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Cómo no evitar la conclusión muy repugnante 如何避免得出令人厌恶的结论
Análisis Filosófico Pub Date : 2024-05-07 DOI: 10.36446/af.e1019
M. Rozas
{"title":"Cómo no evitar la conclusión muy repugnante","authors":"M. Rozas","doi":"10.36446/af.e1019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1019","url":null,"abstract":"En ética de poblaciones, se apela a ciertas perspectivas léxicas y de nivel crítico totalistas para evitar la conclusión repugnante. Dado que la conclusión muy repugnante es una condición de adecuación más débil, podría pensarse que estas perspectivas también nos permitirán evitar esta conclusión. En este artículo argumento que no es así. Primero, muestro que estas perspectivas léxicas no evitan la conclusión muy repugnante. Después, muestro que las perspectivas de rango crítico totalistas tampoco la evitan. Finalmente, aclaro qué perspectivas nos permiten evitar esta conclusión.","PeriodicalId":197625,"journal":{"name":"Análisis Filosófico","volume":"86 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141002465","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Liza Skidelsky (ed. y comp.), Introducción a la Filosofía de las Ciencias Cognitivas, Uniandes, 2023, 652 pp. Liza Skidelsky (ed. and comp.), Introducción a la Filosofía de las Ciencias Cognitivas, Uniandes, 2023, 652 pp.
Análisis Filosófico Pub Date : 2024-05-07 DOI: 10.36446/af.e1074
Manuel Epstein
{"title":"Liza Skidelsky (ed. y comp.), Introducción a la Filosofía de las Ciencias Cognitivas, Uniandes, 2023, 652 pp.","authors":"Manuel Epstein","doi":"10.36446/af.e1074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1074","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":197625,"journal":{"name":"Análisis Filosófico","volume":"137 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141001991","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Ricardo Gómez: In memoriam 里卡多-戈麦斯：悼念
Análisis Filosófico Pub Date : 2024-05-07 DOI: 10.36446/af.e1093
María Cristina González, Cecilia Hidalgo
{"title":"Ricardo Gómez: In memoriam","authors":"María Cristina González, Cecilia Hidalgo","doi":"10.36446/af.e1093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1093","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":197625,"journal":{"name":"Análisis Filosófico","volume":"28 13","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141004605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Alberto Moretti, En sayos analíticos, Buenos Aires, SADAF, 2020 Alberto Moretti, En sayos analíticos, Buenos Aires, SADAF, 2020.
Análisis Filosófico Pub Date : 2024-05-07 DOI: 10.36446/af.e1075
Manuel García-Carpintero
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引用次数: 0
Paraconsistency, Evidence and Semantic Incompleteness 旁证、证据和语义不完整性
Análisis Filosófico Pub Date : 2024-02-26 DOI: 10.36446/af.e986
Edson Bezerra
{"title":"Paraconsistency, Evidence and Semantic Incompleteness","authors":"Edson Bezerra","doi":"10.36446/af.e986","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e986","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we argue that the systems Basic Logic of Evidence (BLE) and Logic of Evidence and Truth (LETJ) suffer a kind of semantic incompleteness with respect to the informal notion of evidence. More especifically, we argue that the connective o of the logic LETJ fails to validate intuitive principles about conclusive evidence.","PeriodicalId":197625,"journal":{"name":"Análisis Filosófico","volume":"9 18","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140430438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Comesaña's Experientialism 科梅萨纳的体验主义
Análisis Filosófico Pub Date : 2024-02-14 DOI: 10.36446/af.e1021
Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas
{"title":"Comesaña's Experientialism","authors":"Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas","doi":"10.36446/af.e1021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1021","url":null,"abstract":"This critical appraisal of Juan Comesaña’s Being Rational and Being Right is divided into three sections: Section I describes the fundamental features of “Experientialism,” the theory of basic rationality developed and defended in the book; Section II briefly indicates how the chapters of the book unfold; and Section III describes and examines one problematic issue concerning how Experientialism interacts with the liberalism/conservatism debate in the theory of justification.","PeriodicalId":197625,"journal":{"name":"Análisis Filosófico","volume":"48 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139779536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Comesaña's Experientialism 科梅萨纳的体验主义
Análisis Filosófico Pub Date : 2024-02-14 DOI: 10.36446/af.e1021
Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas
