{"title":"Does Art Need Copyright After All","authors":"A. K. Brankov","doi":"10.7916/JLA.V43I3.5879","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/JLA.V43I3.5879","url":null,"abstract":"As part of my law practice, I am often asked to counsel clients concerning the purchase and sale of works of art, and questions about the copyrightability of these artworks come up in various ways. Unlike some other forms of cultural production, the main way visual artists benefit economically from the production of their work is not from royalties from the sale of copies of the work, but rather is from the sale of the physical artwork itself. Perhaps that is why, putting aside photographers, visual artists do not commonly register their works in a routine manner. Registration certainly occurs, but it is not an artist’s everyday practice to register a work after she creates it. This can be frustrating because when considering whether and how a work is protected by the copyright law, one of the first things lawyers do is look to see whether there is a copyright registration for the work.","PeriodicalId":222420,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114612434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"U.S. Law’s Artificial Cabining of Moral Rights: The Copyrightability Prerequisite and Cady Noland’s Log Cabin","authors":"Megan E. Noh","doi":"10.7916/JLA.V43I3.5878","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/JLA.V43I3.5878","url":null,"abstract":"In currently pending litigation, Cady Noland has sought to exercise the rights of attribution and integrity in relation to Log Cabin Facade; in this context, the Office’s denial of registration has resulted in complex legal arguments with both philosophical and practical implications. Against the backdrop of the Log Cabin controversy, this Article probes the conflict between the values and objectives underlying moral rights versus the “dominant,” economic theory of pre-existing copyright law. A critical question emerges: whether the “safeguards” imposed by limitations on the scope of copyrightability logically apply to the grant or denial of certain core moral rights protections for the single, original “copy” of an artwork. Concluding that they do not, this Article argues that recognition of an object as “artwork” by the relevant artistic community should “wag the dog” with respect to the artwork’s entitlement to such core moral rights protections, irrespective of its copyrightability.","PeriodicalId":222420,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128354297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Shifting IP Battlegrounds in the U.S.–China Trade War","authors":"Jyh-An Lee","doi":"10.7916/JLA.V43I2.4740","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/JLA.V43I2.4740","url":null,"abstract":"Intellectual property (“IP”) represents one of the main controversies of U.S.– China trade relations in the past three decades and remains one of the core issues behind the two countries’ recent trade frictions. This Article provides an overview of the current IP debates between the two largest economies in the world. It illustrates the transformation of the Chinese government’s role from inactive IP law enforcer to active facilitator of access to and acquisition of foreign technologies. This study further explains how China’s approach to learning western technologies has transformed from low-end imitation to gaining a controlling stake in foreign companies via joint ventures or outbound investments. More importantly, this Article discusses the legal and policy implications of the IP issues in this trade war. I argue that the recent IP trade war represents the struggle for global technological leadership as well as a new institutional competition in the post-Cold War era. Moreover, China’s “economic aggression,” as the United States understands it, has caused a number of unsolved issues for the international IP regime, which include the justification of China’s controversial IP policies for the purpose of industrial catch-up as well as the evidentiary and legal bases for holding China liable for its economic aggression in relation to IP.","PeriodicalId":222420,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114844543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reinvigorating Human Rights in Internet Governance: The UDRP Procedure Through the Lens of International Human Rights Principles","authors":"Monika Zalnieriute","doi":"10.7916/JLA.V43I2.4741","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/JLA.V43I2.4741","url":null,"abstract":"An international legal framework for resolving disputes between trademark owners and domain name holders, the Uniform Domain Names Disputes Resolution Policy (“UDRP”), purports to address economic interests; however, fundamental human rights are indirectly implicated in the process (for example, the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful enjoyment of one’s property) or are ingrained within the procedure itself (such as the right to due process). The UDRP was created in 1998 by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”), which has recently adopted in its organizational bylaws a “Core Value” of respecting “internationally recognized human rights.” In light of these institutional changes, in this Article, I chart the international human rights implications of the procedural aspects of the UDRP. I will show how the UDRP’s procedural elements raise numerous due process concerns regarding the deprivation of property rights, which are recognized in international human rights instruments, and make concrete proposals to improve procedural aspects of the policy in the upcoming UDRP review in 2020. To bring the UDRP procedure in line with “internationally recognized human rights,” the upcoming review should: (1) introduce a clear choice-of law clause in the UDRP; (2) develop uniform “Supplemental Rules” at ICANN level to increase uniformity and consistency of the UDRP system; (3) introduce a requirement to disclose and publish all UDRP decisions and statistics; (4) develop uniform standards for accreditation and selection of panelists; (5) require disclosure of conflicts of interest by panelists and Dispute Resolution Providers; (6) introduce regular comprehensive UDRP reviews; (7) reform the rules around communication, and the effectiveness of notice in particular; (8) establish an appeal procedure; and (9) explicitly acknowledge access to