以色列

Or Tuttnauer, C. Friedberg
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本章研究了影响以色列议会——以色列议会的楼层准入的因素。尽管以色列是一个议会民主制国家,实行比例、名单封闭的选举制度,但以色列议会的议事规则并没有给予政党进入议会的控制权。我们分析了2009年至2019年三个任期内的4.6万多篇演讲,即使在党内领导层确实控制发言的辩论中,我们也没有发现强有力的证据表明,这种控制被用来给排名靠前的代表提供更多的发言时间。这在两个方面与其他人的预测不一致:首先,议会规则并没有反映政党领导层的选举动机;第二,政党似乎没有利用他们所拥有的任何能力来控制其代表的演讲。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Israel
This chapter investigates the factors affecting floor access in the Israeli national parliament—the Knesset. Although Israel is a parliamentary democracy with a proportional, closed-list electoral system, the Knesset’s rules of procedure give little control to parties over floor access. Analyzing over 46,000 speeches over three terms between 2009 and 2019, even in debates where party leadership does have control over who takes the floor, we find no strong evidence that such control is used to give more speech time to highly ranked representatives. This is at odds with predictions made by others in two ways: First, in that the parliamentary rules do not reflect the electoral incentives of party leadership; Second, in that parties do not appear to utilize whatever ability they possess to control their representatives’ speechmaking.
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