification of patent as strategic patenting and start by showing that this novel measure offers improvements over those in the extant literature. We find that when firms strategically patent, overall market concentration increases and entry is deterred. Further, competitor firms experience a decline in total factor productivity following a publication of a focal firm's strategic patent. These effects are more pronounced in capital-intensive firms and technological proximate peer groups. Overall these findings demonstrate the tensions inherent in designing patent policies that promote focal firm innovation, while preventing the stifling of competitor innovation.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125306432","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Economics, Capitalism, and Corporations: Contradictions of Corporate Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm","authors":"W. Huber","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3745306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3745306","url":null,"abstract":"This book is an extension of Corporate Law and the Theory of the Firm: Reconstructing Corporations, Shareholders, Directors, Owners, and Investors, which was an exposé of the contradictions of contract law, property law, agency law, trust law, and corporate law and from which some portions of this book are adopted and summarized with permission. This book delves much more deeply into the contradictions between corporate law and the economic theory of the firm and expands the analysis into the contradictions between corporate law and economics, finance, and accounting. It reveals how the term, and therefore the concept, of “capital” has been distorted and how “capitalist” and “capitalism” as a social system have been twisted and perverted.<br><br>The book begins with a brief review of corporate law and its contradictions, including property law and agency law, in order to establish the context and provide a foundation for an analysis of corporations and economic considerations, finance considerations, investment considerations, and accounting considerations. <br><br>Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure is considered the classic on the “theory of the firm.” Jensen and Meckling attempt to “integrate elements from the theory of agency, the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm” (p. 305). While it was successful in launching an entirely new branch of literature on the economic theory of the firm, it was an abject failure in achieving its objective. It did not integrate elements from the theory of agency with the theory of property rights and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm because it not just ignored, but made assumptions contradicted by, corporate law, property law, and agency law. <br><br>Their approach was backwards. They (attempted to) use the theory of agency, the theory of property rights, and the theory of finance to develop a theory of the ownership structure of the firm rather than establishing the legal ownership structure of the firm as determined by agency law and property law to develop an economic theory of the firm. Property law determines the ownership of the firm, and agency law determines the relationship of directors and shareholders. It is only after the legal ownership structure of the firm and the relationship of corporations, directors, and shareholders are determined that the economic and finance theory of firm can be developed. But Jensen and Meckling completely ignored an analysis of property law and agency law, choosing rather merely to rest on invalid assumptions and unjustified conclusions about the relationship of property law and agency law to corporations. <br><br>Jensen and Meckling’s Theory of the Firm, along with Fama and Jensen’s 1983 Separation of ownership and control laid the groundwork of the economic “theory of the firm.” ","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127514223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How to Use Natural Experiments to Measure Misallocation","authors":"D. Sraer, D. Thesmar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3099007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3099007","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a method to estimate the effect of firm policies (e.g., bankruptcy laws or subsidized credit) on allocative efficiency using (quasi-) experimental evidence. Our approach takes general equilibrium effects into account and requires neither a structural estimation nor a precise assumption on how the experiment affects firms. Our aggregation formula relies on treatment effects of the policy on the distribution of output-to-capital ratios, which are easily estimated in (quasi-) experimental data. We show that this method is valid as long as the true data-generating process belongs to a large class of commonly-used models in macro-finance. Finally, we apply this method to the French banking deregulation episode of the mid-1980s and find that this reform led to an increase in aggregate TFP of 2.7%.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124439049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Ownership of User-Held Data: Why Property Law Is the Right Approach","authors":"Paulius Jurčys, Christopher Donewald, M. Fenwick, Markus Lampinen, A. Smaliukas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3711017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3711017","url":null,"abstract":"The main thesis of this article is that individuals should own their user-held data. Rapidly developing data processing technologies empowers individuals to collect their data from different sources and retain it in personal data clouds. Such user-held data represents the most accurate, up-to-date, and rich information about the individual. We show that user-held data meets all the requirements of an ‘asset’ in property laws regardless of the fact that data could be deemed as being intangible. More specifically, we show that such user-held data is specifically defined, has independent economic value to the individual, and can be freely alienated. We focus on property law aspects of data ownership and prove that user-held data should be treated as an ‘asset’. We submit that the economic benefits property law type of entitlements over user-held data are superior over the set of data rights that are afforded by public law instruments (such as the GDPR or the CCPA) to individuals vis-a-vis third-party service providers who hold and benefit enormously from the information about individuals. Recognition of ownership rights is a necessary precondition for building a new data ecosystem where data is separate from applications; and where applications developed by third parties run on top of user held data. We show how user-held data is changing the understanding of the meaning of data portability and opens the opportunities for more fair, ethical, and transparent use of data and opens a level playing field for businesses to compete in providing bespoke services to individual consumers.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"351 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133621963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Elinor Ostrom’s ‘Realist Orientation’: An Investigation of the Ontological Commitments of her Analysis of the Possibility of Self-Governance","authors":"P. Lewis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3697125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3697125","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores how a consideration of ontological issues - that is, issues concerned the nature of social reality - informed Elinor Ostrom's analysis of the possibility that local communities can successfully govern common property resources. It is suggested that several ontological issues informed Ostrom's work: the distinction between brute and institutional facts; the openness of the social world; the nature of human agency; the configural nature of social rules; the relationship between social structure and human agency; and the complexity of the social world, viewed as a nested hierarchy of emergent systems. It is argued moreover that Ostrom adopted a ‘realist orientation’, whereby she adjusted her methods of analysis to fit her vision of the nature of the social world. In documenting how this realist orientation informed Ostrom’s work, the paper also contributes to research on the role of ontological thinking in the history of economics.