行为效率I:定义、方法与论证

Ronald M. Harstad
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引用次数: 2

摘要

采用诱导值方法在实验室进行的经济实验可以报告所观察到的分配效率。这种方法的局限性在于实验者需要知道被试的动机,这在现场实验中是不可能的。配置效率意味着假设的无成本售后市场将不活跃。如果一个适当的售后市场实际上被附加到分配机制中,并且在售后市场上观察到的互利收益最多可以忽略不计,那么分配机制的结果就被定义为行为有效。提出了观察行为效率或无效率的方法要求。一个简单的实地演示表明,在不知道估值的情况下,公共产品产出的增加何时可以在互利的权力下放中覆盖边际成本。注意到该方法中出现的几个经验问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Behavioral Efficiency I: Definition, Methodology and Demonstration
Economic experiments conducted in laboratories employing an induced-values methodology can report on allocative efficiencies observed. This methodology is limited by requiring the experimenter to know subjects' motivations, an impossibility in field experiments. Allocative efficiency implies a hypothetical costless aftermarket would be inactive. An outcome of an allocation mechanism is herein defined to be behaviorally efficient if an appropriate aftermarket is actually appended to the allocation mechanism and at most a negligible aggregate size of mutually beneficial gains is observed on the aftermarket. Methodological requirements for observation of behavioral efficiency or inefficiency are put forward. A simple field demonstration indicates when an increase in public good output can cover marginal cost in a mutually beneficial decentralization, without knowing valuations. Several empirical issues that arise with the methodology are noted.
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