旁证、证据和语义不完整性

Análisis Filosófico Pub Date : 2024-02-26 DOI:10.36446/af.e986

Edson Bezerra

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在本文中，我们认为证据基本逻辑（BLE）和证据与真理逻辑（LETJ）系统在证据的非正式概念方面存在一种语义上的不完整性。更具体地说，我们认为 LETJ 逻辑的连接词 o 无法验证有关确凿证据的直观原则。

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Paraconsistency, Evidence and Semantic Incompleteness

In this paper, we argue that the systems Basic Logic of Evidence (BLE) and Logic of Evidence and Truth (LETJ) suffer a kind of semantic incompleteness with respect to the informal notion of evidence. More especifically, we argue that the connective o of the logic LETJ fails to validate intuitive principles about conclusive evidence.

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Análisis Filosófico

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