重振:重新平衡非区块链支付网络

Rami A. Khalil, Arthur Gervais
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引用次数: 206

摘要

扩大比特币和以太坊等去中心化区块链分类账的交易吞吐量一直是一个挑战。两方双工支付通道被设计并用作构建链接支付网络的基石,它允许各方之间进行原子和无信任的支付,而不会耗尽区块链的资源。然而,一旦支付渠道耗尽(例如,因为交易大多是单向的),该渠道将需要关闭并重新融资以允许新的交易。用户被设想用不同的实体来娱乐多个支付渠道,因此,用户应该能够利用他现有的渠道来重新平衡资金不足的渠道,而不是向渠道退款(这会导致昂贵的链上交易)。据我们所知,我们提出了第一个解决方案,允许支付渠道网络中的任意一组用户根据渠道所有者的偏好安全地重新平衡他们的渠道。除了争议(类似于传统的支付渠道),我们的解决方案不需要链上交易,因此增加了现有区块链的可扩展性。在我们的证券分析中,我们表明,一个诚实的参与者在重新平衡时不会损失任何资金。最后,我们为以太坊网络提供了一个概念验证实现和评估。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Revive: Rebalancing Off-Blockchain Payment Networks
Scaling the transaction throughput of decentralized blockchain ledgers such as Bitcoin and Ethereum has been an ongoing challenge. Two-party duplex payment channels have been designed and used as building blocks to construct linked payment networks, which allow atomic and trust-free payments between parties without exhausting the resources of the blockchain. Once a payment channel, however, is depleted (e.g., because transactions were mostly unidirectional) the channel would need to be closed and re-funded to allow for new transactions. Users are envisioned to entertain multiple payment channels with different entities, and as such, instead of refunding a channel (which incurs costly on-chain transactions), a user should be able to leverage his existing channels to rebalance a poorly funded channel. To the best of our knowledge, we present the first solution that allows an arbitrary set of users in a payment channel network to securely rebalance their channels, according to the preferences of the channel owners. Except in the case of disputes (similar to conventional payment channels), our solution does not require on-chain transactions and therefore increases the scalability of existing blockchains. In our security analysis, we show that an honest participant cannot lose any of its funds while rebalancing. We finally provide a proof of concept implementation and evaluation for the Ethereum network.
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