NYU: Economics Working Papers (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Market Power: How Does it Arise? How is it Measured?","authors":"L. White","doi":"10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199782956.013.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199782956.013.0003","url":null,"abstract":"Market power – how it arises, and how it is measured – is an important topic for the economics field of “industrial organization” (IO). It is also an important topic for managers and for managerial economics, since it can be related to sustainable advantage for a company and it is usually at the center of antitrust cases in which a company may be involved. This chapter defines market power, discusses how it arises, and describes the various methods that have been used for empirically detecting and measuring it. Attention is also given to the role and measurement of market power in important antitrust contexts.","PeriodicalId":208085,"journal":{"name":"NYU: Economics Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128383258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Network Competition: Workhorse Resurrection","authors":"Thomas P. Tangerås","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1694388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1694388","url":null,"abstract":"I generalize the workhorse model of network competition (Armstrong, 1998; Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a,b) to include income effects in call demand. Income effects imply that call demand depends also on the subscription fee, not only on the call price. In the standard case of differentiated networks, weak income effects are enough to deliver results in line with stylized facts: The networks have an incentive to agree on high mobile termination rates to soften competition. They charge a higher price for calls outside (off-net) than inside (on-net) the network. This vindicates the use of (a perturbation of) the workhorse model of network competition.","PeriodicalId":208085,"journal":{"name":"NYU: Economics Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132292537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Which Kind of Transparency and When? Career Concerns, and Incentives for Acquiring Expertise","authors":"Heski Bar-Isaac","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1174502","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1174502","url":null,"abstract":"An agent can exert effort to improve the quality of a signal that also depends on his ability. The signal will help him to choose an action, which, in turn will lead to some observable good or bad outcome. Transparency on actions can distort the agent's choices towards \"smart\" actions (which a more able agent is more likely to receive), regardless of the signal. When smart actions produce no further information, thus concealing any further signals of ability, this dampens the agent's incentives to exert effort. In contrast, revealing smart actions can boost effort. Thus, this paper provides a more nuanced view on the costs and benefits of transparency and delegation. Further, the model brings together two approaches to career concerns (the ability- and expertise-based approaches) and highlights that the two can act in concert or in opposition.","PeriodicalId":208085,"journal":{"name":"NYU: Economics Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133512282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Correlation in Bivariate Poisson Regression Model","authors":"W. Greene","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.990011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.990011","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a bivariate Poisson model that is based on the lognormal heterogeneity model. Two recent applications have used this model. We suggest that the correlation estimated in their model frameworks is an ambiguous measure of the correlation of the variables of interest, and may substantially overstate it. We conclude with a detailed application of the proposed method using the data employed in one of the two aforementioned bivariate Poisson studies.","PeriodicalId":208085,"journal":{"name":"NYU: Economics Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124891327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Fixed and Random Effects Models for Count Data","authors":"W. Greene","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.990012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.990012","url":null,"abstract":"The most familiar fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) panel data treatments for count data were proposed by Hausman, Hall and Griliches (HHG) (1984). The Poisson FE model is particularly simple and is one of a small few known models in which the incidental parameters problem is, in fact, not a problem. The same is not true of the negative binomial (NB) model. Researchers are sometimes surprised to find that the HHG formulation of the FENB model allows an overall constant - a quirk that has also been documented elsewhere. We resolve the source of the ambiguity, and consider the difference between the HHG FENB model and a \"true\" FENB model that appears in the familiar index function form. The familiar RE Poisson model using a log gamma heterogeneity term produces the NB model. The HHG RE NB model is also unlike what might seem the natural application in which the heterogeneity term appears as an additive common effect in the conditional mean. We consider the lognormal model as an alternative RENB model in which the common effect appears in a natural index function form.","PeriodicalId":208085,"journal":{"name":"NYU: Economics Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"79 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116096288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Political Uncertainty and Crime in Transition Economies","authors":"B. Katz, Joel Owen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.985601","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.985601","url":null,"abstract":"Political Uncertainty and Crime in Transition Economies Two stylized facts are often used to characterize the economies in transition: an increase in the crime level and frequent government changes, where the party in power is replaced by another party with a different, and often opposite, ideologicalorientation. We investigate the impact on agents honesty when agents perceive thefuture form of government as uncertain, and also know that their own collective decisions will effect the government s choice of type. Furthermore, we assume that the form that the government will take depends, in part, on the collective behavior of the agents. By endogenizing the joint decisions made by the agents, as well as the government, we derive the social consequences of these choices, the induced level of crime. Using the level of crime permits us to investigate comparative statics for possible policy