Legal and Criminological Psychology最新文献

{"title":"Comments","authors":"Hans J. Markowitsch, Angelica Staniloiu","doi":"10.1111/lcrp.1_12272","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lcrp.1_12272","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":18022,"journal":{"name":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","volume":"30 S1","pages":"46-48"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143836419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Can highly arousing traumatic Experiences be repressed?","authors":"Israel Nachson","doi":"10.1111/lcrp.3_12273","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lcrp.3_12273","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Reading Mazzoni et al.'s paper, I was glad to find out that their and my own paper (Nachson, <span>2025</span>) are in agreement with each other in terms of both, the issues involved in the concepts of repression and of recovered memory, and their solutions. Although our conceptual perspectives differ from each other—as evident by the differential bibliography lists—the similarity between our analyses is indeed striking, so as to render them complementary.</p><p>We similarly delineate the difficulties involved in the very definition of the concept of repression which is not operationally defined, and hence cannot be scientifically validated. Thus, while ‘soft-minded’ clinicians find the concept useful for treating clients who have allegedly recovered memories of childhood sexual abuses, ‘hard-minded’ researchers find it misleading.</p><p>The latter also shy away from the notion that a given behaviour may be considered an exception to a rule. Therefore, the special properties assigned to memories of traumatic events (such as resistance to distortion over time) cannot be entertained without solid evidence, and indeed, cognitive scientists tend to reject the notion of a special nature of traumatic memories.</p><p>The insistence on a special nature reminds one of other failing attempts to postulate an explanation of a given behaviour in terms of exceptional processes; for example, the original, ‘frustration-aggression hypothesis’ (Dollard et al., <span>1939</span>), which was based on the notion that, unlike other behavioural responses which are learned, aggression is exceptionally caused by a single factor, namely frustration.</p><p>Mazzoni et al. make it clear that evidence showing that memory of traumatic experiences is less accessible and less retrievable than that of non-traumatic experiences does not prove that it is repressed, and in-fact, it might even be enhanced rather than impaired. The studies showing detrimental effects of trauma on memory in animals, and those performed on intentional suppression, do not constitute, according to the authors, evidence for repression in humans.</p><p>The authors' conclusion that each of the two opposing opinions regarding recovered memories entails a partial truth reminds one of the American Psychological Association's decision to accept both of them as valid (Howard & Tuffin, <span>2002</span>), and of my discussion on multiple truths (Nachson, <span>2025</span>).</p><p>As a solution of the on-going debate regarding recovered memories, the authors suggest a ‘middle ground hypothesis’, according to which only traumatic memories of highly arousing, negative experiences might be repressed. However, this suggestion begs the question, since the debate focuses on memories of sexual abuses which are clearly ‘highly arousing, negative experiences’; so we are back on square one.</p><p>Finally, I wholeheartedly agree with the authors that further research on recovery of memory is called for, and that the cl","PeriodicalId":18022,"journal":{"name":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","volume":"30 S1","pages":"107-108"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lcrp.3_12273","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143836416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"British False Memory Society: Caseload and details by year (1993 onwards)","authors":"Lawrence Patihis,&nbsp;Kevin Felstead","doi":"10.1111/lcrp.12274","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lcrp.12274","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Purpose</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>The British False Memory Society (BFMS) is a registered charity founded in 1993 following an epidemic of false-memory type allegations by adult accusers who claimed to have remembered childhood sexual abuse for which they previously had no cognitive recollection. Many of these accusers had entered counselling after typically suffering from anxiety, depression, and relationship problems. Many came out of therapy with what appeared to be false memories, and the accused sometimes contacted the BFMS for advice. Since its inception, the BFMS has kept a record of all calls to its telephone helpline.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Methods</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In this article, we document several caseload details by year from 1993 onwards.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Results</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>In the peak year of 1994, 268 cases were taken up by the BFMS. During recent years in the last 10 years the number of cases taken on by the BFMS oscillated around about 40 each year. The 2010s had just 3% of the total cases leading to a guilty verdict (1990s = 8%; 2000s = 17%). We found the 2000 decade to be the most likely for those accused to be imprisoned, and the most recent years the least.