A Framework for Constructing Fast MPC over Arithmetic Circuits with Malicious Adversaries and an Honest-Majority

Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security Pub Date : 2017-10-30 DOI:10.1145/3133956.3133999

Yehuda Lindell, Ariel Nof

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引用次数: 73

Abstract

Protocols for secure multiparty computation enable a set of parties to compute a function of their inputs without revealing anything but the output. The security properties of the protocol must be preserved in the presence of adversarial behavior. The two classic adversary models considered are semi-honest (where the adversary follows the protocol specification but tries to learn more than allowed by examining the protocol transcript) and malicious (where the adversary may follow any arbitrary attack strategy). Protocols for semi-honest adversaries are often far more efficient, but in many cases the security guarantees are not strong enough. In this paper, we present a new efficient method for "compiling" a large class of protocols that are secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries into protocols that are secure in the presence of malicious adversaries. Our method assumes an honest majority (i.e., that t

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一种基于恶意对手和诚实多数的算法电路快速MPC构建框架

用于安全多方计算的协议使一组各方能够计算其输入的函数，而无需透露除输出之外的任何内容。协议的安全属性必须在存在对抗性行为的情况下保持。所考虑的两种经典攻击模型是半诚实的(攻击者遵循协议规范，但试图通过检查协议记录来学习超出允许范围的内容)和恶意的(攻击者可能遵循任何任意攻击策略)。针对半诚实对手的协议通常要有效得多，但在许多情况下，安全保证不够强大。在本文中，我们提出了一种新的有效方法，将一大类在半诚实对手存在时安全的协议“编译”成在恶意对手存在时安全的协议。我们的方法假设诚实多数(即t

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

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