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121318332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Coase Theorem Tested in China","authors":"P. Schwartz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3695507","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3695507","url":null,"abstract":"The Coase doctrine is usually presented as a static theorem purporting to explain the spontaneous correction of market defects by agreement between affected parties. However, as Stigler formulated it, those results are only reached under the questionable assumptions of zero transaction costs, well-defined property rights, and independence from the distributive effects of the agreements. The lack of realism of these assumptions has resulted in the unfortunate persistence in applying the statist theory of market defects as proclaimed by Pigou. The spectacular progress of the Chinese economy after Mao, as analyzed by Ronald Coase and Ning Wang.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116675585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Investment Expenditures and the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism","authors":"T. Lambert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3636968","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3636968","url":null,"abstract":"There is a great deal of literature on the role of capital investment in the economic transition from feudalism to capitalism. Investment in capital and new technology and agricultural techniques has not been considered worthwhile in a medieval economy because of a lack of strong peasant property rights and no incentive on the part of lords and barons to lend money to peasant farmers. Therefore, the medieval economy and standards of living at that time have been characterized as non-dynamic and static due to insufficient investment in innovative techniques and technology. The capital investment undertaken typically would have been in livestock, homes, or public investment in canals, bridges, and roads, although investment in the latter would have been hindered by a fragmented political system of fiefdoms and lack of a unified national government. This paper attempts to demonstrate empirically that a productive and sufficient level of investment out of accumulated capital income, taxation, and rents does not have a real impact on economic per capita growth until the 1600s in Britain perhaps due to the beginning of a strong, central government as well as to the level of capital, tax, and land income achieving an adequate threshold amount and providing some type of investment multiplier effect. A high wage share as a portion of national income also appears to be associated with higher investment levels. The types of investment, threshold amounts of investment out of profits and rents, and the price of labor seem to matter when it comes to raising GDP per capita to higher levels.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126346540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reconsidering the Dual Nature of Property Rights: Personal Property and Capital in the Law and Economics of Property Rights","authors":"E. Rossi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3659193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3659193","url":null,"abstract":"In the last two decades, a renewed interest in property rights have challenged the accepted interpretation of property rights as “bundle of rights” over the use of things and have rehabilitated the old classical interpretation of property rights as exclusive (absolute) dominium over things rooted in the right to exclude. This paper provides a three-dimensional framework for the study of property rights and shows that, historically, the reason for this dual nature of property rights derives from the fact that properties can either be treated as personal property, or capital. While the classical approach is consistent with the former interpretation, the neoclassical (“bundle of right”) approach is consistent with the latter. By reinterpreting the dual nature of property rights as a dichotomy between capital and personal property the work makes two main contributions to the debates in the legal and economic literature. First, it re-evaluates and justifies the interpretation of property rights as a “politically-embedded” bundle of right provided by legal realist, old progressive and institutional economists at the turn of the twentieth century. Second, it reassesses the conclusions reached by the Coasean legacy in law and economics; the paper shows that transaction costs are necessary and sufficient to explain the emergence and the form of legal institutions only in pure capitalistic societies, but cannot explain the emergence and the nature of legal institutions whenever personal properties are involved. Additional normative assumptions explaining the origin and the legitimacy of value judgments are needed to understand and explain the dual nature of property rights and to make sense of the decisions to employ personal properties as capital (or vice versa). This highlights the often neglected (but decisive) role played by the rationality assumption in legitimizing the normative conclusions reached by Coasean law and economics (and welfare economics more generally). It also highlights that the normative power of transaction costs is always institutiondetermined (socially-embedded), never institution-determining.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"494 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131421059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"How Property Formalization Schemes Affect Land Tenure Security? A Game Theoretical Perspective","authors":"Aleksandar Stojanovic","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3631794","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3631794","url":null,"abstract":"Game theory modeling of the evolution of property rights has paid little attention to the issues of formalization of property rights in land. In developing economies where customary legal arrangements are pervasive, formalization of these rights can play a crucial step in unlocking the growth potential of the local economy. However, there is evidence that the interaction between the newly introduced formalization mechanism and the existing customary system can instead, create further land tenure insecurity. I develop the hawk-dove model to include the choice of formalization of property rights. The model shows that a newly introduced formalization mechanism can lead to a secure system of land tenure if (1) it is effective enough for the parties that register unilaterally to fully capture the original value of the plot and (2) sufficiently harshly punishes those that take an aggressive stance towards the registering party (3) and signals that possession will be decisive if multiple parties attempt to register the same plot. Furthermore, depending on the height of the fees of adjudication when both parties attempt to register the same plot, the English Rule (i.e. shifting the court fee to the loosing party) can incentivize parties to engage in registration selectively. Finally, the attractiveness of registration will rarely diminish even if the cooperation within a customary system is highly beneficial, thus sometimes leading to suboptimal outcomes.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"286 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121372458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}