Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security最新文献_第4页

Practical Multi-party Private Set Intersection from Symmetric-Key Techniques 基于对称密钥技术的实用多方私集交集

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3133956.3134065

V. Kolesnikov, Naor Matania, Benny Pinkas, Mike Rosulek, Ni Trieu

引用次数: 150

Presence Attestation: The Missing Link in Dynamic Trust Bootstrapping 存在证明:动态信任引导中缺失的一环

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3133956.3134094

Zhangkai Zhang, Xuhua Ding, G. Tsudik, Jinhua Cui, Zhoujun Li

引用次数: 14

The Return of Coppersmith's Attack: Practical Factorization of Widely Used RSA Moduli 铜匠攻击的回归:广泛应用的RSA模的实用分解

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3133956.3133969

Matús Nemec, Marek Sýs, P. Švenda, Dusan Klinec, Vashek Matyás

{"title":"The Return of Coppersmith's Attack: Practical Factorization of Widely Used RSA Moduli","authors":"Matús Nemec, Marek Sýs, P. Švenda, Dusan Klinec, Vashek Matyás","doi":"10.1145/3133956.3133969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3133969","url":null,"abstract":"We report on our discovery of an algorithmic flaw in the construction of primes for RSA key generation in a widely-used library of a major manufacturer of cryptographic hardware. The primes generated by the library suffer from a significant loss of entropy. We propose a practical factorization method for various key lengths including 1024 and 2048 bits. Our method requires no additional information except for the value of the public modulus and does not depend on a weak or a faulty random number generator. We devised an extension of Coppersmith's factorization attack utilizing an alternative form of the primes in question. The library in question is found in NIST FIPS 140-2 and CC~EAL~5+ certified devices used for a wide range of real-world applications, including identity cards, passports, Trusted Platform Modules, PGP and tokens for authentication or software signing. As the relevant library code was introduced in 2012 at the latest (and probably earlier), the impacted devices are now widespread. Tens of thousands of such keys were directly identified, many with significant impacts, especially for electronic identity documents, software signing, Trusted Computing and PGP. We estimate the number of affected devices to be in the order of at least tens of millions. The worst cases for the factorization of 1024 and 2048-bit keys are less than 3 CPU-months and 100 CPU-years on single core of common recent CPUs, respectively, while the expected time is half of that of the worst case. The attack can be parallelized on multiple CPUs. Worse still, all susceptible keys contain a strong fingerprint that is verifiable in microseconds on an ordinary laptop -- meaning that all vulnerable keys can be quickly identified, even in very large datasets.","PeriodicalId":191367,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123041987","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 116

PeGaSus: Data-Adaptive Differentially Private Stream Processing PeGaSus:数据自适应差分私有流处理

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3133956.3134102

Yan Chen, Ashwin Machanavajjhala, Michael Hay, G. Miklau

{"title":"PeGaSus: Data-Adaptive Differentially Private Stream Processing","authors":"Yan Chen, Ashwin Machanavajjhala, Michael Hay, G. Miklau","doi":"10.1145/3133956.3134102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3134102","url":null,"abstract":"Individuals are continually observed by an ever-increasing number of sensors that make up the Internet of Things. The resulting streams of data, which are analyzed in real time, can reveal sensitive personal information about individuals. Hence, there is an urgent need for stream processing solutions that can analyze these data in real time with provable guarantees of privacy and low error. We present PeGaSus, a new algorithm for differentially private stream processing. Unlike prior work that has focused on answering individual queries over streams, our algorithm is the first that can simultaneously support a variety of stream processing tasks -- counts, sliding windows, event monitoring -- over multiple resolutions of the stream. PeGaSus uses a Perturber to release noisy counts, a data-adaptive Perturber to identify stable uniform regions in the stream, and a query specific Smoother, which combines the outputs of the Perturber and Grouper to answer queries with low error. In a comprehensive study using a WiFi access point dataset, we empirically show that PeGaSus can answer continuous queries with lower error than the previous state-of-the-art algorithms, even those specialized to particular query types.","PeriodicalId":191367,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123928536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 71

