Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security最新文献_第8页

SafeConfig'17: Applying the Scientific Method to Active Cyber Defense Research SafeConfig’17:应用科学方法进行主动网络防御研究

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3133956.3137054

Nicholas J. Multari, A. Singhal, Erin Miller

引用次数: 1

Oblivious Neural Network Predictions via MiniONN Transformations 通过MiniONN变换的遗忘神经网络预测

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3133956.3134056

Jian Liu, Mika Juuti, Yao Lu, N. Asokan

引用次数: 560

POSTER: A PU Learning based System for Potential Malicious URL Detection 一个基于PU学习的潜在恶意URL检测系统

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3133956.3138825

Ya-Lin Zhang, Longfei Li, Jun Zhou, Xiaolong Li, Yujiang Liu, Yuanchao Zhang, Zhi-Hua Zhou

引用次数: 27

FEAST 2017: The Second Workshop on Forming an Ecosystem Around Software Transformation FEAST 2017:第二届围绕软件转型形成生态系统研讨会

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3133956.3137052

Taesoo Kim, Dinghao Wu

引用次数: 0

Revive: Rebalancing Off-Blockchain Payment Networks 重振:重新平衡非区块链支付网络

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3133956.3134033

Rami A. Khalil, Arthur Gervais

{"title":"Revive: Rebalancing Off-Blockchain Payment Networks","authors":"Rami A. Khalil, Arthur Gervais","doi":"10.1145/3133956.3134033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3134033","url":null,"abstract":"Scaling the transaction throughput of decentralized blockchain ledgers such as Bitcoin and Ethereum has been an ongoing challenge. Two-party duplex payment channels have been designed and used as building blocks to construct linked payment networks, which allow atomic and trust-free payments between parties without exhausting the resources of the blockchain. Once a payment channel, however, is depleted (e.g., because transactions were mostly unidirectional) the channel would need to be closed and re-funded to allow for new transactions. Users are envisioned to entertain multiple payment channels with different entities, and as such, instead of refunding a channel (which incurs costly on-chain transactions), a user should be able to leverage his existing channels to rebalance a poorly funded channel. To the best of our knowledge, we present the first solution that allows an arbitrary set of users in a payment channel network to securely rebalance their channels, according to the preferences of the channel owners. Except in the case of disputes (similar to conventional payment channels), our solution does not require on-chain transactions and therefore increases the scalability of existing blockchains. In our security analysis, we show that an honest participant cannot lose any of its funds while rebalancing. We finally provide a proof of concept implementation and evaluation for the Ethereum network.","PeriodicalId":191367,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"198 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114730093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 206

Attribute-Based Encryption in the Generic Group Model: Automated Proofs and New Constructions 泛群模型中基于属性的加密:自动证明和新构造

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3133956.3134088

Miguel Ambrona, G. Barthe, Romain Gay, H. Wee

引用次数: 32

Fast Private Set Intersection from Homomorphic Encryption 同态加密中的快速私有集交集

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3133956.3134061

Hao Chen, Kim Laine, Peter Rindal

{"title":"Fast Private Set Intersection from Homomorphic Encryption","authors":"Hao Chen, Kim Laine, Peter Rindal","doi":"10.1145/3133956.3134061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3134061","url":null,"abstract":"Private Set Intersection (PSI) is a cryptographic technique that allows two parties to compute the intersection of their sets without revealing anything except the intersection. We use fully homomorphic encryption to construct a fast PSI protocol with a small communication overhead that works particularly well when one of the two sets is much smaller than the other, and is secure against semi-honest adversaries. The most computationally efficient PSI protocols have been constructed using tools such as hash functions and oblivious transfer, but a potential limitation with these approaches is the communication complexity, which scales linearly with the size of the larger set. This is of particular concern when performing PSI between a constrained device (cellphone) holding a small set, and a large service provider (e.g. WhatsApp), such as in the Private Contact Discovery application. Our protocol has communication complexity linear in the size of the smaller set, and logarithmic in the larger set. More precisely, if the set sizes are Ny < Nx, we achieve a communication overhead of O(Ny log Nx). Our running-time-optimized benchmarks show that it takes 36 seconds of online-computation, 71 seconds of non-interactive (receiver-independent) pre-processing, and only 12.5MB of round trip communication to intersect five thousand 32-bit strings with 16 million 32-bit strings. Compared to prior works, this is roughly a 38--115x reduction in communication with minimal difference in computational overhead.","PeriodicalId":191367,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"42 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116641971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 262

A Stitch in Time: Supporting Android Developers in WritingSecure Code A Stitch in Time:支持Android开发者编写安全代码

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3133956.3133977

Duc Cuong Nguyen, Dominik Wermke, Y. Acar, M. Backes, Charles Weir, S. Fahl

引用次数: 107

POSTER: Towards Precise and Automated Verification of Security Protocols in Coq 海报:实现Coq安全协议的精确和自动验证

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3133956.3138846

Hernan M. Palombo, Hao Zheng, Jay Ligatti

引用次数: 2

POSTER: Is Active Electromagnetic Side-channel Attack Practical? 海报:有源电磁侧信道攻击实用吗?

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3133956.3138830

Satohiro Wakabayashi, S. Maruyama, Tatsuya Mori, Shigeki Goto, M. Kinugawa, Y. Hayashi

{"title":"POSTER: Is Active Electromagnetic Side-channel Attack Practical?","authors":"Satohiro Wakabayashi, S. Maruyama, Tatsuya Mori, Shigeki Goto, M. Kinugawa, Y. Hayashi","doi":"10.1145/3133956.3138830","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3138830","url":null,"abstract":"Radio-frequency (RF) retroreflector attack (RFRA) is an {em active} electromagnetic side-channel attack that aims to leak the target's internal signals by irradiating the targeted device with a radio wave, where an attacker has embedded a malicious circuit (RF retroreflector) in the device in advance. As the retroreflector consists of small and cheap electrical elements such as a field-effect transistor (FET) chip and a wire that can work as a dipole antenna, the reflector can be embedded into various kinds of electric devices that carry unencrypted, sensitive information; e.g., keyboard, display monitor, microphone, speaker, USB, and so on. Only a few studies have addressed the basic mechanism of RFRA and demonstrated the success of the attack. The conditions for a successful attack have not been adequately explored before, and therefore, assessing the feasibility of the attack remains an open issue. In the present study, we aim to investigate empirically the conditions for a successful RFRA through field experiments. Understanding attack limitations should help to develop effective countermeasures against it. In particular, with regard to the conditions for a successful attack, we studied the distance between the attacker and the target, and the target signal frequencies. Through the extensive experiments using off-the-shelf hardware including software-defined radio (SDR) equipment, we revealed that the required conditions for a successful attack are (1) up to a 10-Mbps of target signal and (2) up to a distance of 10 meters. These results demonstrate the importance of the RFRA threat in the real world.","PeriodicalId":191367,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121032288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7