ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Equity Offerings in Financial Distress: Evidence from German Restructurings","authors":"Philipp Jostarndt","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1113319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1113319","url":null,"abstract":"For a sample of 267 financially distressed German corporations, I analyze firms’ decision to recapitalize by raising fresh equity. I find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that wealth transfers from owners to creditors, which result from a costly debt overhang present a potential impediment to a successful private restructuring. Firms with high leverage and low future growth potential have troubles raising new funds. However, lending banks frequently accompany offerings with generous debt-concessions, which suggests that firms are able to overcome a debt-overhang in private bargains. Evidence from stock returns around equity offering announcements indicates that high wealth transfers do reduce shareholder wealth. yet, overall announcement returns are significantly positive, indicating that the market considers equity offerings an effective measure for tackling distress out of court.","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"72 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125870732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Some Lessons on the Rescue of Long-Term Capital Management","authors":"Joseph G. Haubrich","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.987558","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.987558","url":null,"abstract":"This Policy Discussion Paper reviews the restructuring and recapitalization of Long-Term Capital Management, looking at possible alternatives and paying particular attention to the Federal Reserve’s role.","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132817500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Labor and Product Market Deregulation: Partial, Sequential, or Simultaneous Reform?","authors":"Helge Berger, S. Danninger","doi":"10.5089/9781451862461.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451862461.001","url":null,"abstract":"This study explores the effects of labor and product market deregulation on employment growth. Our empirical results, based on an OECD country panel from 1990-2004, suggest that lower levels of product and labor market regulation foster employment growth, including through sizable interaction effects. Based on these findings, the paper develops a theoretical framework for evaluating deregulation strategies in the presence of reform costs. Optimal deregulation takes various forms depending on the deregulation costs, the strength of reform interactions, and the perspective of the policymaker. Unless deregulation costs are very asymmetric across markets, optimal deregulation requires some form of coordination.","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"122 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134604019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Changing International Status of Export Cartel Exemptions","authors":"Margaret C. Levenstein, V. Suslow","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.618201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.618201","url":null,"abstract":"In an attempt to create more consistently pro-competitive antitrust policies, many countries have eliminated or restricted antitrust exemptions for firms engaged in export activity. Of the fifty-six countries surveyed, we find only seventeen which offer exporters an exemption from domestic antitrust laws. Thirty-three countries provide no exemption from antitrust laws for export activity, but exempt such activity implicitly: their competition laws are silent on restrictive activities that affect foreign markets. Within the last decade, at least ten countries have rewritten their laws, moving from explicit exemptions to this more passive policy of speaking only to the domestic market. However, the construction of national antitrust laws that ban only activity that harms domestic competition leaves a vacuum in which export cartels can operate with no obvious institution to restrict their activities or limit adverse effects on competition. The elimination of reporting requirements has reduced the information that we have about their activities. International cooperation to regulate and prosecute collusive activity affecting international markets could rationalize these policies and promote competition more effectively than the current haphazard set of national laws.","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114304337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A New Way to Govern: Organisations and Society after Enron","authors":"S. Turnbull","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.319867","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.319867","url":null,"abstract":"This pocketbook was commissioned to identify ways for avoiding the unexpected failure of large publicly traded enterprises and overcoming the shortcomings in government, and/or privatised organisations. It describes the fundamental problems of organisational hierarchies in either the public or private sectors to perform effectively and reliably with the ever-increasing complexity and dynamism in modern societies. Network organisations with multiple control centres or boards are identified as providing requisite variety of information and control channels to flexibly govern complexity. Provided self-governing network organisations are kept to human scale they reduce information overload and bounded rationality. The division of power into a number of centres introduces checks and balances to facilitate self-governance and allows individuals to act in a contrary way that are inhibited in command and control hierarchies. The ability of individuals to be competitive/cooperative, suspicious/trusting, self-interested/altruistic and so on introduces natures' check and balances to efficiently introduce self-regulation. Competition for excellence arises from contestability for control within organisations rather than between organisations through the market place to harness the self-interest of executives to further the public good. Networks of network organisations achieve economies of scale and scope, provided that no higher level network undertakes activities that are better carried out by a lower level self-governing