courts.","PeriodicalId":222420,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125446517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dron’t Stop Me Now: Prioritizing Drone Journalism in Commercial Drone Regulation","authors":"David A Fischer","doi":"10.7916/JLA.V43I1.4127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/JLA.V43I1.4127","url":null,"abstract":"New technologies that simplify lives and improve our understanding of the world around us inevitably pose new, difficult legal questions. This maxim is true for commercial drones. The recent proliferation of these devices creates a multitude of opportunities for commercial use. To borrow a phrase from Justice Robert H. Jackson, the ability of drones to navigate the sky like “vagrant clouds”4 also means that these devices pose significant regulatory challenges for federal, state, and local governments. Governments attempting to address the safety, privacy, and region- specific concerns raised by increased commercial drone use must also consider the concomitant burdens placed on commercial drone use. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I highlights novel journalistic uses of drones for content production and investigative reporting and discusses the pitfalls of under- or overregulating commercial drones. Part II details the current state of federal, state, and local regulation of commercial drone use. Keeping in mind potential changes that may result to the FAA’s Part 107 commercial drone regulations from the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, this Note considers the FAA’s current regulations as a baseline for whether new regulations would help or hinder drone journalism. The state and local picture is more intricate, and this Note discusses those regulations in three parts: safety regulations, privacy regulations, and region-specific regulations. Part III discusses federal safety regulations and the First Amendment and proposes simplifying the regulatory picture by preempting most state and local safety regulations. Part IV examines whether the federal regulatory scheme preempts state and local privacy regulations and common law torts, the application of those common law torts, and First Amendment limitations on state and local privacy regulations. The Conclusion details how an aspiring drone journalist would experience the regulatory scheme proposed herein.","PeriodicalId":222420,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115875232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Volition in Violation of Copyright","authors":"D. Nimmer","doi":"10.7916/JLA.V43I1.4124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/JLA.V43I1.4124","url":null,"abstract":"Many recent copyright infringement cases have focused on the question of volition. As contentious as the matter has become in current copyright doctrine, the issue is relatively new. From the passage of the first Copyright Act in 1790 forward, U.S. copyright cases devoted no discussion to the issue. Two centuries later, however, the advent of the Internet raised this issue, among so many others. \u0000Nothing is totally new under the sun. As far back as enactment of the 1976 Act, concern was expressed lest telephone companies be ensnared in liability, to the extent that their facilities were used in the retransmission of cable signals. Congress adopted the “passive carrier” exemption, releasing from liability those “whose activities with respect to the secondary transmission consist solely of providing wires, cables, or other communications channels for the use of others.” That provision was necessary as telephone companies risked liability in its absence. Nobody at the time raised lack of “volition” as even a theoretical defense to that imputation. Decades later, with the advent of the Internet and online services, those same considerations multiplied along with the explosion of new ways to use “wires, cables, or other communications channels.” \u0000This Article began as the 32d Annual Horace S. Manges Lecture, delivered at Columbia Law School on April 1, 2019.","PeriodicalId":222420,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts","volume":"120 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133581125","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bloody Foundation? Ethical and Legal Implications of (Not) Removing the Equestrian Statue of Theodore Roosevelt at the American Museum of Natural History","authors":"S. Marber","doi":"10.7916/JLA.V43I1.4126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/JLA.V43I1.4126","url":null,"abstract":"On October 26, 2017, protestors calling themselves the Monument Removal Brigade (“MRB”) splashed red paint on the base of a statue of Theodore Roosevelt outside the American Museum of Natural History (“AMNH,” “Museum,” or “Natural History Museum”) in New York City as a form of public protest art. This 1939 sculpture by American artist James Earle Fraser (the “Equestrian Statue of Theodore Roosevelt” or “Equestrian Statue”) portrays the twenty-sixth president of the United States sitting upon a horse, flanked on either side by a standing African man and Native American man intended to represent their respective continents. On its anonymous blog, MRB called for the statue’s removal and claimed, “[t]he true damage lies with patriarchy, white supremacy, and settler-colonialism embodied by the statue.” The Mayoral Advisory Commission on City Art, Monuments, and Markers (the “Commission”) conducted a study of controversial monuments on public land in New York City and was unable to agree on an appropriate fate for the AMNH statue; for this reason, it has remained in place for the time being. In July of 2019, the AMNH opened a special exhibition entitled Addressing the Statue. