Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security最新文献

{"title":"CCSW'20: 2020 Cloud Computing Security Workshop","authors":"R. Sion, Yinqian Zhang","doi":"10.1145/3372297.3416242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3372297.3416242","url":null,"abstract":"Clouds and massive-scale computing infrastructures are starting to dominate computing and will likely continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Major cloud operators are now comprising millions of cores hosting substantial fractions of corporate and government IT infrastructure. CCSW is the world's premier forum bringing together researchers and practitioners in all security aspects of cloud-centric and outsourced computing, including: Side channel attacks; Practical cryptographic protocols for cloud security; Secure cloud resource virtualization mechanisms; Secure data management outsourcing (e.g., database as a service); Practical privacy and integrity mechanisms for outsourcing; Foundations of cloud-centric threat models; Secure computation outsourcing; Remote attestation mechanisms in clouds; Sandboxing and VM-based enforcements; Trust and policy management in clouds; Secure identity management mechanisms; New cloud-aware web service security paradigms and mechanisms; Cloud-centric regulatory compliance issues and mechanisms; Business and security risk models and clouds; Cost and usability models and their interaction with security in clouds; Scalability of security in global-size clouds; Trusted computing technology and clouds; Binary analysis of software for remote attestation and cloud protection; Network security (DOS, IDS etc.) mechanisms for cloud contexts; Security for emerging cloud programming models; Energy/cost/efficiency of security in clouds; Machine learning for cloud protection CCSW especially encourages novel paradigms and controversial ideas that are not on the above list. The workshop has historically acted as a fertile ground for creative debate and interaction in security-sensitive areas of computing impacted by clouds. This year marked the 11th anniversary of CCSW. In the past decade, CCSW has had a significant impact in our research community. As of August 2019, in the Google Scholar Metrics entry for ACM CCS (which encompasses CCSW), 20% of the top 20 cited papers come from CCSW. One way to look at it is that authors are as likely or perhaps more likely to have a top-20 paper publishing in CCSW than in CCS! This year, CCSW received 40 submissions out of which 12 full papers (30%) and 5 blitz abstracts were accepted.","PeriodicalId":20481,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75476804","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Zero Knowledge Proofs for Decision Tree Predictions and Accuracy","authors":"Jiaheng Zhang, Zhiyong Fang, Yupeng Zhang, D. Song","doi":"10.1145/3372297.3417278","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3372297.3417278","url":null,"abstract":"Machine learning has become increasingly prominent and is widely used in various applications in practice. Despite its great success, the integrity of machine learning predictions and accuracy is a rising concern. The reproducibility of machine learning models that are claimed to achieve high accuracy remains challenging, and the correctness and consistency of machine learning predictions in real products lack any security guarantees. In this paper, we initiate the study of zero knowledge machine learning and propose protocols for zero knowledge decision tree predictions and accuracy tests. The protocols allow the owner of a decision tree model to convince others that the model computes a prediction on a data sample, or achieves a certain accuracy on a public dataset, without leaking any information about the model itself. We develop approaches to efficiently turn decision tree predictions and accuracy into statements of zero knowledge proofs. We implement our protocols and demonstrate their efficiency in practice. For a decision tree model with 23 levels and 1,029 nodes, it only takes 250 seconds to generate a zero knowledge proof proving that the model achieves high accuracy on a dataset of 5,000 samples and 54 attributes, and the proof size is around 287 kilobytes.","PeriodicalId":20481,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"111 3S 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76090561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Session details: Session 2C: Browser Security","authors":"A. Kapravelos","doi":"10.1145/3432964","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3432964","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20481,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75773963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Session details: Session 3A: Privacy","authors":"C. Palamidessi","doi":"10.1145/3432967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3432967","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20481,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"48 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85211258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Session details: Session 3C: Consensus","authors":"Kartik Nayak","doi":"10.1145/3432969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3432969","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":20481,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87275832","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"LadderLeak: Breaking ECDSA with Less than One Bit of Nonce Leakage","authors":"Diego F. Aranha, Felipe