{"title":"How getting in sync is curative: Insights gained from research in psychotherapy.","authors":"Sigal Zilcha-Mano","doi":"10.1037/rev0000471","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000471","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>We are all constantly going in and out of sync with the people we meet in our lives: significant others, incidental encounters, and strangers. Synchrony is a ubiquitous phenomenon, considered an evolution-based mechanism of survival. In recent years, technological development has made it possible to collect much data on synchrony across disciplines. The collected data show great potential to shed light on the benefits of this universal phenomenon. At the same time, mixed results emerged, stressing the need for a theory to navigate research inquiries and discoveries. It is proposed here that synchrony serves as an individual-specific mechanism for making relationships curative in all life circumstances, especially therapeutic ones-hence its special relevance for psychotherapy. A synthesis of the majority of the literature across disciplines reveals two implicit assumptions about synchrony, resulting in two separate bodies of knowledge: (a) synchrony is a trait-like signature characterizing individuals; and (b) synchrony is a state-like phenomenon that can be manipulated in the lab. It is proposed here to personalize synchrony research by integrating the two assumptions into a comprehensive theory according to which individuals have a trait-like signature for getting in sync, which determines their physical and mental health, and that this deterministic reality can be subject to state-like manipulation. Individuals can deviate from their trait-like signature. When the deviation is toward normative activation, mental health improves, and the state-like changes are defined as therapeutic. This article calls for research to investigate how trait-like signature of synchrony develops and how it can be therapeutically changed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139736018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The controllosphere: The neural origin of cognitive effort.","authors":"Clay B Holroyd","doi":"10.1037/rev0000467","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000467","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Why do some mental activities feel harder than others? The answer to this question is surprisingly controversial. Current theories propose that cognitive effort affords a computational benefit, such as instigating a switch from an activity with low reward value to a different activity with higher reward value. By contrast, in this article, I relate cognitive effort to the fact that brain neuroanatomy and neurophysiology render some neural states more energy-efficient than others. I introduce the concept of the \"controllosphere,\" an energy-inefficient region of neural state space associated with high control, which surrounds the better known \"intrinsic manifold,\" an energy-efficient subspace associated with low control. Integration of control-theoretic principles with classic neurocomputational models of cognitive control suggests that dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) implements a <i>controller</i> that can drive the system state into the controllosphere, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) implements an <i>observer</i> that monitors changes of state of the controlled system, and cognitive effort reflects a mismatch between DLPFC and ACC energies for control and observation. On this account, cognitive effort scales with the energetic demands of the DLPFC control signal, especially when the consequences of the control are unobservable by ACC. Further, I propose that neural transitions through the controllosphere lead to a buildup of neural waste. Cognitive effort therefore prevents against neural damage by discouraging extended periods of high control. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139736020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Levels of analysis and explanatory progress in psychology: Integrating frameworks from biology and cognitive science for a more comprehensive science of the mind.","authors":"Laith Al-Shawaf","doi":"10.1037/rev0000459","DOIUrl":"10.1037/rev0000459","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported online in <i>Psychological Review</i> on Mar 14 2024 (see record 2024-63968-001). Incorrect italic formatting was removed throughout the article, and an unnecessary paragraph of text was removed from the \"Levels of Analysis and the Branches of Psychology: What Is Needed for a Complete Explanation of a Behavior or Cognitive System?