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000This AMNH protest occurred within a larger national conversation about the place of public monuments, especially those commemorating leaders of the Confederacy. But the current debate often lacks scholarly rigor, with little consideration of the history, intention, or artistic merit of the monuments in question, or the federal, state, local, and administrative laws governing their removal or modification. This Article draws upon the disciplines of art history, museum studies, and the law to contextualize the AMNH Equestrian Statue and expand upon the Commission’s and AMNH’s analyses to develop a suggested framework for considering controversial monuments in the future.","PeriodicalId":222420,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122332890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Iancu v. Brunetti’s Impact on First Amendment Law: Viewpoint Discrimination, Modes of Offensive Expression, Proportionality and Profanity","authors":"C. Calvert","doi":"10.7916/JLA.V43I1.4125","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/JLA.V43I1.4125","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyzes and contextualizes multiple effects on First Amendment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court’s 2019 trademark ruling in Iancu v. Brunetti. It explores what the five opinions in the case reveal regarding the justices’ divergent views on both offensive speech and standards of scrutiny. The six-justice Brunetti majority struck down part of the federal Lanham Act that allowed the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) to deny registration to marks it deemed immoral or scandalous. Yet several justices wanted to permit the PTO to reject registration for vulgar or profane marks that offend based not on the ideas or views conveyed, but rather because of the manner and mode of expression. Furthermore, the majority specified it was silent about such a censorial mode-of- expression possibility. Beyond examining what this portends for Congress in drafting a new statute, the article also considers: (1) Brunetti’s implications for the doctrine against viewpoint-based discrimination; (2) Justice Stephen Breyer’s continued assault on the Court’s traditional categorical approach to First Amendment cases; and (3) how Brunetti indirectly breathes life into the Federal Communications Commission’s quiescent regulation of profanity on the broadcast airwaves. Ultimately, while the Court under Chief Justice John Roberts’s leadership has protected offensive speech in cases such as Snyder v. Phelps and United States v. Stevens, the quintet of opinions in Brunetti reveals that this benevolence has limits, especially when government protection confers benefits upon such expression.","PeriodicalId":222420,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts","volume":"160 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116960602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Meet Your New Overlords: How Digital Platforms Develop and Sustain Technofeudalism","authors":"Katrina Geddes","doi":"10.7916/JLA.V43I4.6127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/JLA.V43I4.6127","url":null,"abstract":"Most digital natives are familiar with YouTube’s anti-piracy algorithm, Content ID. Yet few are familiar with the long-term socio-political consequences of its use. This paper argues that the unlimited power of platforms to regulate access to user-generated content through algorithms like Content ID leads to three perverse outcomes. First, the removal of lawful content falsely flagged as “infringing” results in the suppression of legitimate speech, and a reduction in the diversity of online discourse. Secondly, the erosion of lawful exceptions and limitations to copyright protection through algorithmic adjudication alters the fundamental social contract established by Congress between copyright owners and users; displaces decades of carefully developed fair use jurisprudence; and transfers adjudicatory power from courts to corporations. Thirdly, the monetization of user-generated content, not by users, but by copyright owners (following the flagging of content as “infringing”) is symptomatic of the systemic exploitation of users that is occurring on digital platforms, also known as “technofeudalism”. This paper situates the specific inadequacies of Content ID within the broader socio-political context of technochauvinism, data colonialism, and the neoliberal privatization of governance in order to understand why users keep returning to YouTube even after their content has been removed and their labor monetized by third parties. It examines the increasing pressure placed on platforms to perform quasi-judicial functions (for example, adjudicating the right to be forgotten under the GDPR, and property and expressive rights under the new EU copyright directive) and the algorithms they develop in order to execute their new roles. It concludes by arguing that the convergence of adjudicatory and enforcement power within the hands of a few corporate algorithms demands a fundamental reconceptualization of the user-platform relationship.","PeriodicalId":222420,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128457604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Gambling on Disability Rights","authors":"Y. Covo","doi":"10.7916/JLA.V43I2.4742","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.7916/JLA.V43I2.4742","url":null,"abstract":"In light of the recent legalization of sports betting across the United States, leading American sports organizations have increased their efforts to protect the integrity of their competitions. These efforts include the implementation and enforcement of what this Article calls “anti-tipping rules,” which are internal rules prohibiting athletes and other personnel from disclosing nonpublic information that can be used by gamblers. Under these rules, the disclosure of information about athletes’ psychosocial impairments might be considered prohibited “tipping,” because these impairments may affect athletes’ availability for and performance in sporting events. \u0000This Article argues that anti-tipping rules may encourage athletes to mask their impairments, leading to a chilling effect on the disclosure of information about mental health in the sporting arena. As a result, these rules may adversely affect psychosocially disabled athletes in at least three distinct ways: (1) They may exacerbate pre-existing impairments by preventing diagnosis, treatment, and the therapeutic impact of disclosure; (2) they may discourage athletes from seeking reasonable accommodations or modifications under the Americans with Disabilities Act; and (3) they may perpetuate the stigma of mental health issues and hinder a rising movement of athletes seeking to create a new, more accurate narrative of psychosocial disability. \u0000This Article examines these overlooked consequences of anti-tipping rules and, drawing on U.S. insider trading law, proposes several strategies to address these detrimental effects.","PeriodicalId":222420,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127337045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}