implications. We show that the complex interactions between the government and the agents leads to some non-intuitive results.","PeriodicalId":208085,"journal":{"name":"NYU: Economics Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128973962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Corporate Hierarchies and the Size of Nations: Theory and Evidence","authors":"Dalia. Marin, T. Verdier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.990008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.990008","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate organization varies within a country and across countries with country size. The paper starts by establishing some facts about corporate organization based on unique data of 660 Austrian and German corporations. The larger country (Germany) has larger firms with flatter more decentral corporate hierarchies compared to the smaller country (Austria). Firms in the larger country change their organization less fast than firms in the smaller country. Over time firms have been introducing less hierarchical organizations by delegating power to lower levels of the corporation. We develop a theory which explains these facts and which links these features to the trade environment that countries and firms face. We introduce firms with internal hierarchies in a Krugman (1980) model of trade. We show that international trade and the toughness of competition in international markets induce a power struggle in firms which eventually leads to decentralized corporate hierarchies. We offer econometric evidence which is consistent with the models predictions.","PeriodicalId":208085,"journal":{"name":"NYU: Economics Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"51 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131284355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Empire Effect: The Determinants of Country Risk in the First Age of Globalization, 1880-1913","authors":"N. Ferguson, M. Schularick","doi":"10.1017/S002205070600012X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S002205070600012X","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reassesses the importance of colonial status to investors before 1914 by means of multivariable regression analysis of the data available to contemporaries. We show that British colonies were able to borrow in London at significantly lower rates of interest than non-colonies precisely because of their colonial status, which mattered more than either gold convertibility or a balanced budget. Allowing for differences not only in monetary and fiscal policy but also in economic development and location, the â¬SEmpire effectâ¬? was a discount of around 100 basis points. We conclude that investors saw colonial status as a no-default guarantee.","PeriodicalId":208085,"journal":{"name":"NYU: Economics Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121441472","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry: What Would More Vigorous Competition Look Like?","authors":"L. White","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.895713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.895713","url":null,"abstract":"The residential real estate brokerage industry represents a troubling instance of false appearances. Though the numbers of sales agents and brokerage firms, plus easy entry, would appear to offer the promise of vigorous competition, actual practices in the industry have caused reality to fall substantially short of the potential. After recounting the history of the transition of the securities industry from fixed and non-competitive stock brokerage commissions to far more vigorous competition, I draw on that experience to describe what vigorous competition in the residential real estate brokerage industry would look like. I also suggest public policy measures that would help bring about more vigorous competition.","PeriodicalId":208085,"journal":{"name":"NYU: Economics Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121376295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"An Economic Model for the Incentive/Access Paradigm of Copyright Propertization: An Argument in Support of the Proposed New 514 to the Copyright Act","authors":"Sami Valkonen, L. White","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.895554","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.895554","url":null,"abstract":"This article proposes an economic model of the incentive-access paradigm for copyright designed to correspond to the goal of maximizing societal welfare.The article begins with a discussion on the foundations of copyright and the objectives of the Constitutionâ¬\"s Copyright Clause. The article adopts the majority view that the Constitution mandates that the copyright regime is designed to optimize the positive welfare impacts from copyright protection. Under this view, similarly as antitrust â¬Sprotects competition, not competitorsâ¬?, the copyright regime should protect creativity, not creators. The result of this underlying policy objective is that the level of copyright propertization becomes a balancing test where Congress and the courts should set the extent of the rights granted in the Copyright Act to a level that maximizes the aggregate societal benefit from copyrightable subject matter.After laying this legal foundation, the article analysis the strengths and weaknesses of some economic models presented in academic literature. The focus of this discussion is the model proposed by William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, but also includes a scan of some of the other relevant academic models. The majority of the economic models that have been proposed for intellectual property are built around marginal unit cost analysis, and the article questions whether -- especially in a digital environment that analysis presents a valid basis for modeling. The article then proposes a microeconomic formulation of the incentive-access paradigm that captures the economic concepts needed for Congress and the courts to derive policy decisions that maximize societal welfare.The article concludes with a discussion of an implicit real-world application of the model. In its recent report on so-called â¬Sorphan worksâ¬? the Copyright Office proposes that copyright protection where the owner is unidentifiable is reduced to a liability rule. This is consistent with the modelâ¬\"s conclusion that reducing access costs at the outer perimeters of copyright protection will result in a net increase in output, and thereby in a net societal gain. The article suggests that policymakers and courts should view changes to the level of copyright protection through the lens of the proposed model to ensure that the copyright regime evolves in a manner consistent with the utilitarian objectives of the Constitution.","PeriodicalId":208085,"journal":{"name":"NYU: Economics Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123988691","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}