{"title":"An Analysis of 'Fixed-Up-To' (FUT) Pricing Using a Stochastic Model of Consumer Behavior","authors":"Atanu Lahiri, R. M. Dewan, M. Freimer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.961231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.961231","url":null,"abstract":"\"Fixed-Up-To\" (FUT) tariffs, which are commonly used for pricing telecommunication services, are made up of three parts: a monthly subscription fee (or fixed fee), a usage-limit (or allowance), and an over-limit rate that is used for pricing consumptions in excess of the usage-limit. Typically, the consumption of a service is metered and billed separately for each billing cycle. Consequently, a consumer decides on using the service at an instant based on the inventory of allowance still available to him at that moment, the time left in his ongoing billing cycle, and the over-limit rate. Drawing from the finite-horizon inventory theory, we propose a stochastic model to capture this decision-making process. We provide a closed-form expression for the utility that the consumer gets from an FUT pricing plan. We then examine a monopolist's second-degree price discrimination problem in which consumers are offered a menu of FUT plans to choose from. We model two types of consumer heterogeneity: that in the rate at which opportunities to use the service arrive, and that in the average willingness-to-pay per opportunity. We characterize the optimal FUT price menu and also numerically compare FUT pricing with two-part tariffs and other alternatives. We prove that, in contrast with well-known findings in the literature on nonlinear pricing, there exist situations in the case of FUT pricing in which it is always optimal to serve both \"high\" and \"low\" type consumers regardless of their relative proportions. We also make a methodological contribution -- which is combining the finite-horizon inventory theory with the economic theory on second-degree price discrimination.","PeriodicalId":222025,"journal":{"name":"Simon Business School Working Papers","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133244870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Competing for Consumers with Self-control Problems","authors":"A. Alexandrov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1367427","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1367427","url":null,"abstract":"I examine strategic implications of competing for consumers with self-control problems. For investment goods, like health clubs, I find that the equilibrium sign-up (lump-sum) fees decrease when competition intensifies, similarly to prices in standard oligopoly models. However, the equilibrium attendance (per-unit) price increases due to firms' deteriorated ability to take advantage of the consumers' self-control problems. Moreover, firms earn less profit due to consumers' self-control problems -- the firms have a unilateral incentive to charge per-unit fees lower than the marginal cost, however they cannot make up the lost margins by increasing the lump-sum fee, due to competition. The results are reversed for leisure goods (for example, credit cards).","PeriodicalId":222025,"journal":{"name":"Simon Business School Working Papers","volume":"707 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114001920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Equivalence of Bundling and Advance Sales","authors":"Alexei Alexandrov, Özlem Bedre-Defolie","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1880083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1880083","url":null,"abstract":"We identify the conditions under which a problem of optimal advance selling strategy can be mathematically transformed into a problem of optimal bundle pricing. These conditions are as follows: i consumers and sellers have common priors on the probability of each state being realized in the future, ii consumers are risk-neutral, iii sellers can commit to spot prices, and iv consumers and sellers discount the future at the same rate. The result allows both researchers and practitioners to extend and/or apply the findings from the vast literature on bundling to advance selling problems, and vice versa. We highlight several insights that are particularly relevant, such as the importance of the dependence of consumer valuations across states on the profitability of advance selling in the base case of two states as well as in the cases of more than two states or with possible competition in some of the states.","PeriodicalId":222025,"journal":{"name":"Simon Business School Working Papers","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127895004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Red and Blue Investing: Values and Finance","authors":"Harrison G. Hong, Leonard Kostovetsky","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1214382","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1214382","url":null,"abstract":"Using data on the political contributions and stock holdings of U.S. investment managers, we find that mutual fund managers who make campaign donations to Democrats hold less of their portfolios (relative to non-donors or Republican donors) in companies that are deemed socially irresponsible (e.g., tobacco, guns, or defense firms or companies with bad employee relations or diversity records). Although explicit socially responsible investing (SRI) funds are more likely to be managed by Democratic managers, this result holds for non-SRI funds and after controlling for other fund and manager characteristics. The effect is more than one-half of the underweighting observed for SRI funds.","PeriodicalId":222025,"journal":{"name":"Simon Business School Working Papers","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125718296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Paulo Albuquerque, Polykarpos Pavlidis, Udi Chatow, Kay-Yut Chen, Zainab Jamal
{"title":"Evaluating Promotional Activities in an Online Two-Sided Market of User-Generated Content","authors":"Paulo Albuquerque, Polykarpos Pavlidis, Udi Chatow, Kay-Yut Chen, Zainab Jamal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1538887","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1538887","url":null,"abstract":"We measure the value of promotional activities and referrals by content creators to an online platform of user-generated content. To do so, we develop a modeling approach that explains individual-level choices of visiting the platform, creating, and purchasing content as a function of consumer characteristics and marketing activities, allowing for the possibility of interdependence of decisions within and across users. Empirically, we apply our model to Hewlett-Packard's (HP) print-on-demand service of user-created magazines, named MagCloud. We use two distinct data sets to show the applicability of our approach: an aggregate-level data set from Google Analytics, which is a widely available source of data to managers, and an individual-level data set from HP. Our results compare content creator activities, which include referrals and word-of-mouth efforts, with firm-based actions, such as price promotions and public relations. We show that price promotions have strong effects but are limited to the purchase decisions, whereas content creator referrals and public relations efforts have broader effects that