Strategic Management Journal最新文献_第4页

Public enemies? The differential effects of reputation and celebrity on corporate misconduct scandalization 公敌？声誉和名人效应对企业不当行为丑化的不同影响

IF 8.3 1区管理学

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2024-07-09 DOI: 10.1002/smj.3638

Jung‐Hoon Han, Timothy G. Pollock, Srikanth Paruchuri

{"title":"Public enemies? The differential effects of reputation and celebrity on corporate misconduct scandalization","authors":"Jung‐Hoon Han, Timothy G. Pollock, Srikanth Paruchuri","doi":"10.1002/smj.3638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3638","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryWe explore misconduct scandalization's antecedents by focusing on the rational and emotional bases underlying reputation and celebrity, and considering how they can enhance or reduce the likelihood misconduct is scandalized as a function of the misconduct's objective and perceived severity. Specifically, we argue the quantifiable nature of objective misconduct severity enhances reputation's rational influence, but attenuates celebrity's emotion‐based appeal. Conversely, perceived misconduct severity reduces reputation's influence, while enhancing the media‐driven interest in celebrity firms' behaviors. Our findings based on corporate data breaches confirm that objective severity amplifies reputation's effect and attenuates celebrity's effect, while perceived severity amplifies celebrity's effect and attenuates reputation's effect. Our findings highlight the importance of social evaluations' sociocognitive content in understanding why only some misconduct becomes scandalized.Managerial SummaryCommitting misconduct is costly; having it scandalized is devastating. Yet little is known about how social evaluations influence why only some firms' misconduct is scandalized, beyond the vague notion that prominent firms' misconduct attracts media attention. We find that the rational and emotional bases of firms' evaluations matter. High reputation, based on the rational assessment of firms' capabilities, increases the likelihood of scandalization for objectively severe misconduct, and the influence of celebrity—originating from audiences' emotional resonance with firms' unconventional traits and behaviors—weakens as objective severity increases. Conversely, reputation's influence weakens, and celebrity's influence strengthens, as media “availability cascades” grow and increase perceived severity. In addition to providing a more realistic portrayal of media behavior, we offer insights into post‐misconduct communications and remedial actions.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141573467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The entry‐deterring effects of synergies in complementor acquisitions: Evidence from Apple's digital platform market, the iOS app store 互补收购中协同效应的进入阻滞效应：来自苹果公司数字平台市场 iOS 应用商店的证据

IF 8.3 1区管理学

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2024-07-05 DOI: 10.1002/smj.3639

Yongzhi Wang, Nandini Rajagopalan, Lori Qingyuan Yue, Brian Wu

{"title":"The entry‐deterring effects of synergies in complementor acquisitions: Evidence from Apple's digital platform market, the iOS app store","authors":"Yongzhi Wang, Nandini Rajagopalan, Lori Qingyuan Yue, Brian Wu","doi":"10.1002/smj.3639","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3639","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryWe develop the following typology of four types of acquisition synergies by integrating the multisidedness feature of digital platforms with the mainstream strategy research: complementary‐technology‐side economies of scope, complementary‐technology‐side economies of scale, user‐side economies of scope, and user‐side economies of scale. We show that (1) acquisition synergies are entry‐deterring, (2) synergies derived from economies of scope have stronger effects than those derived from economies of scale, and (3) synergies derived from the technology side have stronger effects than those derived from the user side. We highlight the significant competitive and regulatory implications of our findings. For example, one standard‐deviation increase in technology‐side economies of scope is associated with 55 deterred entries in 1 month or a $2.80 million potential loss in annual revenue.Managerial SummaryAcquisitions can shift the market structure of a digital platform in ways that affect subsequent entries and hence the platform's base of complementors. Synergies that complementor acquirers accrue can be entry‐deterring. We develop a two‐by‐two typology of acquisition synergies in a multisided platform based on the two sides of a platform market (user side or complementary‐technology side) and two sources of synergies (economies of scale or economies of scope). We then leverage over 279,000 app developers' entry decisions into product categories in Apple's iOS App Store, over 71 million customer reviews, and over 12,000 unique software development kits to construct measures of synergies. Our paper contributes to the platform literature by demonstrating the entry‐deterring effects of synergies that complementor acquirers can exploit.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141548015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

When ideologies align: Progressive corporate activism and within‐firm ideological alignment 当意识形态一致时：渐进式公司行动主义与公司内部意识形态一致

IF 8.3 1区管理学

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2024-07-04 DOI: 10.1002/smj.3632

