{"title":"Property Rights and Inefficient Bargaining in 1970's Television","authors":"Ankur Chavda","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3613688","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3613688","url":null,"abstract":"Under property rights theory, ex-post decision rights determine the incentive regime that drives total surplus while efficient ex-post renegotiation over that surplus makes asset ownership itself irrelevant. Using the introduction of a restriction on asset ownership in the US broadcast television industry that did not alter decision rights, this paper shows causal effects inconsistent with asset ownership being irrelevant to contracting. Qualitative evidence suggests this inconsistency results from inefficient ex-post bargaining due to asymmetric ex-post information. Implications of this paper’s results include reevaluating the assumptions underlying property rights theory and the theory’s applicability in settings where bargaining may be inefficient.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129775951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Natural Selection: A Review of Studies on Firms’ Exit and Efficiency","authors":"H. Uchida","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3662911","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3662911","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we review the studies on the relation between firms’ efficiency or profitability and their exit. Although we take it for granted that inefficient or unprofitable firms are more likely to exit, which we call the natural selection hypothesis, some theories predict that it is not necessarily the case. After reviewing these theories, we sort out a large amount of empirical studies that report direct and related evidence on the relation between efficiency or profitability and exit.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121697673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Effect of Asset Ownership on Project Selection: Evidence from 1970's Television","authors":"Ankur Chavda","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3498391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3498391","url":null,"abstract":"Existing theoretical and empirical work on contracting highlights the efficiency gains possible from optimizing asset ownership when projects span firm boundaries. However, in settings where firms are able to choose among heterogenous projects, asset ownership can also determine which projects are selected for execution. Using a regulatory shock to the US broadcast television industry, this study finds restricting television network ownership over television shows altered the types of shows commissioned by the networks. This result extends prior theoretical and empirical work on contracting by showing asset ownership not only determines the efficiency of outcomes given a project but also can change the relative attractiveness of different projects. The relationship between asset ownership and project selection is especially important in innovation contexts where project selection has a cumulative effect by changing the marginal returns to future projects; an industry’s contracting environment can therefore be a driver of the direction of innovation.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130554552","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Firm Integration and Supply Chains","authors":"Shresth Garg, Pulak Ghosh, B. Tan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3507714","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3507714","url":null,"abstract":"Vertical integration is central to understanding patterns of economic activity, but there has been limited empirical work measuring the extent to which firms own and utilize direct upstream and downstream production links for sourcing physical inputs. We use administrative data from Karnataka, India on the movement of goods, both within and outside the firm, and find that 13% of input value can be sourced from vertically integrated upstream establishments. Of this potential 13%, somewhere between 30 - 40% of trade actually materializes. This suggests that the supply of physical goods along the production chain is an important rationale for vertical integration. Notably, within the set of vertically integrated firms, firms which source at least one product from within account for over three-quarters of economic activity. We look at factors associated with the decision to source a given product from within, and find that firm size, distance to outside and within firm suppliers, frequency of input requirement, product relationship specificity, volume, R&D requirements and competition both upstream and downstream are important factors. Finally, we look at factors associated with the ownership of an vertically integrated establishment and find that firm size, product specificity, R&D requirements and competition matter.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"328 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132651510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"David vs. Goliath in the Digital Age: The Effect of Network Structure and Content on the Adoption of Cultural Products","authors":"Jamie Seo Yeon Song, Martin Gargiulo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3403509","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3403509","url":null,"abstract":"Social media platforms have transformed the way with which communication among industry players and relevant audiences can influence adoption of a cultural product. Using Twitter conversations regarding eBooks sold on Amazon.com between 2014 and 2015, this paper studies how producers in the U.S. publishing industry benefit differentially from Twitter network structure and contents. We find that generalists such as the Big Five publishers gain advantage from controversial contents that appeal to the general public whereas peripheral specialists such as indie publishers benefit from network redundancy and consensus of opinion within niche communities. By finding how producers targeting different audiences benefit from online network structure and content, we explore different strategies with which respective players can leverage social media platforms and accrue competitive advantage.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125683939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Overview of the Global Pharma Industry’s New Trends","authors":"M. Ponce","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3397618","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3397618","url":null,"abstract":"This study is a synthesis of the three main drivers that are exerting influence on the global pharmaceutical industry: 1) mergers and acquisitions, 2) R&D changes, and 3) a new pricing context. During the last decades, there has been a revolution in drug discovery and development thanks to pharmacogenomics, proteomics, molecular biology, bioinformatics, biomarker-driven studies, systems therapeutics, drug-target interaction prediction and artificial intelligence. However, there are signs that a problem of excessive pricing of prescription pharmaceuticals is creating awareness among stakeholders that this situation is unsustainable with clear consequences for the global pharmaceutical industry´s predominant business model.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134539111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Public Goods, Property Rights, and Investment Incentives: An Experimental Investigation","authors":"D. Kusterer, P. Schmitz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3340856","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3340856","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How should ownership rights be allocated in public-good settings? We report data from a laboratory experiment with 480 participants that was designed to test a public-good version of the property rights theory based on incomplete contracting. Consider two parties, one of whom can invest in the provision of a public good. The parties value the public good differently. In the literature it has been argued that more investments will be made if the high-valuation party is the owner, regardless of whether or not this party is the investor. Our experimental results cast some doubts on the robustness of this conclusion.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114445766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Empirical Evidence of a Negative Marginal Product of Capital","authors":"Robert James","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3158021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3158021","url":null,"abstract":"If increased capital purchases lowers a firm's after-tax price of capital, the firm's marginal product of capital can be negative. The purpose of this paper is to explore empirical evidence of a negative marginal product of capital. Both macroeconomic evidence (Okun's Law) and microeconomic evidence (the wage elasticity of labor supply for individual firms) appear to imply a negative marginal product of capital for many if not most firms.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116037399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Search Diversion","authors":"Linfeng Chen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3320947","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3320947","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a Hotelling model to deal with search diversion as a continuous variable for complements and substitutes. We examine a fixed gain from trade for complements and substitutes and endogenize the gain from trade. We propose the multi-demand model with linear demand. Further, we model the search diversion as advertising. We identify the conditions under which the equilibrium diversion is socially efficient, excessive, or insufficient. We also analyze the effect of diversion on firms' profits and consumer surplus.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132882148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Resolving China's Zombies: Tackling Debt and Raising Productivity","authors":"W. Lam, A. Schipke, Tan Zhibo","doi":"10.5089/9781484330722.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484330722.001","url":null,"abstract":"Nonviable “zombie” firms have become a key concern in China. Using novel firm-level industrial survey data, this paper illustrates the central role of zombies and their strong linkages with stateowned enterprises (SOEs) in contributing to debt vulnerabilities and low productivity. As a group, zombie firms and SOEs account for an outsized share of corporate debt, contribute to much of the rise in debt, and face weak fundamentals. Empirical results also show that resolving these weak firms can generate significant gains of 0.7–1.2 percentage points in long-term growth per year. These results also shed light on the ongoing government strategy to tackle these issues by evaluating the effects of different restructuring options. In particular, deleveraging, reducing government subsidies, as well as operational restructuring through divestment and reducing redundancy have significant benefits in restoring corporate performance for zombie firms.","PeriodicalId":224966,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Firm Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights (Topic)","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115430974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}