\" section. These were editorial production errors. All versions of this article have been corrected.] Levels of analysis are crucial to the progress of science. They frame the epistemological boundaries of a discipline, chart its explanatory goals, help scientists to avoid needless conflict, and highlight knowledge gaps. Two frameworks in particular, <i>Tinbergen's four questions</i> from biology and <i>Marr's three levels</i> from cognitive science, hold immense potential for psychology. This article proposes ways to integrate the two frameworks and suggests that doing so helps resolve key confusions and unnecessary conflicts in psychology. Integrating these two frameworks clarifies what \"mechanism\" really means, sheds light on how to test evolutionary hypotheses in psychology, and specifies what is required for a comprehensive explanation of a behavior or cognitive system. Adopting and integrating these two theoretical frameworks has the capacity to spur progress in psychology and to clarify what is needed for a comprehensive science of the mind. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-01-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139513556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Psychological reviewPub Date : 2024-01-01Epub Date: 2023-01-16DOI: 10.1037/rev0000403
Jorge Morales, Chaz Firestone
{"title":"Empirical evidence for perspectival similarity.","authors":"Jorge Morales, Chaz Firestone","doi":"10.1037/rev0000403","DOIUrl":"10.1037/rev0000403","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>When a circular coin is rotated in depth, is there any sense in which it comes to resemble an ellipse? While this question is at the center of a rich and divided philosophical tradition (with some scholars answering affirmatively and some negatively), Morales et al. (2020, 2021) took an empirical approach, reporting 10 experiments whose results favor such perspectival similarity. Recently, Burge and Burge (2022) offered a vigorous critique of this work, objecting to its approach and conclusions on both philosophical and empirical grounds. Here, we answer these objections on both fronts. We show that Burge and Burge's critique rests on misunderstandings of Morales et al.'s claims; of the relation between the data and conclusions; and of the philosophical context in which the work appears. Specifically, Burge and Burge attribute to us a much stronger (and stranger) view than we hold, involving the introduction of \"a new entity\" located \"in some intermediate position(s) between the distal shape and the retinal image.\" We do not hold this view. Indeed, once properly understood, most of Burge and Burge's objections favor Morales et al.'s claims rather than oppose them. Finally, we discuss several questions that remain unanswered, and reflect on a productive path forward on these issues of foundational scientific and philosophical interest. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":"311-320"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9100355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Psychological reviewPub Date : 2024-01-01Epub Date: 2023-08-17DOI: 10.1037/rev0000437
Theodore R Sumers, Mark K Ho, Thomas L Griffiths, Robert D Hawkins
{"title":"Reconciling truthfulness and relevance as epistemic and decision-theoretic utility.","authors":"Theodore R Sumers, Mark K Ho, Thomas L Griffiths, Robert D Hawkins","doi":"10.1037/rev0000437","DOIUrl":"10.1037/rev0000437","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>People use language to influence others' <i>beliefs</i> and actions. Yet models of communication have diverged along these lines, formalizing the speaker's objective in terms of <i>either</i> the listener's beliefs or actions. We argue that this divergence lies at the root of a longstanding controversy over the Gricean maxims of truthfulness and relevance. We first bridge the divide by introducing a speaker model which considers <i>both</i> the listener's beliefs (epistemic utility) and their actions (decision-theoretic utility). We show that formalizing truthfulness as an epistemic utility and relevance as a decision-theoretic utility reconciles the tension between them, readily explaining puzzles such as context-dependent standards of truthfulness. We then test a set of novel predictions generated by our model. We introduce a new signaling game which decouples utterances' truthfulness and relevance, then use it to conduct a pair of experiments. Our first experiment demonstrates that participants <i>jointly</i> maximize epistemic and decision-theoretic utility, rather than either alone. Our second experiment shows that when the two conflict, participants make a graded <i>tradeoff</i> rather than prioritizing one over the other. These results demonstrate that human communication cannot be reduced to influencing beliefs or actions alone. Taken together, our work provides a new foundation for grounding rational communication not only in what we <i>believe</i>, but in what those beliefs lead us to do. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":"194-230"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10017214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Psychological reviewPub Date : 2024-01-01Epub Date: 2022-12-22DOI: 10.1037/rev0000405
Rodrigo Sosa
