{"title":"Canada","authors":"Christopher Cochrane, J. Godbout, J. VandenBeukel","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0011","url":null,"abstract":"Canada is a federal parliamentary democracy with a bicameral legislature at the national level. Members of the upper House, styled the Senate, are appointed by the prime minister, and members of the lower House, the House of Commons, are elected in single-member plurality electoral districts. In practice, the House of Commons is by far the more important of the two chambers. This chapter, therefore, investigates access to the floor in the Canadian House of Commons. We find that the age, gender, and experience of MPs have little independent effect on access to the floor. Consistent with the dominant role of parties in Canadian political life, we find that an MP’s role within a party has by far the most significant impact on their access to the floor. Intriguingly, backbenchers in the government party have the least access of all.","PeriodicalId":217414,"journal":{"name":"The Politics of Legislative Debates","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126541637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Israel","authors":"Or Tuttnauer, C. Friedberg","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0024","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter investigates the factors affecting floor access in the Israeli national parliament—the Knesset. Although Israel is a parliamentary democracy with a proportional, closed-list electoral system, the Knesset’s rules of procedure give little control to parties over floor access. Analyzing over 46,000 speeches over three terms between 2009 and 2019, even in debates where party leadership does have control over who takes the floor, we find no strong evidence that such control is used to give more speech time to highly ranked representatives. This is at odds with predictions made by others in two ways: First, in that the parliamentary rules do not reflect the electoral incentives of party leadership; Second, in that parties do not appear to utilize whatever ability they possess to control their representatives’ speechmaking.","PeriodicalId":217414,"journal":{"name":"The Politics of Legislative Debates","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132232883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Legislative Speech in Presidential Systems","authors":"AndrewJ . Taylor","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"This essay constitutes a sort of corrective to the considerable attention scholars of legislative speech have given to bodies in parliamentary regimes. I survey the study of legislative speech in presidential systems by categorizing it into two types. The first presents patterns of speech across memberships as indicative of other factors such as electoral institutions and the strength of legislative parties. Here, I use Proksch and Slapin’s theoretical framework for purchase and refer to a small but growing corpus of literature on Latin America. The subject of the second is the content of speech. The approach is normative and assumes words spoken are independent variables that can have important effects on policy, politics, and the health of the broader polity. I conclude by remarking upon the opportunities computer software and newly accessible data provide for researchers of speech in the legislatures of presidential systems. I also suggest avenues for future research.","PeriodicalId":217414,"journal":{"name":"The Politics of Legislative Debates","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129982579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Malawi","authors":"Nikolaos Frantzeskakis, M. Wahman, T. M. Yildirim","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0027","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter represents one of the very first quantitative analyses of parliamentary speechmaking in an African democracy. Looking at Malawi in the parliamentary term 2009–2014, we find that MPs in ministerial positions and party leadership speak significantly more than other MPs. We also find that those representing the major opposition party speak significantly more than other MPs. Given the candidate-centric nature of Malawian parliamentary politics and high levels of formal parliamentary openness, these findings run counter to the theory presented in this volume. We suggest that in order to understand speechmaking in the Malawi parliament, one has to take into account both the generally weak position of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive and the role-orientation of Malawian MPs. In a system with high MP turnover rates and significant local developmental needs, MPs tend to prioritize constituency development over contributions to the national legislative agenda. With resources highly centered on the executive, backbench MPs are unlikely to see significant benefits in pursuing an active legislative agenda. Consequently, MPs representing the government or those higher in opposition party hierarchies can dominate parliamentary speechmaking.","PeriodicalId":217414,"journal":{"name":"The Politics of Legislative Debates","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116794466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ghana","authors":"E. Sanches, A. Dias","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0020","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter investigates the politics of parliamentary debates in Ghana, a country that combines a hybrid presidential regime with a candidate-centered electoral system. Although these features place Ghana as a typical case in which parliamentary rules grant more leeway to individual MPs, our analysis reveals a more complex scenario that defies conventional wisdom. The partial linkage between the legislative and parliamentary branches gives the executive strong agenda-setting powers; moreover, party leadership’s marked influence in the way business in the House unfolds means that there is a skewed playing field, which curtails individual MPs’ access to the floor. The empirical section draws on an original dataset of legislative debates from 2005 through 2019 to examine the determinants of floor access in the Ghanaian parliament. Three findings merit highlighting. First, female MPs are less likely to be selected to speak, and their speeches are significantly shorter when compared to those of male MPs. Second, seniority and exposure to parliament increase the chances of participating in a debate. Third, party leaders have most access to the