{"title":"Comesaña's Experientialism","authors":"Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas","doi":"10.36446/af.e1021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e1021","url":null,"abstract":"This critical appraisal of Juan Comesaña’s Being Rational and Being Right is divided into three sections: Section I describes the fundamental features of “Experientialism,” the theory of basic rationality developed and defended in the book; Section II briefly indicates how the chapters of the book unfold; and Section III describes and examines one problematic issue concerning how Experientialism interacts with the liberalism/conservatism debate in the theory of justification.","PeriodicalId":197625,"journal":{"name":"Análisis Filosófico","volume":"382 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139839261","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
La naturaleza de la mentira 心灵的自然
Análisis Filosófico Pub Date : 2024-01-12 DOI: 10.36446/af.e972
Jesús Navarro
{"title":"La naturaleza de la mentira","authors":"Jesús Navarro","doi":"10.36446/af.e972","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e972","url":null,"abstract":"Ante la imposibilidad de alcanzar un análisis reductivo del concepto de mentira, Tobies Grimaltos y Sergi Rosell han propuesto una concepción basada en sus condiciones paradigmáticas, entre las que destaca la de engañar al oyente. La relación entre la mentira y el engaño sería, si bien fundamental para entender los casos prototípicos del concepto, meramente contingente —una tesis que tiene importantes implicaciones para su valoración moral—. Presento aquí su propuesta y avanzo tres objeciones a la misma: primero, que la teoría de la mentira debería de construirse sobre una teoría de la aserción, que ya de por sí delimita lo propiamente dicho en los usos parasitarios del lenguaje (como la metáfora o la ironía). Segundo, que es preciso distinguir los usos de la mentira de sus aspectos constitutivos, entre los cuales destaca la intención de mentir, y no la de engañar. Y tercero, que un modelo paradigmático de la mentira debería de asumir una condición epistémica, y no meramente doxástica, según la cual mentir es, paradigmáticamente, decir algo que uno sabe falso.","PeriodicalId":197625,"journal":{"name":"Análisis Filosófico","volume":"2 4-5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140509826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Predicados evaluativos y contexto 评价性谓词和语境
Análisis Filosófico Pub Date : 2024-01-12 DOI: 10.36446/af.e987
Federico Javier Jaimes
{"title":"Predicados evaluativos y contexto","authors":"Federico Javier Jaimes","doi":"10.36446/af.e987","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e987","url":null,"abstract":"En su más reciente libro, Cuestiones de Filosofía del Lenguaje: Pragmática, David Pérez Chico (2022) nos presenta una muy interesante selección de artículos sobre diferentes temáticas actualmente trabajadas en filosofía del lenguaje. Personalmente, considero que este libro es una lectura imprescindible para cualquier lector de habla hispana que quiera introducirse en las temáticas más contemporáneamente discutidas en esa disciplina. En este marco, en el presente artículo me propongo realizar un análisis crítico de cuatro de los artículos de la compilación que trabajan la temática de las emisiones evaluativas, i.e., emisiones cuya extensión depende de parámetros contextuales semánticamente no estándares.","PeriodicalId":197625,"journal":{"name":"Análisis Filosófico","volume":"2 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140509447","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Razones públicas y normatividad moral 公共原因和道德规范
Análisis Filosófico Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI: 10.36446/af.e526
Yohan Molina
{"title":"Razones públicas y normatividad moral","authors":"Yohan Molina","doi":"10.36446/af.e526","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.e526","url":null,"abstract":"Este artículo tiene como objetivo discutir la concepción pública de las razones para justificar la obligación moral propuesta por Christine Korsgaard en sus libros The Sources of Normativity (1996a) y Self-constitution (2009). Se enfatizará principalmente dos puntos conectados. Por un lado, la descripción de Korsgaard de la naturaleza pública de las razones, que afirma que su fuerza normativa es potencialmente compartida, es insuficiente para su propia concepción de las obligaciones morales universales, porque estas obligaciones se basan en la normatividad compartida existente de las razones. Por otra parte, Korsgaard no considera su propia explicación de la normatividad de las razones para dar cuenta del paso de la fuerza normativa compartible de las razones a su normatividad compartida existente, y esto se debería a que ello traería consecuencias perjudiciales para apoyar el respeto incondicional a la humanidad. Además, revisaré formas alternativas de entender la publicidad de las razones y esbozaré un trilema para la justificación moral de Korsgaard.","PeriodicalId":197625,"journal":{"name":"Análisis Filosófico","volume":"13 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135271893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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