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Conclusions</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We conclude that although the numbers have lessened since the 1994 peak, there are still today a number of individuals being affected by allegations stemming from recovered memories.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18022,"journal":{"name":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","volume":"30 S1","pages":"54-69"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lcrp.12274","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143836414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Are traumatic memories at first extraordinarily bad and then extraordinarily good?","authors":"Lawrence Patihis,&nbsp;Kevin Felstead","doi":"10.1111/lcrp.4_12273","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lcrp.4_12273","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;Mazzoni et al. (&lt;span&gt;2025&lt;/span&gt;) seek to reach a middle ground in which they cite research purporting that traumatic memory can be special, yet noting the conceptual creep of the concept of trauma, and by suggesting an openness to further research. Mazzoni et al. point out that negative events might enhance memory sometimes (e.g. Berntsen &amp; Rubin, &lt;span&gt;2014&lt;/span&gt;), and might impair memory sometimes (e.g. Roth et al., 2011). We concur that on the one hand a shocking event is likely to be consolidated more strongly than neutral events, and that chronic and prolonged stress can damage the functioning of the hippocampus and impair memory. This is a decent middle ground. We suppose that in these narrow senses traumatic memory can be special. This is nuanced as noted in Mazzoni et al.—for example traumatic memories are sometimes both strongly consolidated but still inaccurate over time.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Nevertheless, we add the caveat that by ‘special’ we do not mean dissociated or repressed, we just mean sometimes enhanced by epinephrine or sometimes impaired by stress. Notice that in the controversial concept of dissociative amnesia, the ‘special’ status is making a much bolder claim. It is proposed that there is a period of extraordinarily poor memory (zero in fact), followed by extraordinarily good memory. So good, in fact, that the memories arising out of dissociative amnesia might be so trustworthy to be used in legal cases (of course, we disagree, but this is the claim). It is this combination of terrible memory followed by extraordinary memory, caused by psychogenic mechanisms, that we object to.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;There is one concern that if we do not get the terminology exactly correct about DNA methylation studies, that inexactness may spread through the pseudoscientific world of therapies that justify attempting to recover traumatic memories. Mazzoni et al. state that ‘chronic psychosocial stress changes the DNA of a gene in the hippocampus’, and that seems wrong. DNA methylation can suppress gene transcription but it does not change the DNA or the individual genes (see Moore et al., &lt;span&gt;2013&lt;/span&gt;). In effect, the stress in these experiments seem to be affecting the transcription of proteins that the genes would otherwise produce without the stress. Proteins produced by genes in hippocampal neurons (and in connected networks) are needed in both long-term potentiation (see Patihis, &lt;span&gt;2018&lt;/span&gt;) and in dendrite growth (Del Blanco et al., &lt;span&gt;2019&lt;/span&gt;), so it makes sense that chronic stress that blocks transcription would impair memory formation.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Mazzoni et al. (&lt;span&gt;2025&lt;/span&gt;) informs us not only of the terrible Bibbiano scandal in Italy—in which many lives were changed by false memories produced by the therapists—but also that the problems may not be over. If it is true that a large majority of clinicians have received education in the Bessel van der Kolk approach, there may be many false accusations in the future in Italy. Van d","PeriodicalId":18022,"journal":{"name":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","volume":"30 S1","pages":"109-110"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lcrp.4_12273","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143836417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Response to Marchetti et al.'s and Felstead & Patihis' comments on my paper on “alternative truths”","authors":"Israel Nachson","doi":"10.1111/lcrp.3_12275","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lcrp.3_12275","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The two comments on my paper highlight the need to clarify the concept of “alternative truths” which might be misconceived by some readers. As it is readily noticeable, the concepts of legal and therapeutic “truths” are written within quotation marks, thus indicating that they are seemingly, but not actually, true. The only unequivocal truth is, of course, the factual truth (without quotation marks) that refers to whatever actually took place. I used the term “truth,” rather than, say, narrative, in order to indicate that for legal and therapeutic purposes a given narrative may be treated as if it is <i>the</i> truth.