Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security最新文献_第6页

Threshold Password-Hardened Encryption Services 阈值密码强化加密服务

Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2020-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3372297.3417266

Julian Brost, Christoph Egger, Russell W. F. Lai, Fritz Schmid, Dominique Schröder, M. Zoppelt

{"title":"Threshold Password-Hardened Encryption Services","authors":"Julian Brost, Christoph Egger, Russell W. F. Lai, Fritz Schmid, Dominique Schröder, M. Zoppelt","doi":"10.1145/3372297.3417266","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3372297.3417266","url":null,"abstract":"Password-hardened encryption (PHE) was introduced by Lai et al. at USENIX 2018 and immediately productized by VirgilSecurity. PHE is a password-based key derivation protocol that involves an oblivious external crypto service for key derivation. The security of PHE protects against offline brute-force attacks, even when the attacker is given the entire database. Furthermore, the crypto service neither learns the derived key nor the password. PHE supports key-rotation meaning that both the server and crypto service can update their keys without involving the user. While PHE significantly strengthens data security, it introduces a single point of failure because key-derivation always requires access to the crypto service. In this work, we address this issue and simultaneously increase security by introducing threshold password-hardened encryption. Our formalization of this primitive revealed shortcomings of the original PHE definition that we also address in this work. Following the spirit of prior works, we give a simple and efficient construction using lightweight tools only. We also implement our construction and evaluate its efficiency. Our experiments confirm the practical efficiency of our scheme and show that it is more efficient than common memory-hard functions, such as scrypt. From a practical perspective this means that threshold PHE can be used as an alternative to scrypt for password protection and key-derivation, offering better security in terms of offline brute force attacks.","PeriodicalId":20481,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"86 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80016800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 8

QuantumHammer

Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2020-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3372297.3417272

K. Mus, Saad Islam, B. Sunar

{"title":"QuantumHammer","authors":"K. Mus, Saad Islam, B. Sunar","doi":"10.1145/3372297.3417272","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3372297.3417272","url":null,"abstract":"Post-quantum schemes are expected to replace existing public-key schemes within a decade in billions of devices. To facilitate the transition, the US National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) is running a standardization process. Multivariate signatures is one of the main categories in NIST's post-quantum cryptography competition. Among the four candidates in this category, the LUOV and Rainbow schemes are based on the Oil and Vinegar scheme, first introduced in 1997 which has withstood over two decades of cryptanalysis. Beyond mathematical security and efficiency, security against side-channel attacks is a major concern in the competition. The current sentiment is that post-quantum schemes may be more resistant to fault-injection attacks due to their large key sizes and the lack of algebraic structure. We show that this is not true. We introduce a novel hybrid attack, QuantumHammer, and demonstrate it on the constant-time implementation of LUOV currently in Round 2 of the NIST post-quantum competition. The QuantumHammer attack is a combination of two attacks, a bit-tracing attack enabled via Rowhammer fault injection and a divide and conquer attack that uses bit-tracing as an oracle. Using bit-tracing, an attacker with access to faulty signatures collected using Rowhammer attack, can recover secret key bits albeit slowly. We employ a divide and conquer attack which exploits the structure in the key generation part of LUOV and solves the system of equations for the secret key more efficiently with few key bits recovered via bit-tracing. We have demonstrated the first successful in-the-wild attack on LUOV recovering all 11K key bits with less than 4 hours of an active Rowhammer attack. The post-processing part is highly parallel and thus can be trivially sped up using modest resources. QuantumHammer does not make any unrealistic assumptions, only requires software co-location (no physical access), and therefore can be used to target shared cloud servers or in other sandboxed environments.","PeriodicalId":20481,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81257388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 16

Enhancing State-of-the-art Classifiers with API Semantics to Detect Evolved Android Malware 通过API语义增强最先进的分类器来检测进化的Android恶意软件

Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2020-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3372297.3417291