Rodrigues Novaes, Akira Takahashi, Mehdi Tibouchi, Y. Yarom","doi":"10.1145/3372297.3417268","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3372297.3417268","url":null,"abstract":"Although it is one of the most popular signature schemes today, ECDSA presents a number of implementation pitfalls, in particular due to the very sensitive nature of the random value (known as the nonce) generated as part of the signing algorithm. It is known that any small amount of nonce exposure or nonce bias can in principle lead to a full key recovery: the key recovery is then a particular instance of Boneh and Venkatesan's hidden number problem (HNP). That observation has been practically exploited in many attacks in the literature, taking advantage of implementation defects or side-channel vulnerabilities in various concrete ECDSA implementations. However, most of the attacks so far have relied on at least 2 bits of nonce bias (except for the special case of curves at the 80-bit security level, for which attacks against 1-bit biases are known, albeit with a very high number of required signatures). In this paper, we uncover LadderLeak, a novel class of side-channel vulnerabilities in implementations of the Montgomery ladder used in ECDSA scalar multiplication. The vulnerability is in particular present in several recent versions of OpenSSL. However, it leaks less than 1 bit of information about the nonce, in the sense that it reveals the most significant bit of the nonce, but with probability <1. Exploiting such a mild leakage would be intractable using techniques present in the literature so far. However, we present a number of theoretical improvements of the Fourier analysis approach to solving the HNP (an approach originally due to Bleichenbacher), and this lets us practically break LadderLeak-vulnerable ECDSA implementations instantiated over the sect163r1 and NIST P-192 elliptic curves. In so doing, we achieve several significant computational records in practical attacks against the HNP.","PeriodicalId":20481,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91132222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"TRUSTORE: Side-Channel Resistant Storage for SGX using Intel Hybrid CPU-FPGA","authors":"Hyunyoung Oh, Adil Ahmad, Seonghyun Park, Byoungyoung Lee, Y. Paek","doi":"10.1145/3372297.3417265","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3372297.3417265","url":null,"abstract":"Intel SGX is a security solution promising strong and practical security guarantees for trusted computing. However, recent reports demonstrated that such security guarantees of SGX are broken due to access pattern based side-channel attacks, including page fault, cache, branch prediction, and speculative execution. In order to stop these side-channel attackers, Oblivious RAM (ORAM) has gained strong attention from the security community as it provides cryptographically proven protection against access pattern based side-channels. While several proposed systems have successfully applied ORAM to thwart side-channels, those are severely limited in performance and its scalability due to notorious performance issues of ORAM. This paper presents TrustOre, addressing these issues that arise when using ORAM with Intel SGX. TrustOre leverages an external device, FPGA, to implement a trusted storage service within a completed isolated environment secure from side-channel attacks. TrustOre tackles several challenges in achieving such a goal: extending trust from SGX to FPGA without imposing architectural changes, providing a verifiably-secure connection between SGX applications and FPGA, and seamlessly supporting various access operations from SGX applications to FPGA.We implemented TrustOre on the commodity Intel Hybrid CPU-FPGA architecture. Then we evaluated with three state-of-the-art ORAM-based SGX applications, ZeroTrace, Obliviate, and Obfuscuro, as well as an end-to-end key-value store application. According to our evaluation, TrustOre-based applications outperforms ORAM-based original applications ranging from 10x to 43x, while also showing far better scalability than ORAM-based ones. We emphasize that since TrustOre can be deployed as a simple plug-in to SGX machine's PCIe slot, it is readily used to thwart side-channel attacks in SGX, arguably one of the most cryptic and critical security holes today.","PeriodicalId":20481,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90646124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"iDEA: Static Analysis on the Security of Apple Kernel Drivers","authors":"Xiaolong Bai, Luyi Xing, Min Zheng, Fuping Qu","doi":"10.1145/3372297.3423357","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3372297.3423357","url":null,"abstract":"Drivers on Apple OSes (e.g., iOS, tvOS, iPadOS, macOS, etc.) run in the kernel space and driver vulnerabilities can incur serious security consequences. A recent report from Google Project Zero shows that driver vulnerabilities on Apple OSes have been actively exploited in the wild. Also, we observed that driver vulnerabilities have accounted for one-third of kernel bugs in recent iOS versions based on Apple's security updates. Despite the serious security implications, systematic static analysis on Apple drivers for finding security vulnerabilities has never been done before, not to mention any large-scale study of Apple drivers. In this paper, we developed the first automatic, static analysis tool iDEA for finding bugs in Apple driver binaries, which is applicable to major Apple OSes (iOS, macOS, tvOS, iPadOS). We summarized and tackled