Strategic Management Journal最新文献_第4页

When ideologies align: Progressive corporate activism and within‐firm ideological alignment 当意识形态一致时：渐进式公司行动主义与公司内部意识形态一致

IF 8.3 1区管理学

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2024-07-04 DOI: 10.1002/smj.3632

Anna E. McKean, Brayden G. King

{"title":"When ideologies align: Progressive corporate activism and within‐firm ideological alignment","authors":"Anna E. McKean, Brayden G. King","doi":"10.1002/smj.3632","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3632","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryThis article examines the association between ideology and firm participation in sociopolitical activism. In particular, it focuses on the ideological alignment between a firm's upper echelons and its general employees. We theorize that participation in progressive corporate activism reflects the ideological views of both the top management team and general employees. By examining firm participation in letter campaigns supporting progressive causes, our findings indicate that ideological alignment between a top management teams and general employees' liberal political leanings is associated with a firm's participation in progressive corporate activism. The CEO's own ideological preferences do not have an independent association with this kind of activism. This article concludes with a discussion of implications for our understanding of corporate political action and nonmarket strategy.Managerial SummaryThis article looks at the relationship between political ideology and firm participation in sociopolitical activism. Although some have argued that firms' activism reflects a CEO's ideological preferences or employee activism, we find that neither explanation fully accounts for the kinds of companies that engage in this kind of activism. We find that progressive corporate activism reflects the ideological views of both top management and general employees. Our findings suggest that companies that have ideological alignment on progressive issues are more likely to take public stands on those issues because the stands reinforce core values held by employees and the top management.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141548016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Finding a road less traveled: Combining analysis and intuition to develop novel problem formulations 寻找少有人走的路将分析与直觉相结合，开发新的问题公式

IF 8.3 1区管理学

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1002/smj.3637

Chan Hyung Park

引用次数: 0

The influence of media scrutiny on firms' strategic eschewal of lobbying 媒体监督对企业放弃游说战略的影响

IF 8.3 1区管理学

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2024-06-25 DOI: 10.1002/smj.3633

Jinsil Kim, Miranda J. Welbourne Eleazar, Seung‐Hyun Lee

{"title":"The influence of media scrutiny on firms' strategic eschewal of lobbying","authors":"Jinsil Kim, Miranda J. Welbourne Eleazar, Seung‐Hyun Lee","doi":"10.1002/smj.3633","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3633","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryLobbying allows firms to influence the government to potentially limit firms' costs during product recall crises. However, such lobbying can elicit scrutiny from the media if the lobbying gives the impression that firms wish to save costs at the expense of safety, thereby appearing hypocritical. We theorize that when faced with negative media coverage of product recalls or recall‐related lobbying, firms strategically eschew lobbying to limit further media scrutiny and its associated negative consequences. We test our hypotheses using the US auto industry's lobbying from 2008 to 2022. We provide further depth to our examination of strategic eschewal through 15 supplemental interviews of lobbyists about how the media influences firms' lobbying decisions.Managerial SummaryCompanies may resort to lobbying in efforts to reduce costs related to product recall crises, but such controversial lobbying may also tarnish their image. When confronted with negative media coverage of product recalls, or recall‐related lobbying, companies are more likely to strategically refrain from lobbying to minimize additional, unwanted media spotlight and its associated negative repercussions. Managers should be mindful that even if lobbying may help limit the costs of recalls, it could also cause potential reputational harm. Thus, it is vitally important that managers pay attention to the reputational cues from the media, which can help them determine when lobbying may be problematic and allow them to preemptively refrain from such lobbying.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141510645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Do tenure-based voting rights help mitigate the family firm control-growth dilemma? 基于任期的投票权是否有助于缓解家族企业控制权--增长的两难困境？

IF 8.3 1区管理学

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2024-06-07 DOI: 10.1002/smj.3630

Claudia Imperatore, Peter F. Pope

引用次数: 0

Resource redeployment as an entry advantage in resource-poor settings 在资源匮乏的环境中，资源重新调配是一项入门优势

