ERN: Public Goods & International Public Goods (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Regulatory Innovations in the Governance of Decent Work for Domestic Workers in Côte D’Ivoire: Labour Administration and the Judiciary Under a Generalist Labour Code","authors":"Adelle Blackett, Assata Koné‐Silué","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2926783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2926783","url":null,"abstract":"This study looks closely at Ivoirian initiatives to acknowledge and redress the paradox of domestic workers’ simultaneous ubiquity and invisibility. It takes a close look at the nature and quality of domestic workers’ inclusion under the generalist labour law framework. In some contexts, including neighbouring Ghana, it has been affirmed that domestic workers may textually be included in a generalist code, but in practice, excluded from its application. This study has shed light on a more complex dynamic at play in Cote d’Ivoire. Without a doubt, the prevalence of domestic work undertaken under particularly precarious conditions attests to the significance of domestic workers’ marginalization under labour law. However, the working paper similarly reveals that inclusion under the Labour Code, and specialized institutions dedicated to the enforcement of workers’ rights, is not a mere chimera. On the contrary, throughout one of the most destabilizing moments in Cote d’Ivoire’s history, during the crisis from 1999–2011, the labour administration and the specialized labour tribunal regularly addressed an appreciable number of cases of domestic workers’ rights under the employment relationship. Coupled with the interviews conducted for this study, we were able to identify a sensitivity amongst the labour inspectorate, as well as some jurisprudential evolution affirming that domestic workers are workers like any other, to whom key aspects of general labour law should apply. However, the application of the Labour Code and related labour laws to domestic workers was limited in its depth and breadth. The case law showed a solid appreciation of basic employer obligations that might lead to termination, as well as the variety of termination damages that an employee may claim. In some cases the courts attentively applied the minimum wage provisions or awarded the employee indemnities for the employer’s failure to register the domestic worker for social security protections. However, the inquiry stopped short when the specificity of the domestic work paradigm – as witnessed through working time law and the live in relationship – was more squarely before the courts. It is not surprising, therefore, that labour relations and civil society actors continue to call for specific regulation of decent work for domestic workers in Cote d’Ivoire, and that an initiative to adopt a special decree on domestic workers is underway. We argue that there is a need for initiatives on decent work for domestic workers to be built through multi-level social dialogue, to ensure that the legislative and regulatory initiatives are informed both by the generalist courts’ decisions, by the international standard setting and by domestic workers’ transnational social movements.","PeriodicalId":222232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Public Goods & International Public Goods (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130390142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Mission Drift in Microcredit and Microfinance Institution Incentives","authors":"Sara Biancini, D. Ettinger, Baptiste Venet","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2925759","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2925759","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the relationship between Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) and external donors, with the aim of contributing to the debate on “mission drift” in microfinance. We assume that both the donor and the MFI are pro-poor, possibly at different extents. Borrowers can be (very) poor or wealthier (but still unbanked). Incentives have to be provided to the MFI to exert costly effort to identify the more valuable projects and to choose the right share of poorer borrowers (the optimal level of poor outreach). We first concentrate on hidden action. We show that asymmetric information can distort the share of very poor borrowers reached by loans, thus increasing mission drift. We then concentrate on hidden types, assuming that MFIs are characterized by unobservable heterogeneity on the cost of effort. In this case, asymmetric information does not necessarily increase the mission drift. The incentive compatible contracts push efficient MFIs to serve a higher share of poorer borrowers, while less efficient ones decrease their poor outreach.","PeriodicalId":222232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Public Goods & International Public Goods (Topic)","volume":"155 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127353656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Political Economy of Heterogeneity and Conflict","authors":"Enrico Spolaore, Romain Wacziarg","doi":"10.3386/w23278","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w23278","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we present a conceptual framework linking cultural heterogeneity to inter-group conflict. When conflict is about control of public goods, more heterogeneous groups are expected to fight more with each other. In contrast, when conflict is about rival goods, more similar groups are more likely to engage in war with each other. We formalize these ideas within an analytical model and discuss recent empirical studies that are consistent with the model's implications.","PeriodicalId":222232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Public Goods & International Public Goods (Topic)","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126981982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Taking Sustainable Development Goal 17 Seriously. The World Bank’s Legal Framework for Providing Global Public Goods","authors":"J. Wouters, Samuel Cogolati","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2718044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2718044","url":null,"abstract":"Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 17 aims to “[s]trengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.” Based on previous experiences with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), more and more voices say that, to succeed, the renewed global partnership in SDG 17 will have to overcome collective action problems in the provision of “global public goods” (i.e. those policy issues, such as climate change mitigation, the fight against corruption, and the control of communicable diseases, which transcend national boundaries and current generations). Both the new global partnership for sustainable development and the global public goods agenda are being actively supported by the World Bank – the world’s foremost development agency with near global membership and with the single largest source of net income. Yet, while internal staff reports and other recent studies commissioned by the Bank have already extensively analyzed the political, economic and financial role the institution could play in providing global public goods, the legal dimension of the Bank’s global public goods action has curiously attracted very little attention as of yet. The present article aims to put the Bank’s policy discourse on global public goods on a more solid legal footing by analyzing the legal framework within which the Bank operates to deliver such goods.","PeriodicalId":222232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Public Goods & International Public Goods (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131329323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Compassion