POSTER: PenJ1939: An Interactive Framework for Design and Dissemination of Exploits for Commercial Vehicles PenJ1939:商用车漏洞设计和传播的交互式框架

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3133956.3138844

S. Mukherjee, Noah Cain, Jacob Walker, David White, I. Ray, I. Ray

引用次数: 1

Post-Quantum Zero-Knowledge and Signatures from Symmetric-Key Primitives 对称密钥基元的后量子零知识和签名

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3133956.3133997

Melissa Chase, David Derler, Steven Goldfeder, Claudio Orlandi, Sebastian Ramacher, Christian Rechberger, Daniel Slamanig, Gregory M. Zaverucha

{"title":"Post-Quantum Zero-Knowledge and Signatures from Symmetric-Key Primitives","authors":"Melissa Chase, David Derler, Steven Goldfeder, Claudio Orlandi, Sebastian Ramacher, Christian Rechberger, Daniel Slamanig, Gregory M. Zaverucha","doi":"10.1145/3133956.3133997","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3133997","url":null,"abstract":"We propose a new class of post-quantum digital signature schemes that: (a) derive their security entirely from the security of symmetric-key primitives, believed to be quantum-secure, and (b) have extremely small keypairs, and, (c) are highly parameterizable. In our signature constructions, the public key is an image y=f(x) of a one-way function f and secret key x. A signature is a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of x, that incorporates a message to be signed. For this proof, we leverage recent progress of Giacomelli et al. (USENIX'16) in constructing an efficient Σ-protocol for statements over general circuits. We improve this Σ-protocol to reduce proof sizes by a factor of two, at no additional computational cost. While this is of independent interest as it yields more compact proofs for any circuit, it also decreases our signature sizes. We consider two possibilities to make the proof non-interactive: the Fiat-Shamir transform and Unruh's transform (EUROCRYPT'12, '15,'16). The former has smaller signatures, while the latter has a security analysis in the quantum-accessible random oracle model. By customizing Unruh's transform to our application, the overhead is reduced to 1.6x when compared to the Fiat-Shamir transform, which does not have a rigorous post-quantum security analysis. We implement and benchmark both approaches and explore the possible choice of f, taking advantage of the recent trend to strive for practical symmetric ciphers with a particularly low number of multiplications and end up using Low MC (EUROCRYPT'15).","PeriodicalId":191367,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121643008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 247

DEFTL: Implementing Plausibly Deniable Encryption in Flash Translation Layer DEFTL:在Flash转换层实现似是而非的加密

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3133956.3134011

Shijie Jia, Luning Xia, Bo Chen, Peng Liu

{"title":"DEFTL: Implementing Plausibly Deniable Encryption in Flash Translation Layer","authors":"Shijie Jia, Luning Xia, Bo Chen, Peng Liu","doi":"10.1145/3133956.3134011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3134011","url":null,"abstract":"Mobile devices today have been increasingly used to store and process sensitive information. To protect sensitive data, mobile operating systems usually incorporate a certain level of encryption to protect sensitive data. However, conventional encryption cannot defend against a coercive attacker who can capture the device owner, and force the owner to disclose keys used for decrypting sensitive information. To defend against such a coercive adversary, Plausibly Deniable Encryption (PDE) was introduced to allow the device owner to deny the very existence of sensitive data stored on his/her device. The existing PDE systems, built on flash storage devices, are problematic, since they either neglect the special nature of the underlying storage medium (which is usually NAND flash), or suffer from deniability compromises. In this paper, we propose DEFTL, a Deniability Enabling Flash Translation Layer for devices which use flash-based block devices as storage media. DEFTL is the first PDE design which incorporates deniability to Flash Translation Layer (FTL), a pervasively deployed \"translation layer\" which stays between NAND flash and the file system in literally all the computing devices. A salient advantage of DEFTL lies in its capability of achieving deniability while being able to accommodate the special nature of NAND flash as well as eliminate deniability compromises from it. We implement DEFTL using an open-source NAND flash controller. The experimental results show that, compared to conventional encryption which does not provide deniability, our DEFTL design only incurs a small overhead.","PeriodicalId":191367,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126849774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 34