{"title":"Conditioned inhibition, inhibitory learning, response inhibition, and inhibitory control: Outlining a conceptual clarification.","authors":"Rodrigo Sosa","doi":"10.1037/rev0000405","DOIUrl":"10.1037/rev0000405","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Inhibition can be defined as a phenomenon in which an agent prevents or suppresses a behavioral state that would otherwise occur. Associative learning studies have extensively examined how experiences shape the acquisition of inhibitory behavioral tendencies across many species and situations. Associative inhibitory phenomena can be studied at various levels of analysis. One could focus on the trajectory of behavioral change involved in learning from negative statistical associations between discrete events (<i>inhibitory learning</i>). Alternatively, one could be interested in the effects of accumulated experience with those negative associations (<i>conditioned inhibition</i>). One could rather be interested in how organisms implement what they learn through experiences involving negative associations (<i>response inhibition</i>). Yet, one could inquire into how the capacity of learning negative associations and performing accordingly varies between individuals and along time for the same individual (<i>inhibitory control</i>). This article presents a tentative taxonomy addressing different levels of analysis of associative inhibitory phenomena by using different terms for each. In addition, recent evidence and certain unresolved issues at each level are thoroughly scrutinized and contrasted with prior findings. The empirical and theoretical advances made by modeling inhibition as an associative learning phenomenon have provided scaffolds for the current knowledge and emerging accounts of the topic. Some of those emerging accounts have the potential to bridge different levels of analysis and foster \"cross-pollination\" of ideas among broad fields beyond associative learning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":"138-173"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10419985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Psychological reviewPub Date : 2024-01-01Epub Date: 2023-01-12DOI: 10.1037/rev0000413
Richard J Stevenson, Martin R Yeomans, Heather M Francis
{"title":"Human hunger as a memory process.","authors":"Richard J Stevenson, Martin R Yeomans, Heather M Francis","doi":"10.1037/rev0000413","DOIUrl":"10.1037/rev0000413","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Hunger refers to (1) the meaning of certain bodily sensations; (2) a mental state of anticipation that food will be good to eat; and (3) an organizing principal, which prioritizes feeding. Definitions (1) and (2) are the focus here, as (3) can be considered their consequent. Definition (1) has been linked to energy-depletion models of hunger, but these are no longer thought viable. Definition (2) has been linked to learning and memory (L&M) models of hunger, but these apply just to palatable foods. Nonetheless, L&M probably forms the basis for hunger generally, as damage to declarative memory can eradicate the experience of hunger. Currently, there is no general L&M model of hunger, little understanding of how physiology intersects with a L&M approach, and no understanding of how Definitions (1) and (2) are related. We present a new L&M model of human hunger. People learn associations between internal (e.g., tummy rumbles) and external cues (e.g., brand names) and food. These associations can be to specific foods (episodic memories) or food-related categories (semantic memories). When a cue is encountered, it <i>may</i> lead to food-related memory retrieval. If retrieval occurs, the memory's affective content allows one to know if food will be good to eat now-hunger-a cognitive operation learned in childhood. These memory processes are acutely inhibited during satiety, and chronically by multiple biological parameters, allowing physiology to modulate hunger. Implications are considered for the process of making hunger judgments, thirst, the cephalic phase response, and motivational and lay theories of hunger. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":"174-193"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10519105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Psychological reviewPub Date : 2024-01-01Epub Date: 2023-11-13DOI: 10.1037/rev0000451
Shufan Mao, Philip A Huebner, Jon A Willits
{"title":"Spatial versus graphical representation of distributional semantic knowledge.","authors":"Shufan Mao, Philip A Huebner, Jon A Willits","doi":"10.1037/rev0000451","DOIUrl":"10.1037/rev0000451","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Spatial distributional semantic models represent word meanings in a vector space. While able to model many basic semantic tasks, they are limited in many ways, such as their inability to represent multiple kinds of relations in a single semantic space and to directly leverage indirect relations between two lexical representations. To address these limitations, we propose a distributional graphical model that encodes lexical distributional data in a graphical structure and uses spreading activation for determining the plausibility of word sequences. We compare our model to existing spatial and graphical models by systematically varying parameters that contributing to dimensions of theoretical interest in semantic modeling. In order to be certain about what the