Anna E. McKean, Brayden G. King

{"title":"When ideologies align: Progressive corporate activism and within‐firm ideological alignment","authors":"Anna E. McKean, Brayden G. King","doi":"10.1002/smj.3632","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3632","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryThis article examines the association between ideology and firm participation in sociopolitical activism. In particular, it focuses on the ideological alignment between a firm's upper echelons and its general employees. We theorize that participation in progressive corporate activism reflects the ideological views of both the top management team and general employees. By examining firm participation in letter campaigns supporting progressive causes, our findings indicate that ideological alignment between a top management teams and general employees' liberal political leanings is associated with a firm's participation in progressive corporate activism. The CEO's own ideological preferences do not have an independent association with this kind of activism. This article concludes with a discussion of implications for our understanding of corporate political action and nonmarket strategy.Managerial SummaryThis article looks at the relationship between political ideology and firm participation in sociopolitical activism. Although some have argued that firms' activism reflects a CEO's ideological preferences or employee activism, we find that neither explanation fully accounts for the kinds of companies that engage in this kind of activism. We find that progressive corporate activism reflects the ideological views of both top management and general employees. Our findings suggest that companies that have ideological alignment on progressive issues are more likely to take public stands on those issues because the stands reinforce core values held by employees and the top management.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141548016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Finding a road less traveled: Combining analysis and intuition to develop novel problem formulations 寻找少有人走的路将分析与直觉相结合，开发新的问题公式

IF 8.3 1区管理学

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2024-06-26 DOI: 10.1002/smj.3637

Chan Hyung Park

引用次数: 0

The influence of media scrutiny on firms' strategic eschewal of lobbying 媒体监督对企业放弃游说战略的影响

IF 8.3 1区管理学

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2024-06-25 DOI: 10.1002/smj.3633

Jinsil Kim, Miranda J. Welbourne Eleazar, Seung‐Hyun Lee

{"title":"The influence of media scrutiny on firms' strategic eschewal of lobbying","authors":"Jinsil Kim, Miranda J. Welbourne Eleazar, Seung‐Hyun Lee","doi":"10.1002/smj.3633","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3633","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryLobbying allows firms to influence the government to potentially limit firms' costs during product recall crises. However, such lobbying can elicit scrutiny from the media if the lobbying gives the impression that firms wish to save costs at the expense of safety, thereby appearing hypocritical. We theorize that when faced with negative media coverage of product recalls or recall‐related lobbying, firms strategically eschew lobbying to limit further media scrutiny and its associated negative consequences. We test our hypotheses using the US auto industry's lobbying from 2008 to 2022. We provide further depth to our examination of strategic eschewal through 15 supplemental interviews of lobbyists about how the media influences firms' lobbying decisions.Managerial SummaryCompanies may resort to lobbying in efforts to reduce costs related to product recall crises, but such controversial lobbying may also tarnish their image. When confronted with negative media coverage of product recalls, or recall‐related lobbying, companies are more likely to strategically refrain from lobbying to minimize additional, unwanted media spotlight and its associated negative repercussions. Managers should be mindful that even if lobbying may help limit the costs of recalls, it could also cause potential reputational harm. Thus, it is vitally important that managers pay attention to the reputational cues from the media, which can help them determine when lobbying may be problematic and allow them to preemptively refrain from such lobbying.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141510645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Geopolitical volatility and subsidiary investments 地缘政治动荡与子公司投资

IF 8.3 1区管理学

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2024-06-11 DOI: 10.1002/smj.3631

Gilbert Kofi Adarkwah, S. Dorobantu, C. Sabel, Flladina Zilja

{"title":"Geopolitical volatility and subsidiary investments","authors":"Gilbert Kofi Adarkwah, S. Dorobantu, C. Sabel, Flladina Zilja","doi":"10.1002/smj.3631","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3631","url":null,"abstract":"We examine how geopolitical volatility—the instability of bilateral political affinity between countries—affects foreign subsidiary investments. Building on prior work that shows that the level of political affinity between countries facilitates foreign investments, we argue that the volatility of political affinity impedes firms' ability to form expectations about stakeholder behavior and reduces subsequent investments in subsidiaries. We further argue that the effect of volatility of political affinity on foreign subsidiary investments is less pronounced when the level of political affinity between countries is high and when the firm has strong political connections at home. Our analyses examine 1054 US firms and their subsidiary investments in 106 countries from 2000 to 2015.Geopolitical risk has emerged as an important factor in foreign investment decisions in recent years. The rise of geopolitical tensions worldwide and the fragmentation of relationships between countries have introduced new dimensions to foreign investment risks. We study the propensity for sudden and unpredictable shifts in the political relationship between countries—that is, volatility of political affinity in their bilateral political relations—and its effect on firms' foreign subsidiary investments. We show that volatility of political affinity negatively affects the number of subsidiaries, employees, and local sales in the host country because when bilateral relations change suddenly, it is more difficult for multinational firms to predict how stakeholder behavior will impact the performance of their investments.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141359530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Do tenure-based voting rights help mitigate the family firm control-growth dilemma? 基于任期的投票权是否有助于缓解家族企业控制权--增长的两难困境？