unit. This principle of subsidiary function is illustrated by the nested networks that make up the stakeholder control enterprises around the town of Mondragon in Northern Spain that operate more efficiently that investor owned firms. Like a mutual enterprise the Mondragon firms do not require equity investors. All viable firms by definition become independent of investors but no firm can exist without employees, customers and suppliers who are described as strategic stakeholders. Tax incentives are proposed for shareholders to agree to change corporate constitutions so that all ownership rights are transferred to citizen stakeholders over a twenty-year period. This eliminates any overpayment of investors after 20 years to democratise the wealth of nations. Firms transferring ownership would sponsor new ownership transfer \"offspring\" firms to raise the new funds required to expand the size and scope of their operations by establishing network relationship with their offspring. This process would convert multi-national corporations into nested networks of firms owned and control by local citizens who supported their operations by being a strategic stakeholder. While investors are eliminated from the new UK proposals for the running railways and some water supply firms, their governance system is identified as being inconsistent with self-regulation. The booklet was developed from a working paper with the abbreviated name of \"A New Way to Go","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"346 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122996560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Privatization and Restructuring: Friends or Enemies?","authors":"Josef Kotrba","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1542344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1542344","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes decisions of managers on restructuring before privatization. After privatization, the new owner decides on manager's future based on his/her beliefs on manager's quality. Manager and owner are playing a signalling game, in which restructuring is a signal of manager's quality. The model has two important sets of equilibria: one in which signalling does not persuade the owner to keep the manager who restructures, and other in which signalling offsets the counter-restructuring effect of privatization caused by manager's uncertainty on after-privatization future. Whereas the latter set of equilibria seems to be rather robust, the former one fails whenever there is competititon among privatizers.","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"401 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115242711","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Financial Mobility of Motor Carriers: Pre- and Post-Deregulation","authors":"C. Scheraga, John A. Haslem, T. Corsi","doi":"10.1016/0965-8564(94)90023-X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/0965-8564(94)90023-X","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"8 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120264440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Entry, Contestability, and Deregulated Airline Markets: an Event Study Analysis of People Express","authors":"M. Whinston, Scott C. Collins","doi":"10.3386/W3318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W3318","url":null,"abstract":"A number of recent papers have studied the relationship between price and market structure in the deregulated airline industry through a cross-sectional analysis of city-pair markets. Yet, while interesting, several potential difficulties underlie the inferences drawn in these analyses. In this paper, we consider an alternative approach that uses stock price reactions to entry announcements to shed light on the nature of competitive behavior in this industry. The analysis sheds light on three issues. First, it offers a clean test of contestable market theory. Second, it provides evidence on the level of profits or sunk costs present in these markets. Third, it sheds light on the degree of competitive \"localization\" existing in the industry. The particular entry events that we focus on are those involving People Express Airline in 1984 and 1985. To provide a more complete picture of the effects of these entry events, we also examine the price and quantity changes that occurred following entry.","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128983179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Financial Deregulation, Monetary Policy, and Central Banking","authors":"M. Goodfriend, R. King","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2120879","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2120879","url":null,"abstract":"The paper analyzes the need for financial regulations in the implementation of central bank policy. It emphasizes that a central bank serves two functions. Central banks function as monetary authorities, managing high-powered money to influence the price level and real activity; and they engage in regular and emergency lending to financial institutions. The authors term these functions monetary and banking policies, respectively. They emphasize that regulations are not essential for the execution of monetary policy because high-powered money can be managed with open market operations in government bonds. By its very nature, however, banking policy involves a swap of government securities for claims on individual banks. Just as private lenders must restrict and monitor individual borrowers, a central bank must regulate and supervise the institutions that borrow from it. Virtually all economists agree that there is an important role for monetary policy to stabilize prices and real activity. Banking policy has been rationalized as a source of funds for temporarily illiquid but solvent banks. To assess that rationale, the authors develop the distinction between illiquidity and insolvency in detail, showing the distinction to be meaningful precisely because information about the value of bank assets is incomplete and costly to obtain. Nevertheless, they explain why the cost of information per se cannot rationalize banking policy. On the basis of such considerations, they find it difficult to make a case for banking policy and the regulatory and supervisory activities that support it.","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115314981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}