floor, followed by committee chairs and ministers. However, female MPs who are members of the party leadership speak significantly less than their male counterparts.","PeriodicalId":217414,"journal":{"name":"The Politics of Legislative Debates","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127129699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Analyzing the Politics of Legislative Debate","authors":"M. Laver","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers why we should be interested in the politics of legislative debate. What does the analysis of legislative debate contribute to our understanding of politics more generally? This is particularly important given that legislative debate is not actually “debate” in any meaningful sense of the word, and that most legislators are not even present when most legislative speeches are made. The answers offered here rest on the assumption that speeches in the legislature allow legislators to commit to policy positions on the official record. If the main concern is politics between parties, debate speeches tend to concern actual policy implementation, likely closer to “true” preferences than electoral aspirations and promises. If the prime concern is politics within parties, debate speeches can give insight into internal party policy divisions, even in settings where the final legislative party vote is tightly whipped.","PeriodicalId":217414,"journal":{"name":"The Politics of Legislative Debates","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127986878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Denmark","authors":"David M. Willumsen","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0013","url":null,"abstract":"The Danish Parliament, the Folketing, is elected through a highly proportional electoral system, which places a substantial value on personal votes. Despite this, access to the floor is not controlled by the party leadership, but rather party spokespersons are privileged. The average size of parliamentary party groups is relatively small, which limits the need for hierarchy to coordinate and restricts the ability of party leaders to prevent some MPs from taking the floor. Analyzing speeches given from the start of the 2011–2015 parliamentary term to the end of March 2020, it is found that female MPs are consistently under-represented in terms of parliamentary speeches in the Danish Folketing, and MPs from smaller parliamentary party groups speak significantly more often. No significant effects on the number of words spoken are found. Despite the highly personalized electoral system, access to the floor is neither influenced by electoral vulnerability nor by electoral success.","PeriodicalId":217414,"journal":{"name":"The Politics of Legislative Debates","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126062176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"United States","authors":"D. Gelman, Max Goplerud","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0039","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter analyzes the trends in speaking behavior in the United States Congress from 1921 to 2010 in the House and Senate. We find that key determinants of political behavior from the existing American and comparative literature (seniority, committee leader, party leadership, ideological extremism, and majority party membership) correspond to more floor speeches by members. Senators deliver more speeches per member than their counterparts in the House, although the determinants of activity are broadly similar. Splitting the results by historical period and examining the relationship by the polarization of the chamber show that the effects of certain variables have changed considerably over time. In the House, in particular, the effects of committee leader, extremism, and majority party status have increased over time while the effect of seniority has noticeably decreased in the post-Gingrich period.","PeriodicalId":217414,"journal":{"name":"The Politics of Legislative Debates","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133884273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ecuador","authors":"Analía Gómez Vidal, Sebastián Vallejo Vera","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, we describe the institutional settings of legislative debates in the Ecuador Congress and evaluate the speechmaking patterns using original data from 1988 to 2018. We show that the main determinants of participation in debates in Ecuador are whether legislators hold positions of power within the legislature and whether the legislator is from the same party as the President of Congress. In addition, we highlight the significance of gender as a determinant for access to the floor and floor time. Specifically, we find that women speak less and for a shorter time than men. We also show that increasing descriptive participation of women in the legislature is not enough to increase participation on the floor and find that women in positions of power are able to eliminate the participation gap with men.","PeriodicalId":217414,"journal":{"name":"The Politics of Legislative Debates","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114140513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Netherlands","authors":"S. Otjes, Tom Louwerse","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198849063.003.0029","url":null,"abstract":"Speechmaking in the Dutch parliament is characterized by party dominance and individual autonomy. This paradoxical situation can be understood from the perspective of specialization: every Member of Parliament acts as a spokesperson on a specific issue for their party. Therefore, usually, only one MP per party participates in a debate. Within their policy portfolio, MPs enjoy considerable autonomy, in particular in deciding whether to participate in a debate and what to say. The leadership does not decide for each debate whether or not to delegate speaking time to individual MPs, but rather at the beginning of the parliamentary term when the portfolios are assigned. An empirical analysis of debate participation and the number of words spoken shows that these are most strongly related to electoral list position and seniority. PPG leaders speak longer than other MPs, but we observe no such effect for committee chairs or PPG board members.","PeriodicalId":217414,"journal":{"name":"The Politics of Legislative Debates","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123448743","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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