</p><p>For example, the judges may or may not have a hunch as to what the factual truth in a given case is. Yet, they must abide by the rules of evidence, and issue a verdict based on the “legal truth” (in quotation marks) which may or may not correspond to the factual truth.</p><p>Similarly, the term “therapeutic truth” means that for psychotherapy to succeed, the therapist should relate to the client's version of the past traumatic events as veridical (“truth”) in <i>her</i> eyes.</p><p>That means that there is only one truthful narrative of the event under consideration. All other narratives are conveniently considered “truths” in specific contexts for particular purposes. This reasoning excludes cases where the factual truth cannot be definitely determined, and the people involved provide differential reports of the controversial course of events. In these cases, the “truth” is “in the eye of the beholder,” and consequently it might be either partial or multiple. This is clearly not the case in recovered memories where whenever there is no corroborative evidence, the factual truth cannot be determined, and one is left with the plaintiff's narrative, which is <i>her</i> “truth” (and should be treated by the therapist as such), and the court's verdict, the “legal truth,” as based on the evidence provided by the prosecution. In short, while there is only a single truth, there may be multiple alternative “truths.” In my paper I call for increased awareness among the judges of the problematic nature of the alternative “truths,” in order to enhance the correspondence between the “legal truth” and the factual truth, which can be solely achieved by corroborating evidence.</p>","PeriodicalId":18022,"journal":{"name":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","volume":"30 S1","pages":"87-88"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lcrp.3_12275","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143836430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Possible factors associated with increased risk for false memories but decreased convictions in the British False Memory Society data: A comment on Patihis and Felstead","authors":"Elisa Krackow,&nbsp;Henry Otgaar,&nbsp;Rafaële Huntjens,&nbsp;Mark L. Howe,&nbsp;Ivan Mangiulli,&nbsp;Olivier Dodier,&nbsp;Marko Jelicic,&nbsp;Steven Jay Lynn","doi":"10.1111/lcrp.2_12274","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lcrp.2_12274","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":18022,"journal":{"name":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","volume":"30 S1","pages":"72-74"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143836427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The neuroscience of dissociative amnesia and repressed memory: Premature conclusions and unanswered questions","authors":"Henry Otgaar,&nbsp;Mark L. Howe,&nbsp;Lawrence Patihis,&nbsp;Ivan Mangiulli,&nbsp;Olivier Dodier,&nbsp;Rafaële Huntjens,&nbsp;Elisa Krackow,&nbsp;Marko Jelicic,&nbsp;Steven Jay Lynn","doi":"10.1111/lcrp.12272","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lcrp.12272","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Purpose</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>A heated debate exists on whether traumatic memories can be dissociated or repressed. One way in which researchers have attempted to prove the existence of dissociative amnesia or repressed memory is to examine whether claims of amnesia for traumatic events are associated with specific neural markers.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Methods</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Here, we will argue that such neuroscientific examinations do not tell us whether traumatic memories can be unconsciously repressed or dissociated from consciousness, respectively.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Results</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We discuss neuroscientific studies on dissociative amnesia and repressed memory and show that there are no reliable biological markers for dissociative amnesia and that the alleged involved brain areas are heterogenous among studies. Furthermore, we will demonstrate that it is unclear whether these studies truly involved patients with dissociative amnesia and that alternative explanations of dissociative amnesia were often not ruled out (e.g. malingering, organic amnesia). Moreover, we will make the case that the discussed patients in the studies do not meet the DSM-5 criteria for dissociative amnesia.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Conclusions</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Taken together, neuroscientific research into dissociative amnesia does not present a convincing case for a biological basis of the purported memory loss.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18022,"journal":{"name":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","volume":"30 S1","pages":"29-46"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lcrp.12272","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143836418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Taking the middle stance in the debate on the nature of traumatic memories","authors":"Giuliana Mazzoni,&nbsp;Gianmarco Convertino,&nbsp;Michela Marchetti,&nbsp;Danilo Mitaritonna,&nbsp;Mara Stockner,&nbsp;Jessica Talbot","doi":"10.1111/lcrp.12273","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lcrp.12273","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;div&gt;\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 &lt;section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;h3&gt; Purpose&lt;/h3&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;p&gt;The discussion on the degree of similarity and continuity between more neutral memories and genuine traumatic memories lies at the core of the (at times too heated) debate on the possibility of having declarative memories for traumatic personal experiences. In this paper, we aim at taking a middle ground in the debate, by examining, albeit very briefly, clinical, neurological and behavioural data from a hopefully more objective point of view.