IF 8.3 1区管理学

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2024-05-26 DOI: 10.1002/smj.3627

Jasmina Chauvin, Carlos Inoue, Christopher Poliquin

引用次数: 0

External representations in strategic decision‐making: Understanding strategy's reliance on visuals 战略决策中的外部表征：了解战略对视觉效果的依赖

IF 8.3 1区管理学

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2024-05-21 DOI: 10.1002/smj.3613

Felipe A. Csaszar, Nicole Hinrichs, Mana Heshmati

{"title":"External representations in strategic decision‐making: Understanding strategy's reliance on visuals","authors":"Felipe A. Csaszar, Nicole Hinrichs, Mana Heshmati","doi":"10.1002/smj.3613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3613","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryExternal representations, particularly visuals, are important in strategic decision‐making. However, their pervasiveness and impact are not well understood in the strategy literature. Based on cognitive science research, we identify four cognitive functions crucial to strategic decision‐making that benefit from using external representations. We also propose a conceptual model and propositions that explain how the quality of strategic decision‐making depends on the interactions among task environment, external representations, and managers. We show that external representations influence in predictable ways the boundedly rational process of searching for new strategies. Key determinants include the manager's representational capability and the usability and malleability of the external representation. We discuss implications for users, designers, and teachers of external representations in strategy, as well as suggest avenues for future research.Managerial SummaryThis research points to the pivotal role of external representations, especially visuals, in strategic decision‐making. Drawing from cognitive science, this study identifies four critical cognitive functions that benefit from these external representations—working memory, long‐term memory, pattern recognition, and knowledge transfer. Further, the study highlights that external representations significantly influence the process of strategic decision‐making in predictable ways. Finally, we show that not all external representations are alike in their ease of use and a managers' ability to operate on an external representation, referred to as representational capability, greatly affects the decision‐making quality. The implications extend to users, designers, and educators of external representations, urging attention to the design and use of external representations for improved decision outcomes.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141150290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Setting the tone to get their way: An attention‐based approach to how narcissistic CEOs influence the board of directors to take more risk 设定基调，以达到自己的目的：自恋型首席执行官如何以注意力为基础影响董事会承担更多风险

IF 8.3 1区管理学

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2024-05-11 DOI: 10.1002/smj.3610

Christopher S. Tuggle, Cameron J. Borgholthaus, Peter D. Harms, Jonathan P. O'Brien

{"title":"Setting the tone to get their way: An attention‐based approach to how narcissistic CEOs influence the board of directors to take more risk","authors":"Christopher S. Tuggle, Cameron J. Borgholthaus, Peter D. Harms, Jonathan P. O'Brien","doi":"10.1002/smj.3610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3610","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryUpper echelons research has generated insights into the organizational consequences of CEO narcissism. However, fewer studies have empirically attended to the mechanisms through which these consequences occur. Using the attention‐based view, we introduce a process model examining how CEO narcissism is linked to corporate risk‐taking through the board of director discussion tone of risk‐taking during board meetings. We further note that narcissistic CEOs have an increased ability to do so when they are appointed to be board chair. We find strong support for each of our hypotheses by utilizing a unique data set of corporate board meeting transcripts encompassing 88 public firms and 197 CEOs over 20 years. Our results suggest that narcissistic CEOs are adept at controlling the attentional foci of boards of directors to get their way.Managerial SummaryOur study offers an explanation as to how CEO narcissism influences firm risk‐taking behavior. Specifically, we demonstrate that narcissistic CEOs are prone to drive board discussions about risk‐taking to hold a positive tone—especially when they also serve as board chair—thereby enabling them to allocate increased resources toward risk‐taking strategies. Through an extensive analysis of board meeting transcripts spanning two decades across 88 companies, we illustrate how narcissistic CEOs wield substantial influence in molding board conversations to mirror their own pro‐risk inclinations. This insight further considers the importance of understanding CEO behavior in guiding risk management strategies in the future.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140935438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Giving up learning from failures? An examination of learning from one's own failures in the context of heart surgeons 放弃从失败中学习？从心脏外科医生的失败中汲取教训的研究