IF 8.3 1区管理学

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2024-06-07 DOI: 10.1002/smj.3630

Claudia Imperatore, Peter F. Pope

引用次数: 0

Inventor CEO involvement and firm exploitative and exploratory innovation 发明人首席执行官的参与与企业的开拓性和探索性创新

IF 8.3 1区管理学

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2024-06-05 DOI: 10.1002/smj.3628

Joseph S. Harrison, Steven Boivie, Ithai Stern, Joseph Porac

{"title":"Inventor CEO involvement and firm exploitative and exploratory innovation","authors":"Joseph S. Harrison, Steven Boivie, Ithai Stern, Joseph Porac","doi":"10.1002/smj.3628","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3628","url":null,"abstract":"This study extends recent findings that inventor CEOs increase innovative output in large established firms by examining how their involvement in the innovative process influences the nature of innovations produced. Our theory suggests that inventor CEOs who take a hands‐on approach to innovation lead their firms to engage in more exploitative rather than exploratory innovation. We further posit that this effect is particularly strong for insider inventor CEOs, and especially founders, but weaker for outsiders and when the firm's board has broader industry experience. Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 1994 to 2010 and inventor CEOs' engagement in patenting as an indicator of hands‐on involvement, we find considerable support for our predictions.CEOs with hands‐on experience innovating can substantially increase innovative output in large established firms. Yet, we show that inventors who remain directly engaged in their firms' innovation activities as CEO can limit their scope to incremental innovations that exploit existing technologies as opposed to more radical innovations that result in novel product or service offerings. These tendencies are stronger for inventors who come to the CEO position from inside the firm, especially founders, but weaker when the firm's board has broader industry experience. Overall, our study reveals an important tradeoff for large firms of having an inventor as CEO, how hands‐on involvement by inventor CEOs may narrow their firms' innovative trajectories, and how or when these tendencies can be mitigated.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141384191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Resource redeployment as an entry advantage in resource-poor settings 在资源匮乏的环境中，资源重新调配是一项入门优势

IF 8.3 1区管理学

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2024-05-26 DOI: 10.1002/smj.3627

Jasmina Chauvin, Carlos Inoue, Christopher Poliquin

引用次数: 0

External representations in strategic decision‐making: Understanding strategy's reliance on visuals 战略决策中的外部表征：了解战略对视觉效果的依赖

IF 8.3 1区管理学

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2024-05-21 DOI: 10.1002/smj.3613

Felipe A. Csaszar, Nicole Hinrichs, Mana Heshmati

{"title":"External representations in strategic decision‐making: Understanding strategy's reliance on visuals","authors":"Felipe A. Csaszar, Nicole Hinrichs, Mana Heshmati","doi":"10.1002/smj.3613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.3613","url":null,"abstract":"Research SummaryExternal representations, particularly visuals, are important in strategic decision‐making. However, their pervasiveness and impact are not well understood in the strategy literature. Based on cognitive science research, we identify four cognitive functions crucial to strategic decision‐making that benefit from using external representations. We also propose a conceptual model and propositions that explain how the quality of strategic decision‐making depends on the interactions among task environment, external representations, and managers. We show that external representations influence in predictable ways the boundedly rational process of searching for new strategies. Key determinants include the manager's representational capability and the usability and malleability of the external representation. We discuss implications for users, designers, and teachers of external representations in strategy, as well as suggest avenues for future research.Managerial SummaryThis research points to the pivotal role of external representations, especially visuals, in strategic decision‐making. Drawing from cognitive science, this study identifies four critical cognitive functions that benefit from these external representations—working memory, long‐term memory, pattern recognition, and knowledge transfer. Further, the study highlights that external representations significantly influence the process of strategic decision‐making in predictable ways. Finally, we show that not all external representations are alike in their ease of use and a managers' ability to operate on an external representation, referred to as representational capability, greatly affects the decision‐making quality. The implications extend to users, designers, and educators of external representations, urging attention to the design and use of external representations for improved decision outcomes.","PeriodicalId":22023,"journal":{"name":"Strategic Management Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.3,"publicationDate":"2024-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141150290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0