&lt;/p&gt;\u0000 &lt;/section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;h3&gt; Method&lt;/h3&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;p&gt;In discussing traumatic memories, the first necessary step is to clarify the concept of trauma, its use and the consequences of the definition in applied areas such as the legal arena. It is not meaningful to talk about traumatic memories if trauma is defined too loosely and refers to any type of negative experience. Second, we provide a very brief overview of data deriving from both sides of the debate.&lt;/p&gt;\u0000 &lt;/section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;h3&gt; Results&lt;/h3&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;p&gt;The brief review suggests that the definition of trauma has been the object of a ‘conceptual bracket creep’, extending to events and behaviours that should not be considered trauma. This has consequences on the definition of what a traumatic memory is, hindering a productive discussion on the topic. Data from clinical observations, which strongly speak in favour of the special nature of traumatic memories, unfortunately suffer from such conceptual looseness, while neurobiological studies have adopted a more strict conceptualisation of trauma, but mainly in animal models. These studies converge in indicating that neurobiological processes involved in traumatic compared with non-traumatic memories are different, but the effect of trauma can be both of impairing and enhancing declarative memory. Behavioural studies which oppose the special nature of traumatic memories are rigorous, but such studies lack exposure to genuine traumatic experiences.&lt;/p&gt;\u0000 &lt;/section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;h3&gt; Conclusion&lt;/h3&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;p&gt;Only by taking a more dispassionate middle ground, it becomes possible to evaluate merits, flaws and the validity of results. We suggest that the nature of traumatic memories will be better understood by accepting solid data indicating that encoding and consolidation are different in case of very strong emotionally negative events (leading at times to memory impairment, but also often to memory improvement) and by integrating these data with equally solid behavioural data. Overall, traumatic memories can be special. Research should help define specific conditions for special processes to be involve","PeriodicalId":18022,"journal":{"name":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","volume":"30 S1","pages":"89-102"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lcrp.12273","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143836415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"There is only one truth, the objective truth, in recovered memory cases","authors":"Kevin Felstead,&nbsp;Lawrence Patihis","doi":"10.1111/lcrp.2_12275","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lcrp.2_12275","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;Nachson (&lt;span&gt;2025&lt;/span&gt;) provides a clear and logical review of the scientific literature about the repressed memory controversy, concluding that there is no credible scientific evidence which supports the concept of traumatic repression: “the theory cannot be empirically validated, and it therefore has no scientific value” (p. 5). We endorse this position. As Larry Weiskrantz asserted: “repression is a theory, not a fact” (Weiskrantz, &lt;span&gt;2007&lt;/span&gt;, p. 81).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Nachson adopts a novel approach in attempting to accommodate a middle ground regarding multiple, alternative truths—scientific, legal, and therapeutic—with reference to three cases heard by the Israeli Supreme Court. The Israeli Supreme Court has on the one hand accepted the problematic nature of recovered memories. Yet, on the other hand, it has demonstrated that it will allow recovered memory testimony into evidence, with the caveat that additional corroborative evidence also be present before someone is convicted. This doublethink is concerning because the admission of repressed memory testimony could contaminate a case, and the standard for what constitutes “corroborating evidence” could be low (e.g., it could include testimony contaminated by the repressed memory recovery). There is a real danger that miscarriages of justice can occur (see Felstead &amp; Patihis, &lt;span&gt;2025&lt;/span&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The multiple truths approach outlined by Nachson is concerningly postmodern, though it seems he is advocating at times that the factual truth determines cases. Our position is that there is only one singular objective truth (“factual truth” as phrased by Nachson). This has been the approach of an extraordinarily successful scientific enterprise over a few hundred years. The objective truth is the most important element for all involved. We do not agree that the factual truth can take a back seat to wellbeing in therapy (“therapeutic truth”). We do not agree that judges can change the course of justice by sidestepping the objective truth either (“judicial truth”). If we agree that the concept of repressed memory is unsound, then there is no place in any criminal court for “therapeutic truths.