{"title":"Costly Contracting in a Long-Term Relationship","authors":"Pierpaolo Battigalli, G. Maggi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.480642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.480642","url":null,"abstract":"We examine a model of contracting where parties interact repeatedly and can contract at any point in time, but writing enforceable contracts is costly. A contract can describe contingencies and actions at a more or less detailed level, and the cost of writing a contract is proportional to the amount of detail. We consider both formal (externally enforced) and informal (self-enforcing) contracts. The presence of writing costs has important implications both for the optimal structure of formal contracts, particularly the tradeoff between contingent and spot contracts, and for the interaction between formal and informal contracting. Our model sheds light on these implications and generates a rich set of predictions about the determinants of the optimal mode of contracting.","PeriodicalId":208085,"journal":{"name":"NYU: Economics Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2003-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121369176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"IPO's and the Growth of Firms","authors":"Gian Luca Clementi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.314277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.314277","url":null,"abstract":"Recent years have witnessed a rapid accumulation of empirical evidence documenting firm dynamics around the IPO date. A particularly striking finding is that operating performance, as measured by Returns on Assets for example, peaks in the fiscal year preceding the offering, worsens on impact at the IPO date, and keeps on declining for a few more years. In this paper, I provide a novel rationalization of this evidence. To this end, I construct a simple dynamic stochastic model of firm behavior in which the decision to go public is modelled explicitly. The model predicts that the operating performance reaches its peak in the period before the offering and experiences a sudden decline at the IPO date. The comparative advantage of my approach is that it produces further implications that are in line with the data. Most importantly, the model predicts that the IPO coincides with an increase in sales and capital expenditures. Consistently with evidence pointed out by the Industrial Organization literature, the firm growth rate is shown to be decreasing in age and size.","PeriodicalId":208085,"journal":{"name":"NYU: Economics Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131974311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What's Been Happening to Aggregate Concentration in the United States? (And Should We Care?),","authors":"L. White","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.293822","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.293822","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I assemble and array two rarely used data sets to measure the extent ofaggregate concentration the share of national economic activity accounted for by the largest X companies in the U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s. The data show clearly that, despite the substantial merger wave of the 1980s and the far larger wave of the 1990s, aggregate concentration declined inthe 1980s and the early 1990s. Aggregate concentration increased after the mid 1990s, but the levels at the end of the decade were still at or below the levels of the late 1980s or early 1990s. The average size of firm did increase, however, and the relative importance of the larger size classes offirms increased generally. Gini coefficients computed for employment shares and payroll shares of companies showed moderate but steady increases from 1988 through 1998. In the conclusion of the paper I offer some tentative hypotheses for explaining these patterns.","PeriodicalId":208085,"journal":{"name":"NYU: Economics Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115313611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Wanted: A Market Definition Paradigm for Monopolization Cases","authors":"L. White","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.164869","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.164869","url":null,"abstract":"For the wide range of antitrust cases involving allegations of monopoly or monopolization (or variations on that theme), the presence of market power is a necessary prerequisite for finding liability. In turn, the definition or delineation of a relevant market is essential for measuring a defendant's market share -- a key determinant of the presence or absence of market power. Unfortunately, there are few or no intellectual underpinnings for the market definition process in monopolization cases. This void contrasts sharply with the substantial conceptual developments of the past two decades with respect to the market definition process in antitrust merger analysis, as embodied in the Merger Guidelines of the U.S. Department of Justice. This article contrasts the achievements in the merger analysis area with the continuing dilemmas and conundrums in the monopolization area with respect to market definition. In the latter area the \"cellophane fallacy\" (which is explained), combined with the frequently cloudy state of firm-level profit data, continues to create confusion as to when the presence of competitors is an indication of the absence of market power and when their presence is the consequence of the exercise of market power. Underlying this confusion is the absence of a clear market definition paradigm for these monopolization cases. Until such a paradigm is developed, the confusion will persist, as will a pattern of erratic and inconsistent outcomes in alleged monopolization cases.","PeriodicalId":208085,"journal":{"name":"NYU: Economics Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128927004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Aggregate Concentration in the Global Economy: Issues and Evidence","authors":"L. White","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.446920","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.446920","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I present new and original evidence concerning global aggregate concentration. To my knowledge, this evidence constitutes the first systematic effort to measure global aggregate concentration. The data are available only for the years 1994-2001 and require some compromises and approximations. For 2001, the largest 500 global companies' employment accounted for 1.60% of the world labor force, or 9.92% of OECD employment. These companies' profits amounted to 0.94% of world GDP or 4.16% of world gross domestic savings (GDS); their profits also amounted to 1.18% of OECD GDP or 5.62% of OECD gross national saving (GNS). Similar estimates are available for the largest 50 global companies. The time trends for 1994-2001 show a mixed picture. If employment is the basis for the measurements, the largest 50 global companies accounted for a slightly decreasing share of aggregate employment over time. If, instead, profits are the basis for the measurements, then the 50 largest companies accounted for an increasing share over these same years. But this latter trend is likely overstated and is unlikely to be sustained. Future years will yield more data that can be used to check these trends and refine these measurements.","PeriodicalId":208085,"journal":{"name":"NYU: Economics Working Papers (Topic)","volume":"663 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115833104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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