ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"The Deregulation Deception","authors":"C. Coglianese, Natasha Sarin, S. Shapiro","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3723915","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3723915","url":null,"abstract":"President Donald Trump and his supporters repeatedly pointed to positive economic trends in the United States prior to the pandemic as proof of the growth delivered by his Administration, especially through deregulation. Yet, the Trump Administration actually accomplished much less by way of deregulation than it claimed—and much less than most commentators and scholars have surmised. In this Article, we perform an original analysis of data on federal regulation from the Trump Administration’s four years and find every claim made about its deregulatory record turned out either to be wrong or significantly exaggerated. The reality is that the Trump Administration accomplished much less deregulating than it claimed during its four years, and its deregulatory actions never achieved any demonstrable boost to the economy. Indeed, the economic growth in the early Trump years had nothing to do with the Administration at all: It was the result of trends that began years prior. Why did the Trump Administration end up failing so miserably to deliver on its deregulatory claims? Legal scholarship would suggest the answer lies with the ossification thesis—the oft-invoked claim that administrative agencies have been severely hampered in their ability to adopt or change rules due to the accretion of regulatory procedures and the threat of judicial review. Yet empirical research has drawn the ossification thesis into question. Here, we offer three alternative explanations: President Trump’s prioritization of symbolism over substance; the distinctive obstacles to deregulation (as opposed to regulation); and the Trump Administration’s relative lack of professional acumen. Overall, we conclude that the nation’s recent experience reinforces the value of the administrative state’s procedural norms, which discourage ill-considered, ideologically driven agency action.","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131990543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Burden of Being Public: Evidence from Local Labor Markets","authors":"Andrew Bird, S. Karolyi, T. Ruchti","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3013835","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3013835","url":null,"abstract":"We exploit rich, cross-occupation employment data and quasi-experimental variation in IPO completion to quantify the direct labor compliance costs of being a public company. We precisely estimate a small, positive effect of public listings on local employment for compliance occupations that translates to average annual firm-level compliance costs of no higher than $1.3M. Using dynamic cross-sectional variation in the regulatory burden for public companies, we find that labor costs are highly sensitive to capital markets regulation. However, our estimates are substantially lower than self-reported compliance costs and suggest that labor costs are likely not an important determinant of listing status.","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126323577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Federal Preemption of Local Government Telegraph Franchise Entry Barriers","authors":"Aaron M. Honsowetz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3233417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3233417","url":null,"abstract":"The United States central government enactment of the 1866 Post Roads Act preempted state and municipal telegraph franchise entry barriers. Like present-day telecommunication companies, local franchise regulations were an entry barrier to United States telegraph companies. These pre-1866 state and municipal telegraph laws were barriers of both entry and trade between states. Trade barriers reduced the benefits of a common market and undermined market-preserving federalism (Weingast 1995). I document what laws were preempted by the 1866 Post Roads Act, explain how these laws increased entry barriers, provide evidence that preemption was enforced, and uses two counterfactuals to calculate rough estimates of the decrease in entry costs from enforcement of the act.","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130317150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Russia's Economic Growth Characteristics in 2017-2018: Incentives and Constraints","authors":"S. Drobyshevsky, S. Sinelnikov-Murylev","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3126793","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3126793","url":null,"abstract":"2017 year-end positive results, particularly real GDP growth recovery, fixed investment growth, reflected largely the termination of the cyclical downswing phase for the Russian economy. However, structural and external factors in 2018 will not be able to shore up economic growth. To ensure a sustainable economic growth, a new government should be focused more on structural reforms including a fiscal manoeuvre, denationalization of the economy and deregulation of foreign economic activities.","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114776863","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"A Study of Disinvestment of Central Public Sector Enterprises in India (1991-2016)","authors":"B. Kakkar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3093570","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3093570","url":null,"abstract":"The study deals with the evolution of the disinvestment policy with respect to the Central Public Sector Enterprises (CPSEs) since 1991 and examines two issues specifically – development of legal perspective on disinvestment through important cases and valuation methods of shares/assets adopted in the Strategic Sales of CPSEs. The study outlines the evolution of disinvestment policy, the institutional structure, the role of different bodies/agencies in disinvestment process and the key Supreme Court decisions related to disinvestment. Following broad areas are covered in the study: • Disinvestment Procedures; the methods adopted for disinvestment with a particular focus on the decision making process in case of Strategic Sale of a Company and Public Offerings. • Valuation Methods; a brief account of the methods used for carrying out the valuation of a company along with some findings/comments on the same. • Legal Issues; the stand taken by the Supreme Court in dealing with matters related to Disinvestment of CPSEs. • National Investment Fund; creation of a Disinvestment Proceeds Fund keeping in line with the objectives of the Disinvestment Policy. The study mentions the useful experiences gained in the course of evolution of the policy. It also attempts to relate the recommendations