RiskTeller: Predicting the Risk of Cyber Incidents 风险柜员:预测网络事件的风险

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3133956.3134022

Leyla Bilge, Yufei Han, Matteo Dell'Amico

引用次数: 71

A Framework for Constructing Fast MPC over Arithmetic Circuits with Malicious Adversaries and an Honest-Majority 一种基于恶意对手和诚实多数的算法电路快速MPC构建框架

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3133956.3133999

Yehuda Lindell, Ariel Nof

{"title":"A Framework for Constructing Fast MPC over Arithmetic Circuits with Malicious Adversaries and an Honest-Majority","authors":"Yehuda Lindell, Ariel Nof","doi":"10.1145/3133956.3133999","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3133999","url":null,"abstract":"Protocols for secure multiparty computation enable a set of parties to compute a function of their inputs without revealing anything but the output. The security properties of the protocol must be preserved in the presence of adversarial behavior. The two classic adversary models considered are semi-honest (where the adversary follows the protocol specification but tries to learn more than allowed by examining the protocol transcript) and malicious (where the adversary may follow any arbitrary attack strategy). Protocols for semi-honest adversaries are often far more efficient, but in many cases the security guarantees are not strong enough. In this paper, we present a new efficient method for \"compiling\" a large class of protocols that are secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries into protocols that are secure in the presence of malicious adversaries. Our method assumes an honest majority (i.e., that t<n/2 where t is the number of corrupted parties and n is the number of parties overall), and is applicable to many semi-honest protocols based on secret-sharing. In order to achieve high efficiency, our protocol is secure with abort and does not achieve fairness, meaning that the adversary may receive output while the honest parties do not. We present a number of instantiations of our compiler, and obtain protocol variants that are very efficient for both a small and large number of parties. We implemented our protocol variants and ran extensive experiments to compare them with each other. Our results show that secure computation with an honest majority can be practical, even with security in the presence of malicious adversaries. For example, we securely compute a large arithmetic circuit of depth 20 with 1,000,000 multiplication gates, in approximately 0.5 seconds with three parties, and approximately 29 seconds with 50 parties, and just under 1 minute with 90 parties.","PeriodicalId":191367,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127430714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 73

HexType: Efficient Detection of Type Confusion Errors for C++ HexType: c++类型混淆错误的有效检测

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/3133956.3134062

Yuseok Jeon, Priyam Biswas, Scott A. Carr, Byoungyoung Lee, Mathias Payer

{"title":"HexType: Efficient Detection of Type Confusion Errors for C++","authors":"Yuseok Jeon, Priyam Biswas, Scott A. Carr, Byoungyoung Lee, Mathias Payer","doi":"10.1145/3133956.3134062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3134062","url":null,"abstract":"Type confusion, often combined with use-after-free, is the main attack vector to compromise modern C++ software like browsers or virtual machines. Typecasting is a core principle that enables modularity in C++. For performance, most typecasts are only checked statically, i.e., the check only tests if a cast is allowed for the given type hierarchy, ignoring the actual runtime type of the object. Using an object of an incompatible base type instead of a derived type results in type confusion. Attackers abuse such type confusion issues to attack popular software products including Adobe Flash, PHP, Google Chrome, or Firefox. We propose to make all type checks explicit, replacing static checks with full runtime type checks. To minimize the performance impact of our mechanism HexType, we develop both low-overhead data structures and compiler optimizations. To maximize detection coverage, we handle specific object allocation patterns, e.g., placement new or reinterpret_cast which are not handled by other mechanisms. Our prototype results show that, compared to prior work, HexType has at least 1.1 -- 6.1 times higher coverage on Firefox benchmarks. For SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks with overhead, we show a 2 -- 33.4 times reduction in overhead. In addition, HexType discovered 4 new type confusion bugs in Qt and Apache Xerces-C++.","PeriodicalId":191367,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133625623","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 47