Xiaohan Zhang, Yuan Zhang, Ming Zhong, Daizong Ding, Yinzhi Cao, Yukun Zhang, Mi Zhang, Min Yang

{"title":"Enhancing State-of-the-art Classifiers with API Semantics to Detect Evolved Android Malware","authors":"Xiaohan Zhang, Yuan Zhang, Ming Zhong, Daizong Ding, Yinzhi Cao, Yukun Zhang, Mi Zhang, Min Yang","doi":"10.1145/3372297.3417291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3372297.3417291","url":null,"abstract":"Machine learning (ML) classifiers have been widely deployed to detect Android malware, but at the same time the application of ML classifiers also faces an emerging problem. The performance of such classifiers degrades---or called ages---significantly over time given the malware evolution. Prior works have proposed to use retraining or active learning to reverse and improve aged models. However, the underlying classifier itself is still blind, unaware of malware evolution. Unsurprisingly, such evolution-insensitive retraining or active learning comes at a price, i.e., the labeling of tens of thousands of malware samples and the cost of significant human efforts. In this paper, we propose the first framework, called APIGraph, to enhance state-of-the-art malware classifiers with the similarity information among evolved Android malware in terms of semantically-equivalent or similar API usages, thus naturally slowing down classifier aging. Our evaluation shows that because of the slow-down of classifier aging, APIGraph saves significant amounts of human efforts required by active learning in labeling new malware samples.","PeriodicalId":20481,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90306434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 103

UC Non-Interactive, Proactive, Threshold ECDSA with Identifiable Aborts 具有可识别终止的UC非交互式、主动、阈值ECDSA

Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2020-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3372297.3423367

R. Canetti, R. Gennaro, Steven Goldfeder, Nikolaos Makriyannis, Udi Peled

{"title":"UC Non-Interactive, Proactive, Threshold ECDSA with Identifiable Aborts","authors":"R. Canetti, R. Gennaro, Steven Goldfeder, Nikolaos Makriyannis, Udi Peled","doi":"10.1145/3372297.3423367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3372297.3423367","url":null,"abstract":"Building on the Gennaro & Goldfeder and Lindell & Nof protocols (CCS '18), we present two threshold ECDSA protocols, for any number of signatories and any threshold, that improve as follows over the state of the art: -- For both protocols, only the last round requires knowledge of the message, and the other rounds can take place in a preprocessing stage, lending to a non-interactive threshold ECDSA protocol. -- Both protocols withstand adaptive corruption of signatories. Furthermore, they include a periodic refresh mechanism and offer full proactive security. -- Both protocols realize an ideal threshold signature functionality within the UC framework, in the global random oracle model, assuming Strong RSA, DDH, semantic security of the Paillier encryption, and a somewhat enhanced variant of existential unforgeability of ECDSA. -- Both protocols achieve accountability by identifying corrupted parties in case of failure to generate a valid signature. The two protocols are distinguished by the round-complexity and the identification process for detecting cheating parties. Namely: -- For the first protocol, signature generation takes only 4 rounds (down from the current state of the art of 8 rounds), but the identification process requires computation and communication that is quadratic in the number of parties. -- For the second protocol, the identification process requires computation and communication that is only linear in the number of parties, but signature generation takes 7 rounds. These properties (low latency, compatibility with cold-wallet architectures, proactive security, identifiable abort and composable security) make the two protocols ideal for threshold wallets for ECDSA-based cryptocurrencies.","PeriodicalId":20481,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83004876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 84

Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2020年ACM SIGSAC计算机与通信安全会议论文集

Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2020-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3372297

引用次数: 6

A 2.1 KHz Zero-Knowledge Processor with BubbleRAM 带有BubbleRAM的2.1 KHz零知识处理器

Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2020-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3372297.3417283

