ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)最新文献_第2页

New Powers - New Vulnerabilities? A Critical Analysis of Market Inquiries Performed by Competition Authorities 新的力量-新的弱点?竞争管理机构市场调查的批判性分析

ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-10-06 DOI: 10.4337/9781783472598.00012

Tamar Indig, M. Gal

{"title":"New Powers - New Vulnerabilities? A Critical Analysis of Market Inquiries Performed by Competition Authorities","authors":"Tamar Indig, M. Gal","doi":"10.4337/9781783472598.00012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781783472598.00012","url":null,"abstract":"In the past two decades the number of jurisdictions which have empowered their Competition Authorities to engage in market inquiries (MIs) has grown substantially. Although jurisdictions differ in the scope and procedure adopted for such studies, they all share an important common trait: attempting to allocate the roots of limited competition in the studied market. Market studies differ from traditional competition law tools in their triggers, range, object, and the level of pro-activity of the Competition Authority. They are not triggered by a suspicion of anti-competitive conduct of specific firm(s), but rather allow the Authority to use a broad prism which focuses on a wider set of potential obstacles to competition, including the Authority's own past conduct, in order to find ways to enhance competition. MIs entail many advantages. Yet, bestowing this power upon a Competition Authority is not self-explanatory. Furthermore, it is far from costless. Beyond the direct costs imposed on both the Authority and market participants, MIs often carry less tangible price tags. They raise a host of constitutional, democratic and practical issues that have not been thoroughly studied as of yet, which are the focus of this paper. In so doing, the paper builds, inter alia, on the recent administrative law literature which focuses on multi-agency interactions. Accordingly, this paper seeks to provide a synergetic analysis of MIs for the benefit of policymakers.","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125366998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

'Make or Buy' as Competitive Strategy: Evidence from the Spanish Local TV Industry “制造或购买”作为竞争策略:来自西班牙地方电视行业的证据

ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic) Pub Date : 2013-05-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2213070

Ricard Gil, Christian A. Ruzzier

引用次数: 2

The Liberalisation of the Postal Service Market in Estonia and Its Effect on Competition 爱沙尼亚邮政服务市场的自由化及其对竞争的影响

ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-11-15 DOI: 10.15157/TPEP.V20I2.843

Jüri Sepp, Raigo Ernits

引用次数: 2

Do Public Equity Markets Matter in Emerging Economies? Evidence from India 新兴经济体的公共股权市场重要吗?来自印度的证据

ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic) Pub Date : 2012-08-28 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1010116

Todd A. Gormley, R. Gopalan

引用次数: 32

Deregulation, Consolidation, and Efficiency: Evidence from U.S. Nuclear Power 放松管制、合并与效率：美国核电的证据

ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic) Pub Date : 2011-08-01 DOI: 10.1257/APP.4.4.194

Lucas W. Davis, Catherine Wolfram

引用次数: 145

Ronald H. Coase 罗纳德·h·科斯

ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic) Pub Date : 2010-04-02 DOI: 10.4337/9781849806909.00010

M. Sykuta

{"title":"Ronald H. Coase","authors":"M. Sykuta","doi":"10.4337/9781849806909.00010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781849806909.00010","url":null,"abstract":"As a student at the London School of Economics (LSE), Ronald Coase posed a seemingly naive question that would, in time, fundamentally change the face of economics and earn him the Nobel Prize: ‘Why do firms exist?’ The import of this simple question derived not only from the response Coase proposed, that is, that firms exist to economize on the costs of using the market, but also from the analytic perspective underlying both the question and the process by which Coase arrived at his conclusion. Coase’s insight and approach to understanding the economic system provided the theoretical foundation for Transaction Cost Economics and much of organizational economics more generally. Much has been written of Coase’s days as a student at the LSE and lecturer at the Dundee School of Economics and Commerce, most notably Coase’s (1991) autobiographical lectures on the origin, meaning and influence of his 1937 paper, ‘The Nature of the Firm’. One of the most striking realizations for many students is that the basic ideas contained in the 1937 paper had been developed in 1932 when Coase traveled to the United States as a mere 21 year-old, having received a scholarship to study ‘vertical and lateral integration in industry’ (Coase, 1991, p.38). That the ideas of such a young person with very little formal economics training could have such significant implications for an entire discipline should be an encouragement to students and young professionals. It should also serve as a reminder to the profession as a whole to be careful of overlooking the most basic of its assumptions.","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133750733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Evolution of Seeds Commerce: Deregulation, Technology, and Local Practices 种子商业的演变:放松管制、技术和地方实践

ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic) Pub Date : 2009-05-23 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1409044

Aashish Argade, Ram Kumar Kakani

{"title":"Evolution of Seeds Commerce: Deregulation, Technology, and Local Practices","authors":"Aashish Argade, Ram Kumar Kakani","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1409044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1409044","url":null,"abstract":"This paper captures the evolution of seeds commerce in India, a traditionally agrarian economy. It also captures some exciting aspects of industry evolution of one of the top seeds market in the world (given its size). Following a review of the industry in India over the last few decades one observes that the deregulation of seeds commerce has been influenced not only by the progressive liberalization of the Indian economy but also by the development of science and technology in the private sector, both locally and globally. This has resulted in the seeds market in India becoming highly competitive by attracting a large number of players. The discussion also captures another interesting facet – that the norms and regulations of the industry and the way it develops can be severely influenced not only by the (large) private business players but also by the dispersed (and seemingly) powerless farming community! The existing farmer’s rights gives a free hand to farmers to multiply, exchange, sell and use any proprietary (seed) variety. The local practices especially of seed organizers also make the life of the rules setter (i.e., the state) very difficult. Perhaps, one can observe that seeds commerce in India has grown beyond the control of the state and its bureaucracy.","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131977538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Capital Structure Decisions: Evidence from Deregulated Industries 资本结构决策:来自放松管制行业的证据

ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic) Pub Date : 2008-09-18 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1270822

A. Ovtchinnikov

引用次数: 144

Outsourcing and the Duty to Govern 外判与管治责任

ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic) Pub Date : 2008-02-20 DOI: 10.2307/j.ctv22jnrsb.16

Paul R. Verkuil

{"title":"Outsourcing and the Duty to Govern","authors":"Paul R. Verkuil","doi":"10.2307/j.ctv22jnrsb.16","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv22jnrsb.16","url":null,"abstract":"This article, which will be a chapter in Government by Contract (Martha Minow and Jody Freeman eds., Harvard University Press 2008), addresses the proposition that some duties of government may not be transferred to private hands. It views the executive power as requiring public governance and connects Congress to this responsibility through the Appointments Clause. Officers of the United States are those officials directly charged with doing the public's business and any direct or indirect transfer of their responsibilities would run counter to the constitutional plan. Decisions at the margins, where government remains nominally in control, are less easy to categorize and issues of justiciability are always problematic. However, there remains a core of government responsibilities that must be protected from the increasingly robust privatization movement. This chapter is concerned with the transfer to private contractors of government power that might be considered inherent or significant under governing constitutional, statutory or regulatory norms (especially the Appointments Clause, the Subdelegation Act and OMB's A-76 process). Through a study of the Transportation Security Agency, it seeks to offer workable definitions of these limitations. This chapter connects to prior work by the author in Outsourcing Sovereignty (Cambridge University Press 2007).","PeriodicalId":217147,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130364124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Liberalization and Private Sector Involvement in the Water Industry: A Review of the Economic Literature 自由化与私营部门参与水务行业:经济文献综述

ERN: Deregulation/Restructuring of Public Sector Firms (Topic) Pub Date : 2007-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1031623

A. Massarutto

引用次数: 14