models should be able to learn, we trained each model on an artificial corpus describing events in an artificial world simulation containing experimentally controlled verb-noun selectional preferences. The task used for model evaluation requires recovering observed selectional preferences and inferring semantically plausible but never observed verb-noun pairs. We show that the distributional graphical model performed better than all other models. Further, we argue that the relative success of this model comes from its improved ability to access the different orders of spatial representations with the spreading activation on the graph, enabling the model to infer the plausibility of noun-verb pairs unobserved in the training data. The model integrates classical ideas of representing semantic knowledge in a graph with spreading activation and more recent trends focused on the extraction of lexical distributional data from large natural language corpora. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":"104-137"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"92156312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Psychological reviewPub Date : 2024-01-01Epub Date: 2022-12-22DOI: 10.1037/rev0000404
Tony Cheng, Yi Lin, Chen-Wei Wu
{"title":"Perspectival shapes are viewpoint-dependent relational properties.","authors":"Tony Cheng, Yi Lin, Chen-Wei Wu","doi":"10.1037/rev0000404","DOIUrl":"10.1037/rev0000404","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Recently, there is a renewed debate concerning the role of perspective in vision. Morales et al. (2020) present evidence that, in the case of viewing a rotated coin, the visual system is sensitive to what has often been called \"perspectival shapes.\" It has generated vigorous discussions, including an online symposium by Morales and Cohen, an exchange between Linton (2021) and Morales et al. (2021), and most recently, a fierce critique by Burge and Burge (2022), in which they launch various conceptual and empirical objections. Although Morales and Firestone (2022) have responded to them recently, and we are in agreement with Morales and Firestone in general, there are further problems in Burge and Burge (2022) that are worth highlighting. The main point of this comment is that what the Burge-Burge team call \"viewpoint-dependent relational properties\" are simply instances of what the Morales-Firestone team call \"perspectival shapes\"; the confusion arises from Burge and Burge's misconstrual of Morales et al.'s claims. This shows that conceptually, the two teams are in large agreement, as Morales and Firestone (2022) also point out, and the focus should be put on the empirical disagreements, which has been covered by Morales and Firestone (2022). Relatedly, we argue that Burge and Burge (2022) misinterpret Morales et al. (2020) as supporting a new entity in perception science, and that this misinterpretation is a primary source of their apparent disagreement. This is worth pointing out because such misunderstanding generates many unnecessary quarrels that hinder progress. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":" ","pages":"307-310"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10419986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Diana Vogel-Blaschka, Wilfried Kunde, Oliver Herbort, Stefan Scherbaum
{"title":"Ideonamic: An integrative computational dynamic model of ideomotor learning and effect-based action control.","authors":"Diana Vogel-Blaschka, Wilfried Kunde, Oliver Herbort, Stefan Scherbaum","doi":"10.1037/rev0000460","DOIUrl":"10.1037/rev0000460","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>According to ideomotor theory, actions are represented, controlled, and retrieved in terms of the perceptual effects that these actions experientially engender. When agents perform a motor action, they observe its subsequent perceptual effects and establish action-effect associations. When they want to achieve this effect at a later time, they use the action-effect associations to preactivate the action by internally activating the effect representation. Ideomotor theory has received extensive support in recent years. To capture this particular effect-based view on action control and goal-directed behavior, we developed IDEONAMIC, an integrative computational model based on dynamic field theory that represents the specific components of the action control process as dynamic neural fields. We show that IDEONAMIC applies conveniently to different types of experimental ideomotor settings, simulates key findings, generates novel predictions from the dynamics of data, and allows reapproaching the underlying cognitive mechanisms from a computational point of view. We encourage the application of IDEONAMIC to more types of ideomotor settings to gain insights into effect-based action control. The model is available at https://osf.io/hbc6n. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":21016,"journal":{"name":"Psychological review","volume":"131 1","pages":"79-103"},"PeriodicalIF":5.4,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139725654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}