IF 8.3 1区管理学

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2024-05-03 DOI: 10.1002/smj.3609

Sunkee Lee, Jisoo Park

引用次数: 0

Multimarket contact between partners and strategic alliance survival 合作伙伴之间的多市场接触与战略联盟的生存

IF 8.3 1区管理学

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2024-04-29 DOI: 10.1002/smj.3607

Tadhg Ryan‐Charleton, Robert J. Galavan

{"title":"Multimarket contact between partners and strategic alliance survival","authors":"Tadhg Ryan‐Charleton, Robert J. Galavan","doi":"10.1002/smj.3607","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3607","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryThe impact of multimarket contact (MMC) between partners on strategic alliance survival is unclear, even though recent studies have suggested that MMC increases the likelihood of alliance formation. Our study investigates this issue by integrating two mechanisms occurring between multimarket firms: mutual forbearance and technological resource imitation. We argue that MMC between partners deters opportunism in alliances via mutual forbearance, resulting in a positive effect on the likelihood of strategic alliance survival. We also suggest that the positive effect is weakened in two settings with higher risks of technological resource imitation: technological overlap between partners and the presence of R&D activities in an alliance. Evidence from strategic alliances in the global semiconductor industry supports these conclusions.Managerial SummaryRecent research has shown that firms encountering each other in multiple markets are more likely to form strategic alliances, but it is unclear whether these firms are likely to stick together. Our theory suggests that the threat of broad retaliation limits opportunism and increases the likelihood of alliance survival when partners encounter each other in multiple markets. Nonetheless, in settings where partners have similar technologies, or in alliances involving R&D activities, their ability and incentives to copy each other's technological resources offsets the positive effect of multimarket contact on alliance survival. We study strategic alliances in the global semiconductor industry and find evidence consistent with these arguments.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140829384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Escaping the patent trolls: The impact of non‐practicing entity litigation on firm innovation strategies 逃离专利巨魔：非执业实体诉讼对企业创新战略的影响

IF 8.3 1区管理学

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2024-04-20 DOI: 10.1002/smj.3606

Kenneth G. Huang, Mei‐Xuan Li, Carl Hsin‐Han Shen, Yanzhi Wang

{"title":"Escaping the patent trolls: The impact of non‐practicing entity litigation on firm innovation strategies","authors":"Kenneth G. Huang, Mei‐Xuan Li, Carl Hsin‐Han Shen, Yanzhi Wang","doi":"10.1002/smj.3606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3606","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryNon‐practicing entities (NPEs) are firms that accumulate and acquire patents but do not further develop or implement the patented inventions (known as patent trolling). NPEs seek to receive royalties or profits through out‐of‐court settlements in patent infringement cases. We examine how firms targeted by NPEs in NPE‐initiated litigations (i.e., target firms) shift their innovation strategies and trajectories in response to heightened litigation risks. We theorize and show that after the initial lawsuit, target firms draw more upon their in‐house technologies to reduce the legal ground for further lawsuits. Furthermore, nontarget firms in related technology areas shift their innovation activities away from those of target firms under high NPE litigation risks. These effects are more pronounced with higher innovation costs and under more competitive product markets.Managerial SummaryNon‐practicing entities (NPEs) are known as patent trolls that accumulate and acquire patents but do not further develop or implement these patented inventions. These patent trolls aim to obtain royalties or profits through out‐of‐court settlements in patent infringement cases. We investigate how firms targeted by patent trolls in litigations (i.e., target firms) change their innovation strategies and trajectories to deal with increased NPE litigation risks. After the initial lawsuit, we find that these target firms use their in‐house technologies more to reduce the legal ground for future lawsuits. Moreover, nontarget firms in related technology areas move their innovation activities away from those of target firms under high litigation risks. These effects are stronger when innovation costs are higher and under more competitive product markets.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":"94 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140629960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0