made by different researchers and Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) on the issue of valuation to the process of disinvestment and makes concluding observations.","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133894405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Foundations of Net Neutrality","authors":"Thomas Spavins","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3010818","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3010818","url":null,"abstract":"This brief paper reviews the historical background of the net neutrality debate. It corrects a number of widespread misconceptions.","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130210926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Privatization Trends and Major Deals in 2015 and 2016","authors":"W. Megginson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2944287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2944287","url":null,"abstract":"This article details major privatization deals executed during 2015 and 2016 and surveys trends shaping the privatization landscape worldwide. We document several important facts, including the following: (1) Governments raised a record $319.9 billion (€289.5 billion) through privatization sales worldwide during 2015, substantially more than the $218.8 billion (€166.5 billion) total for 2014 and easily exceeding the previous record of $265.2 billion (€184.3 billion) set in 2009; (2) The global value of privatizations during 2016, $266.4 billion (€241.4 billion) is the second highest on record; (3) Share issue privatizations (SIPs) accounted for over 95% of the total number of privatizations during 2015, and 87% of the total value while auctions, targeted stake sales, convertible bond offerings, and asset sales accounted for the rest. The corresponding figures for 2016 are 93% and 81%, respectively; (4) China was, by far, the leading privatizing country during both 2015 and 2016, raising an astonishing $173.2 billion (€158.4 billion) during 2015, and $148.0 billion (€134.0 billion) during 2016. These Chinese totals represented over half of the worldwide total for both 2015 (54.1%) and 2016 (55.6%). The United Kingdom was a distant second-leading privatizing country during 2015 [13 deals, worth $34.8 billion (€32.1 billion)], while Australia [5 deals worth $25.7 billion (€23.3 billion)] took second place during 2016; (5) The $87.1 billion (€80.0 billion) and $37.8 billion (€34.0 billion) raised by EU governments during, respectively, 2015 and 2016 represented 27.2% and 14.2% of the respective global annual totals. Both 2015 and 2016’s values are far below the long-run average EU share of 37.5% of the global value of privatizations, with 2016 hitting a historic low; (6) There were a relative handful of failed, withdrawn, and cancelled specific privatization sales during 2015 and 2016, but the political turmoil associated with the United Kingdom’s surprisingly successful “Brexit” vote in June — plus global uncertainty leading up to the US presidential election in November — forced a pause in a number of European privatization programs, especially Britain’s; and (7) The large number (903) and value [$586.3 billion (€530.9 billion)] of privatizations executed during 2015 and 2016, coupled with several massive planned sale announcements — especially Saudi Aramco’s mooted $100 billion IPO in 2017 or early 2018, suggests that the massive global privatization wave that began in 2012 continues unabated.","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129541415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Bank Branching Deregulation and High School Graduation","authors":"Patrick A. Reilly","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3050569","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3050569","url":null,"abstract":"This paper utilizes variation in timing of deregulation to investigate the relationship between bank branching deregulation and educational outcomes for individuals in 39 states over the period 1977 - 1999. In order to investigate the labor market channel, this paper focuses on the relationship between deregulation and high school graduation, as opposed to recent studies focusing on the relationship between deregulation and college attendance via the credit market channel. Results indicate increases in the likelihood of graduating high school after deregulation. Results also suggest heterogeneity in effects due to race and age at deregulation. Finally, models testing the relationship between bank deregulation and post-secondary education outcomes generate similar results to findings from previous studies.","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"IM-34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126634447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Government Contracting and the Threat of Re-Election","authors":"Robert C. Seamans","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2569288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2569288","url":null,"abstract":"Incumbent politicians may worry about their chances of re-election. Re-election concerns may induce incumbents to write contracts that have low power incentives (LPI) instead of high power incentives (HPI). This may result in inefficient outcomes in cases where high power incentives are desirable. The purpose of this research is to model the incumbent’s decision to choose between contracts of high or low powered incentives, and derive conditions under which the incumbent will favor LPI over HPI, even if HPI is more efficient. The model builds directly off of an earlier model developed by Coate and Morris (1995).","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114388059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Differences in the Information Environment Prior to Seasoned Equity Offerings under Relaxed Disclosure Regulation","authors":"S. B. Clinton, Joshua T. White, Tracie Woidtke","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1973819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1973819","url":null,"abstract":"The SEC promulgated the Securities Offering Reform (SOR) in 2005 to ease disclosure restrictions prior to seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). The SEC argued that SOR would improve the information environment, but critics claimed it would allow firms to hype their stock. This paper is the first to examine the information environment at the time of capital formation under SOR. We find more frequent and accurate management earnings forecasts, more 8-K filings, greater absolute market-adjusted returns, and more positive stock returns leading up to the SEO issue date indicating a richer pre-SEO information environment with capital formation benefits after SOR.","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132226685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}