David Heath, V. Kolesnikov

{"title":"A 2.1 KHz Zero-Knowledge Processor with BubbleRAM","authors":"David Heath, V. Kolesnikov","doi":"10.1145/3372297.3417283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3372297.3417283","url":null,"abstract":"Zero-Knowledge (ZK) proofs (ZKP) are foundational in cryptography. Most recent ZK research focuses on non-interactive proofs (NIZK) of small statements, useful in blockchain scenarios. Another line, and our focus, instead targets proofs of large statements that are useful, e.g., in proving properties of programs in ZK. We specify a zero-knowledge processor that executes arbitrary programs written in a simple instruction set, and proves in ZK the correctness of the execution. Such an approach is well-suited for constructing ZK proofs of large statements as it efficiently supports complex programming constructs, such as loops and RAM access. Critically, we propose several novel ZK improvements that make our approach concretely efficient: (1) an efficient arithmetic representation with conversions to/from Boolean, (2) an efficient read-only memory that uses $2łog n$ OTs per access, and (3) an efficient read-write memory, øurram, which uses $frac1 2 łog^2 n$ OTs per access. øurram beats linear scan for RAM of size $>3$ elements! Prior ZK systems used generic ORAM costing orders of magnitude more. We cast our system as a garbling scheme that can be plugged into the ZK protocol of [Jawurek et al, CCS'13]. Put together, our system is concretely efficient: for a processor instantiated with $512$KB of main memory, each processor cycle costs $24$KB of communication. We implemented our approach in textttC++. On a 1Gbps LAN our implementation realizes a $2.1$KHz processor.","PeriodicalId":20481,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84538618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 20

Logging to the Danger Zone: Race Condition Attacks and Defenses on System Audit Frameworks 记录到危险区域:系统审计框架上的竞争条件攻击和防御

Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2020-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3372297.3417862

Riccardo Paccagnella, Kevin Liao, D. Tian, Adam Bates

{"title":"Logging to the Danger Zone: Race Condition Attacks and Defenses on System Audit Frameworks","authors":"Riccardo Paccagnella, Kevin Liao, D. Tian, Adam Bates","doi":"10.1145/3372297.3417862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3372297.3417862","url":null,"abstract":"For system logs to aid in security investigations, they must be beyond the reach of the adversary. Unfortunately, attackers that have escalated privilege on a host are typically able to delete and modify log events at will. In response to this threat, a variety of secure logging systems have appeared over the years that attempt to provide tamper-resistance (e.g., write once read many drives, remote storage servers) or tamper-evidence (e.g., cryptographic proofs) for system logs. These solutions expose an interface through which events are committed to a secure log, at which point they enjoy protection from future tampering. However, all proposals to date have relied on the assumption that an event's occurrence is concomitant with its commitment to the secured log. In this work, we challenge this assumption by presenting and validating a race condition attack on the integrity of audit frameworks. Our attack exploits the intrinsically asynchronous nature of I/O and IPC activity, demonstrating that an attacker can snatch events about their intrusion out of message buffers after they have occurred but before they are committed to the log, thus bypassing existing protections. We present a first step towards defending against our attack by introducing KennyLoggings, the first kernel- based tamper-evident logging system that satisfies the synchronous integrity property, meaning that it guarantees tamper-evidence of events upon their occurrence. We implement KennyLoggings on top of the Linux kernel and show that it imposes between 8% and 11% overhead on log-intensive application workloads.","PeriodicalId":20481,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"162 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78531729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 24

Session details: Keynote Talk I 会议详情:主题演讲1

Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2020-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3432956

Jonathan Katz

引用次数: 0

VRLifeTime -- An IDE Tool to Avoid Concurrency and Memory Bugs in Rust VRLifeTime——一个IDE工具来避免Rust中的并发和内存错误

Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2020-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3372297.3420024

Ziyi Zhang, Boqin Qin, Yilun Chen, Linhai Song, Yiying Zhang

引用次数: 5

Session details: Session 1E: Cyberphysical Systems 会议详情:会议1E:网络物理系统

Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2020-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3432961

Brendan Saltaformaggio

引用次数: 0