a set of Apple-unique challenges: for example, we show that prior C++ binary analysis techniques are ineffective (i.e., failing to recover C++ classes and resolve indirect calls) on Apple platform due to Apple's unique programming model. To solve the challenges, we found a reliable information source from Apple's driver programming and management model to recover classes, and identified the unique paradigms through which Apple drivers interact with user-space programs. iDEA supports customized, pluggable security policy checkers for its security analysis. Enabled by iDEA, we performed the first large-scale study of 3,400 Apple driver binaries across major Apple OSes and 15 OS versions with respect to two common types of security risks - race condition and out-of-bound read/write, and discovered 35 zero-day bugs. We developed PoC and end-to-end attacks to demonstrate the practical impacts of our findings. A portion of the bugs have been patched by recent Apple security updates or are scheduled to be fixed; others are going through Apple's internal investigation procedure. Our evaluation showed that iDEA incurs a low false-positive rate and time overhead.","PeriodicalId":20481,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"103 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83624315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"SNI-in-the-head: Protecting MPC-in-the-head Protocols against Side-channel Analysis","authors":"Okan Seker, Sebastian Berndt, T. Eisenbarth","doi":"10.1145/3372297.3417889","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3372297.3417889","url":null,"abstract":"MPC-in-the-head based protocols have recently gained much popularity and are at the brink of seeing widespread usage. With widespread use come the spectres of implementation issues and implementation attacks such as side-channel attacks. We show that implementations of protocols implementing the MPC-in-the-head paradigm are vulnerable to side-channel attacks. As a case study, we choose the ZKBoo-protocol of Giacomelli, Madsen, and Orlandi (USENIX 2016) and show that even a single leaked value is sufficient to break the security of the protocol. To show that this attack is not just a theoretical vulnerability, we apply differential power analysis to show the vulnerabilities via a simulation. In order to remedy this situation, we extend and generalize the ZKBoo-protocol by making use of the notion of strong non-interference of Barthe et al. (CCS 2016). To apply this notion to ZKBoo, we construct novel versions of strongly non-interfering gadgets that balance the randomness across the different branches evenly. Finally, we show that each circuit can be decomposed into branches using only these balanced strongly non-interfering gadgets. This allows us to construct a version of ZKBoo, called $(n+1)$-ZKBoo which is secure against side-channel attacks with limited overhead in both signature-size and running time. Furthermore, $(n+1)$-ZKBoo is scalable to the desired security against adversarial probes. We experimentally confirm that the attacks successful against ZKBoo no longer work on $(n+1)$-ZKBoo. Moreover, we present an extensive performance analysis and quantify the overhead of our scheme using a practical implementation.","PeriodicalId":20481,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"140 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86613600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Forensic Analysis in Access Control: Foundations and a Case-Study from Practice","authors":"Nahid Juma, Xiaowei Huang, Mahesh V. Tripunitara","doi":"10.1145/3372297.3417860","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3372297.3417860","url":null,"abstract":"We pose and study forensic analysis in the context of access control systems in a manner that prior work has not. Forensics seeks to answer questions about past states of a system, and thereby provides important clues and evidence in the event of a security incident. Access control deals with who may perform what action on a resource and is a critical security function. Our focus is access control systems that allow for changes to the authorization state to be delegated to potentially untrusted users. We argue that this context in access control is an important one in which to consider forensic analysis, and observe that it is a natural complement of safety analysis, which has been considered extensively in the literature. We pose the forensic analysis problem for such access control systems abstractly, and instantiate it for three schemes from the literature: a well-known access matrix scheme, a role-based scheme, and a discretionary scheme. We identify the computational complexity of forensic analysis, and compare it to that of safety analysis for each of the schemes. We consider also the notion of logs, i.e., data that can be collected over time to aid forensic analysis. We present results for sufficient and minimal logs that render forensic analysis for the three schemes efficient. This motivates discussions on goal-directed logging, with the explicit intent of aiding forensic analysis. We carry out a case-study in the realistic setting of a serverless cloud application, and observe that goal-directed logging can be highly effective. Our work makes contributions at the foundations of information security, and its practical implications.","PeriodicalId":20481,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"331 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80509155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}