基于任期的投票权是否有助于缓解家族企业控制权--增长的两难困境？

IF 6.5 1区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2024-06-07 DOI:10.1002/smj.3630

Claudia Imperatore, Peter F. Pope

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引用次数: 0

摘要

家族企业的投资增长受制于家族保留企业控制权的偏好，这限制了外部股票发行，增加了外部小股东认为的征用风险。基于任期的投票权（TVR）削弱了投票权与现金流权之间的联系，有利于在不丧失控制权的情况下发行新的股权资本。我们发现，在意大利上市的家族企业会采用任期投票权来促进投资的持续增长，同时保留家族的控制权。我们还发现，在控制权脆弱的家族企业中，采用 TVR 后投资会增加。我们的研究结果表明，TVR 等增强控制权的机制有助于解决家族企业控制权与增长之间的两难问题。

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Do tenure-based voting rights help mitigate the family firm control-growth dilemma?

Investment growth in family firms is constrained by family preferences to retain corporate control, which limits outside equity issuance and increases the expropriation risk perceived by external minority shareholders. Tenure-based voting rights (TVRs) weaken the link between voting rights and cash flow rights, facilitating new equity capital issuance without loss of control. We find that publicly listed family firms in Italy adopt TVRs to facilitate the continuation of investment growth while retaining family control. We also find that in family firms with fragile control, investment increases after TVR adoption. Our results indicate that control-enhancing mechanisms such as TVRs can help resolve the control–growth dilemma in family firms.

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来源期刊

Strategic Management Journal Multiple-

CiteScore

13.70

自引率

8.40%

发文量

109

期刊介绍： At the Strategic Management Journal, we are committed to publishing top-tier research that addresses key questions in the field of strategic management and captivates scholars in this area. Our publication welcomes manuscripts covering a wide range of topics, perspectives, and research methodologies. As a result, our editorial decisions truly embrace the diversity inherent in the field.