impact all consumer decisions at the platform. We provide recommendations as to the level of a firm's investments when “free” promotional activities by content creators exist. These free marketing campaigns are likely to have a substantial presence in most online services of user-generated content.","PeriodicalId":222025,"journal":{"name":"Simon Business School Working Papers","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127238880","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Economic Perspective on Leadership","authors":"Mark a. Zupan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1355962","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1355962","url":null,"abstract":"Helpful comments on a prior draft have been provided by Steve Zaffron.","PeriodicalId":222025,"journal":{"name":"Simon Business School Working Papers","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130192614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Using Bid Data for the Management of Sequential, Multi-Unit, Online Auctions With Uniformly Distributed Bidders Valuations","authors":"Edieal J. Pinker, A. Seidmann, Yaniv Vakrat","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.251958","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.251958","url":null,"abstract":"Internet auctions for consumers' goods are an increasingly popular selling venue. Many sellers, instead of offering their entire inventory in a single auction, split it into sequential auctions of smaller lots, thereby reducing the negative market impact of large lots. Information technology also makes it possible to collect and analyze detailed bid data from online auctions. In this paper, we develop and test a new model of sequential online auctions to explore the potential benefits of using real bid data from earlier auctions to improve the management of future auctions. Assuming a truth-revealing auction model, we quantify the effect of the lot size on the closing price. We then develop a model for allocating inventory across multiple auctions that dynamically incorporates the results of previous auctions as feedback into the management of subsequent auctions, updating the lot size and number of auctions. We demonstrate that information signals from previous auctions can be used to update the auctioneer's beliefs about the customers' valuation distribution, and then to significantly increase the seller's profit potential. We use several examples to show how the benefits of using detailed transaction data for the management of sequential, multi-unit, online auctions are influenced by the inventory holding costs, the number of bidders, and the dispersion of consumers' valuations.","PeriodicalId":222025,"journal":{"name":"Simon Business School Working Papers","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132298978","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Security Issue Timing: What Do Managers Know, and When Do They Know it?","authors":"Dirk Jenter, Katharina Lewellen, Jerold B. Warner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.945471","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.945471","url":null,"abstract":"We study put option sales undertaken by corporations during their repurchase programs. Put sales' main theoretical motivation is market timing, providing an excellent framework for studying whether security issues reflect managers' ability to identify mispricing. Our evidence is that these bets reflect timing ability, and are not simply a result of overconfidence. In the 100 days following put option issues, there is roughly a 5% abnormal stock price return, and the abnormal return is concentrated around the first earnings release date following put option sales. Longer term effects are generally not detected. Put sales also appear to reflect successful bets on the direction of stock price volatility.","PeriodicalId":222025,"journal":{"name":"Simon Business School Working Papers","volume":"114 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116920105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Effect of Reporting Frequency on the Timeliness of Earnings: The Cases of Voluntary and Mandatory Interim Reports","authors":"Marty Butler, A. Kraft, Ira S. Weiss","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.788084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.788084","url":null,"abstract":"We examine whether financial reporting frequency affects the speed with which accounting information is reflected in security prices. For a sample of 28,824 reporting-frequency observations from 1950 to 1973, we find little evidence of differences in timeliness between firms reporting quarterly and those reporting semiannually, even after controlling for self-selection. However, firms that voluntarily increased reporting frequency from semiannual to quarterly experienced increased timeliness, while firms whose increase was mandated by the SEC did not. We conclude that there is little evidence to support the claim that regulation forcing firms to report more frequently improves earnings timeliness.","PeriodicalId":222025,"journal":{"name":"Simon Business School Working Papers","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134073520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings, Market-to-Book and Conservatism in Financial Reporting","authors":"Sugata Roychowdhury, R. Watts","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.638001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.638001","url":null,"abstract":"When annual earnings are regressed on annual returns, the returns coefficient is higher when returns are negative. The difference between the coefficients of earnings on positive and negative returns is called asymmetric timeliness of earnings and, in the accounting literature, is used extensively as a conservatism measure. The objective of this paper is to investigate the relation between asymmetric timeliness and the market-to-book ratio (MTB), using a theory of accounting conservatism that reflects the role of accounting as observed in practice. Recent literature has focused on the negative relation between the two measures. Using our theory of conservatism, we predict and observe empirically that the relation between asymmetric timeliness over a period and MTB at the end of the period is positive when asymmetric timeliness is measured cumulatively over long horizons. Our paper further highlights that when asymmetric timeliness is measured over short periods not including the firm's IPO, it is dependent on the composition of equity value at the beginning of that period. This dependence is responsible for the negative association observed between asymmetric timeliness estimated over short periods and MTB at the end of the period. Our theory and empirical results further suggest that asymmetric timeliness is a better measure of total conservatism at a point in time when it is estimated cumulatively over multiple years preceding that time. Overall, our results are consistent with our theory that accounting does not record changes in rents and is asymmetrically timely in recording changes in separable asset values.","PeriodicalId":222025,"journal":{"name":"Simon Business School Working Papers","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126006038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}