{"title":"The Aims of a Moral Theory","authors":"T. Fowler","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvwrm4bm.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvwrm4bm.5","url":null,"abstract":"The chapter defends the use of ideal theory, and that moral theory should rely on insights from the social sciences. An ideal theory is one that assumes away some political constraints, while the resulting model is unrealistic it plays a vital evaluative function. The conclusions of the social sciences matter in virtue of concepts like wellbeing, which are partly empirical.","PeriodicalId":192204,"journal":{"name":"Liberalism, Childhood and Justice","volume":"100 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134003848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What is a Child?","authors":"T. Fowler","doi":"10.1332/policypress/9781529201635.003.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781529201635.003.0002","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter outlines an account of what it means to be a child, and why childhood matters as a moral category. I argue that despite concerns, a theory should take childhood simply to mean people below the age of 18. I argue that childhood matters because children’s malleability and vulnerability mean they are poorly served by existing accounts of liberal justice.","PeriodicalId":192204,"journal":{"name":"Liberalism, Childhood and Justice","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124828928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Welfare across the Lifespan","authors":"T. Fowler","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvwrm4bm.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvwrm4bm.8","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter considers how welfare or advantage ought to be distributed within a single lifespan, rather than between lives. A possibility is that people can make up for a bad childhood via compensating factors in adulthood, and thus there is no need to prioritise the interests of children. Through a consideration of what are termed ‘the intrinsic goods of childhood’ I make the argument that there is a basic case for seeing the start of a person’s life as the most important life stage, because gains in childhood are by their nature longer lasting and likely to lead to further advantages later in life. This provides a powerful, though potentially outweighed, reason for thinking that justice requires devoting more attention and resources to children than is recognised by most accounts.","PeriodicalId":192204,"journal":{"name":"Liberalism, Childhood and Justice","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131053635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Currency of Children’s Justice","authors":"T. Fowler","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvwrm4bm.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvwrm4bm.7","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores different theories of advantage in the context of childhood. It argues that both subjective theories of advantage, which measure mental states like happiness, and resource theories must both be rejected. Resource based theories are attractive in the case of adulthood when a person can rightly be held responsible for their choices but cannot capture important threats to children’s interests. In their place I propose a wellbeing theory drawing on Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities view.","PeriodicalId":192204,"journal":{"name":"Liberalism, Childhood and Justice","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129027206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Case against Neutrality","authors":"T. Fowler","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvwrm4bm.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvwrm4bm.10","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter I consider and reject various leading arguments for liberal neutrality. I show that the extent of so called ‘reasonable’ disagreement about the good is much less than is often supposed. Much of the disagreement about ethics exist because of the human tendency to adopt the beliefs of one’s community. This tendency, rather than the limits of reason, better explains why many views continue to be widely held. Since children have a powerful interest in holding an epistemically reasonable conception of the good, they have an interest in being raised with a sound view of the good. I argue against the view that equal respect requires state neutrality, since respect for children requires giving them a good upbringing. Finally, I show why perfectionism for children need not be illegitimate.","PeriodicalId":192204,"journal":{"name":"Liberalism, Childhood and Justice","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131794255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Project View of Parenting","authors":"T. Fowler","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvwrm4bm.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvwrm4bm.13","url":null,"abstract":"Here, I consider what morally connects adults to children so that they have a presumptive right to parent the child. I argue against the still widely held genetic view and suggest that blood connections, in themselves, do not matter very much morally. I also suggest that while relationships between parents and children are highly significant, they do not define parenting or exhaust the set of considerations relevant to the distribution of parental rights. Instead, I defend the ‘project view’ of parenting, according to which parenting should be respected as part of an important project that most people have a right to pursue.","PeriodicalId":192204,"journal":{"name":"Liberalism, Childhood and Justice","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131908132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Understanding Perfectionism","authors":"T. Fowler","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvwrm4bm.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvwrm4bm.11","url":null,"abstract":"In this chapter, I discuss what perfectionism for children entails. In this context, perfectionism refers to the view that the state is empowered to promote people’s welfare by taking actions premised on a contested view of ethics. Whereas previous discussions have been focussed on individual achievements in fields like the arts or sport, I argue this rests on an implausibly narrow view of personal flourishing. In addition, I argue against the view that perfectionism should aim only, or mostly, at the promotion of autonomy. While critical thinking and self-reflection are often central to a good life, they are far from sufficient. Instead, promoting the welfare of children requires them to come to hold ethical beliefs conducive to their flourishing; they must hold a positive and plausible conception of the good.","PeriodicalId":192204,"journal":{"name":"Liberalism, Childhood and Justice","volume":"134 2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130995497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Implications of Perfectionism","authors":"T. Fowler","doi":"10.2307/j.ctvwrm4bm.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvwrm4bm.12","url":null,"abstract":"Here, I build on the conception of children’s interests outlined in chapter 3, I show how Nussbaum’s list of valuable goods can be productively extended once the requirement to be neutral about ethics is dropped. I offer a view of flourishing grounded in the importance of interpersonal relationships, of agency and an appreciation of the natural world. I then discuss a few more concrete examples of the kinds of beliefs that will be required by progressive upbringing. These are i) a personal commitment to gender equality) knowledge of controversial scientific and historical truths, iii) an openness to sexual choice and iv) a rejection of consumerism. Taken together, these discussions show why justice for children requires them to be raised in an environment conducive to socially liberal beliefs and values, a view that stands in deep tension with theories of liberalism that apply only to politics, and to the preferences of many parents. I turn to these concerns in the next section.","PeriodicalId":192204,"journal":{"name":"Liberalism, Childhood and Justice","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124733765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}