or Cash: Evaluating Survey Response Incentives and Valuing Public Goods","authors":"V. Smith, S. Harlan, Michael McLaen, Jacob Fishman, Carlos Valcarcel, Marcia L. Nation","doi":"10.3386/W21288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W21288","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reports the results of an experiment evaluating the effects of incentives on individuals' willingness to participate in a survey. By pairing the assessment with a natural field experiment, the analysis considers private versus public goods as incentives, and estimates respondents' willingness to support the oldest food bank in the U.S.","PeriodicalId":222232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Public Goods & International Public Goods (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114974367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Revisit Centralized Production of Complementary Goods","authors":"Zhaolin Li","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2592844","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2592844","url":null,"abstract":"This article revisits a classic mechanism design problem for a principal who procures two complementary goods from a single agent. Although the final product requires both goods to function properly, the principal may purchase unbalanced quantities and discard some of the output. The wasteful spending on unbalanced quantities could help the principal reduce information rents. As such, the common approach of using the total cost of producing a final product as a sufficient statistics, which was used in several early articles, might be flawed.","PeriodicalId":222232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Public Goods & International Public Goods (Topic)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114726794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Conditional Cooperation in Students’ Stated Contributions to a Public Good","authors":"Andrew G. Meyer, Guanyi Yang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2252075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2252075","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze a survey of 559 students to investigate how information about peers affects individuals’ stated contributions to a specific pro-environment program — a student “green fee.” Compared to students that receive no information about peer contributions, the students that receive information about the dollar value range of contributions at peer institutions contribute less on average while the students that learn about the high percentage of students voting “yes” on green fee programs at peer institutions contribute more on average. These results support a hypothesis of conditional cooperation and are consistent with motivations for voluntary contributions of reciprocity and conformity. We also find that there are positive associations between 1) individuals’ extent of pro-environment behaviors and their stated contributions and 2) individuals’ certainty that their vote will matter and their stated contributions.","PeriodicalId":222232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Public Goods & International Public Goods (Topic)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134644960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Behavioral Efficiency I: Definition, Methodology and Demonstration","authors":"Ronald M. Harstad","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1943295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1943295","url":null,"abstract":"Economic experiments conducted in laboratories employing an induced-values methodology can report on allocative efficiencies observed. This methodology is limited by requiring the experimenter to know subjects' motivations, an impossibility in field experiments. Allocative efficiency implies a hypothetical costless aftermarket would be inactive. An outcome of an allocation mechanism is herein defined to be behaviorally efficient if an appropriate aftermarket is actually appended to the allocation mechanism and at most a negligible aggregate size of mutually beneficial gains is observed on the aftermarket. Methodological requirements for observation of behavioral efficiency or inefficiency are put forward. A simple field demonstration indicates when an increase in public good output can cover marginal cost in a mutually beneficial decentralization, without knowing valuations. Several empirical issues that arise with the methodology are noted.","PeriodicalId":222232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Public Goods & International Public Goods (Topic)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115554764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Lessons from South Africa in Judicial Power and Minority Protection","authors":"A. Diala","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2992045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2992045","url":null,"abstract":"The South African Constitutional Court is endowed with substantial judicial powers flowing from its constitutional task of judicial review and enforcement of all categories of rights. However, its exercise of this power is a creative balancing act borne from its need to maintain harmony with the political branches of government. This creative balancing offers a useful lesson for Nigerian courts faced with the non-judicial enforceability of social and economic rights.","PeriodicalId":222232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Public Goods & International Public Goods (Topic)","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134185254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Public Goods Agreements with Other-Regarding Preferences","authors":"C. Kolstad","doi":"10.3386/W17017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W17017","url":null,"abstract":"Why cooperation occurs when noncooperation appears to be individually rational has been an issue in economics for at least a half century. In the 1960's and 1970's the context was cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game; in the 1980's concern shifted to voluntary provision of public goods; in the 1990's, the literature on coalition formation for public goods provision emerged, in the context of coalitions to provide transboundary pollution abatement. The problem is that theory suggests fairly low (even zero) levels of contributions to the public good and high levels of free riding. Experiments and empirical evidence suggests higher levels of cooperation. This is a major reason for the emergence in the 1990's and more recently of the literature on other-regarding preferences (also known as social preferences). Such preferences tend to involve higher levels of cooperation (though not always). This paper contributes to the literature on coalitions, public good provision and other-regarding preferences. For standard preferences, the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to investing in the public good must be greater than one for contributing to be individually rational. We find that Charness-Rabin preferences tend to reduce this threshold for individual contributions. We also find that Charness-Rabin preferences reduce the equilibrium size of a coalition of agents formed to provide the public good. In contrast to much of the literature, we treat the wealth of agents as heterogeneous. In such cases, we find that transfers among agents of the coalition may be necessary to sustain cooperation (regardless of the nature of preferences). An example drawn from experiments is provided as an illustration of the effectiveness of social preferences.","PeriodicalId":222232,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Public Goods & International Public Goods (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124389941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}