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The telling example of Thomas Quick—Sweden's most notorious serial killer who confessed to 39 murders—pinpoints the inherent dangers of accepting “therapeutic truths.” Quick's psychotherapist, the charismatic Margit Norwell, dogmatically assumed that her clients who entered therapy had been abused in childhood. She subsequently helped Quick to recover repressed memories of murder, memories that turned out to be false. Thomas Quick was subsequently wrongfully convicted of eight murders. The last of these convictions was thankfully overturned in 2013, following the largest forensic investigation in Sweden since the second world war (Josefsson, &lt;span&gt;2015&lt;/span&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In conclusion, Nachson valuably informs us of the Israeli openness to repressed memory testimony, and quite rightly suggest that","PeriodicalId":18022,"journal":{"name":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","volume":"30 S1","pages":"86-87"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lcrp.2_12275","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143836445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Debate is still going on: A comment on “British False Memory Society: Caseload and Details by Year (1993 Onwards)” by Lawrence Patihis and Kevin Felstead","authors":"Israel Nachson","doi":"10.1111/lcrp.1_12274","DOIUrl":"10.1111/lcrp.1_12274","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;Unfortunately, the picture drawn by Patihis and Felsead regarding the unconditional belief in repressed memories on the part of clinicians, academics and legal authorities in the U.S. and in Europe looks familiar, as it resembles the one in Israel. In the first trial in Israel that involved alleged recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse a clinician expert testified on behalf of the prosecution, arguing that the plaintiff's memories, which have allegedly been repressed for many years and finally recovered, constituted a valid description of the sexual abuses that she had undergone during childhood. Once this testimony was accepted by the court, it has been considered precedence in all subsequent cases, despite the fact that the judges have been aware of the fact that the “recovered memory hypothesis” lacks scientific validation. Presumably, that is because lay people, as well as professional judges (in Israel there is no jury system), tend to believe the plaintiff's emotion-laden narratives of sexual abuses, rather than the defendant's straightforward denial of the criminal accusations (cf. Nachson et al., &lt;span&gt;2007&lt;/span&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;It is important to point out, as Patihis and Felstead do, that outright acceptance of allegations of childhood sexual abuse on the basis of recovered memories – which the authors convincingly demonstrate its continuing prevalence in the U.K. – might lead to miscarriages of justice by wrongfully convicting innocent defendants. This likelihood transforms the issue at hand from an academic debate into a social and legal problem.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;An interesting case in point is the legislation regarding corroboration in cases of rape, which was mandatory in the U.K. until its removal in 1994. The purpose of the removal sounds good, as it was supposed to help the victims of sexual abuse. However, in cases of alleged recovery of memories of sexual abuse, the removal might be harmful, because it might facilitate uncorroborated acceptance of an invalid theory and practice. According to the authors, the theory is invalid because in principle it does not exclude any behavioral responses (thus violating an imperative condition for scientific theory), and the practice is invalid because the false memories are often constructed during therapy (thus raising the suspicion that they are implanted by the therapist).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I share with the Patihis and Felstead (Nachson, &lt;span&gt;2025&lt;/span&gt;), the distinction between the legal and the factual truths. As they point out, the former, which is based on legally admissible evidence, might not correspond with the latter. Some or many of the convicted defendants might therefore be actually innocent.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The debate regarding recovered memory has been called “a war”, yet the authors consider it as “just a metaphor of a fierce debate”, since “unlike a real war, in this case the probable harm is being done in psychotherapies that tell clients that they may have hidden trauma, and then engage in digging ","PeriodicalId":18022,"journal":{"name":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","volume":"30 S1","pages":"70-71"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lcrp.1_12274","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143835763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}