Legal and Criminological Psychology最新文献

{"title":"Response to Marchetti et al.'s and Felstead & Patihis' comments on my paper on “alternative truths”","authors":"Israel Nachson","doi":"10.1111/lcrp.3_12275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lcrp.3_12275","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The two comments on my paper highlight the need to clarify the concept of “alternative truths” which might be misconceived by some readers. As it is readily noticeable, the concepts of legal and therapeutic “truths” are written within quotation marks, thus indicating that they are seemingly, but not actually, true. The only unequivocal truth is, of course, the factual truth (without quotation marks) that refers to whatever actually took place. I used the term “truth,” rather than, say, narrative, in order to indicate that for legal and therapeutic purposes a given narrative may be treated as if it is <i>the</i> truth.</p><p>For example, the judges may or may not have a hunch as to what the factual truth in a given case is. Yet, they must abide by the rules of evidence, and issue a verdict based on the “legal truth” (in quotation marks) which may or may not correspond to the factual truth.</p><p>Similarly, the term “therapeutic truth” means that for psychotherapy to succeed, the therapist should relate to the client's version of the past traumatic events as veridical (“truth”) in <i>her</i> eyes.</p><p>That means that there is only one truthful narrative of the event under consideration. All other narratives are conveniently considered “truths” in specific contexts for particular purposes. This reasoning excludes cases where the factual truth cannot be definitely determined, and the people involved provide differential reports of the controversial course of events. In these cases, the “truth” is “in the eye of the beholder,” and consequently it might be either partial or multiple. This is clearly not the case in recovered memories where whenever there is no corroborative evidence, the factual truth cannot be determined, and one is left with the plaintiff's narrative, which is <i>her</i> “truth” (and should be treated by the therapist as such), and the court's verdict, the “legal truth,” as based on the evidence provided by the prosecution. In short, while there is only a single truth, there may be multiple alternative “truths.” In my paper I call for increased awareness among the judges of the problematic nature of the alternative “truths,” in order to enhance the correspondence between the “legal truth” and the factual truth, which can be solely achieved by corroborating evidence.</p>","PeriodicalId":18022,"journal":{"name":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","volume":"30 S1","pages":"87-88"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lcrp.3_12275","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143836430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Possible factors associated with increased risk for false memories but decreased convictions in the British False Memory Society data: A comment on Patihis and Felstead","authors":"Elisa Krackow,&nbsp;Henry Otgaar,&nbsp;Rafaële Huntjens,&nbsp;Mark L. Howe,&nbsp;Ivan Mangiulli,&nbsp;Olivier Dodier,&nbsp;Marko Jelicic,&nbsp;Steven Jay Lynn","doi":"10.1111/lcrp.2_12274","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lcrp.2_12274","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":18022,"journal":{"name":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","volume":"30 S1","pages":"72-74"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143836427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The neuroscience of dissociative amnesia and repressed memory: Premature conclusions and unanswered questions","authors":"Henry Otgaar,&nbsp;Mark L. Howe,&nbsp;Lawrence Patihis,&nbsp;Ivan Mangiulli,&nbsp;Olivier Dodier,&nbsp;Rafaële Huntjens,&nbsp;Elisa Krackow,&nbsp;Marko Jelicic,&nbsp;Steven Jay Lynn","doi":"10.1111/lcrp.12272","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lcrp.12272","url":null,"abstract":"<div>\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Purpose</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>A heated debate exists on whether traumatic memories can be dissociated or repressed. One way in which researchers have attempted to prove the existence of dissociative amnesia or repressed memory is to examine whether claims of amnesia for traumatic events are associated with specific neural markers.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Methods</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Here, we will argue that such neuroscientific examinations do not tell us whether traumatic memories can be unconsciously repressed or dissociated from consciousness, respectively.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Results</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>We discuss neuroscientific studies on dissociative amnesia and repressed memory and show that there are no reliable biological markers for dissociative amnesia and that the alleged involved brain areas are heterogenous among studies. Furthermore, we will demonstrate that it is unclear whether these studies truly involved patients with dissociative amnesia and that alternative explanations of dissociative amnesia were often not ruled out (e.g. malingering, organic amnesia). Moreover, we will make the case that the discussed patients in the studies do not meet the DSM-5 criteria for dissociative amnesia.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 \u0000 <section>\u0000 \u0000 <h3> Conclusions</h3>\u0000 \u0000 <p>Taken together, neuroscientific research into dissociative amnesia does not present a convincing case for a biological basis of the purported memory loss.</p>\u0000 </section>\u0000 </div>","PeriodicalId":18022,"journal":{"name":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","volume":"30 S1","pages":"29-46"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lcrp.12272","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143836418","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Taking the middle stance in the debate on the nature of traumatic memories","authors":"Giuliana Mazzoni,&nbsp;Gianmarco Convertino,&nbsp;Michela Marchetti,&nbsp;Danilo Mitaritonna,&nbsp;Mara Stockner,&nbsp;Jessica Talbot","doi":"10.1111/lcrp.12273","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lcrp.12273","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;div&gt;\u0000 \u0000 \u0000 &lt;section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;h3&gt; Purpose&lt;/h3&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;p&gt;The discussion on the degree of similarity and continuity between more neutral memories and genuine traumatic memories lies at the core of the (at times too heated) debate on the possibility of having declarative memories for traumatic personal experiences. In this paper, we aim at taking a middle ground in the debate, by examining, albeit very briefly, clinical, neurological and behavioural data from a hopefully more objective point of view.&lt;/p&gt;\u0000 &lt;/section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;h3&gt; Method&lt;/h3&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;p&gt;In discussing traumatic memories, the first necessary step is to clarify the concept of trauma, its use and the consequences of the definition in applied areas such as the legal arena. It is not meaningful to talk about traumatic memories if trauma is defined too loosely and refers to any type of negative experience. Second, we provide a very brief overview of data deriving from both sides of the debate.&lt;/p&gt;\u0000 &lt;/section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;h3&gt; Results&lt;/h3&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;p&gt;The brief review suggests that the definition of trauma has been the object of a ‘conceptual bracket creep’, extending to events and behaviours that should not be considered trauma. This has consequences on the definition of what a traumatic memory is, hindering a productive discussion on the topic. Data from clinical observations, which strongly speak in favour of the special nature of traumatic memories, unfortunately suffer from such conceptual looseness, while neurobiological studies have adopted a more strict conceptualisation of trauma, but mainly in animal models. These studies converge in indicating that neurobiological processes involved in traumatic compared with non-traumatic memories are different, but the effect of trauma can be both of impairing and enhancing declarative memory. Behavioural studies which oppose the special nature of traumatic memories are rigorous, but such studies lack exposure to genuine traumatic experiences.&lt;/p&gt;\u0000 &lt;/section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;section&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;h3&gt; Conclusion&lt;/h3&gt;\u0000 \u0000 &lt;p&gt;Only by taking a more dispassionate middle ground, it becomes possible to evaluate merits, flaws and the validity of results. We suggest that the nature of traumatic memories will be better understood by accepting solid data indicating that encoding and consolidation are different in case of very strong emotionally negative events (leading at times to memory impairment, but also often to memory improvement) and by integrating these data with equally solid behavioural data. Overall, traumatic memories can be special. Research should help define specific conditions for special processes to be involve","PeriodicalId":18022,"journal":{"name":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","volume":"30 S1","pages":"89-102"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lcrp.12273","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143836415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"There is only one truth, the objective truth, in recovered memory cases","authors":"Kevin Felstead,&nbsp;Lawrence Patihis","doi":"10.1111/lcrp.2_12275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lcrp.2_12275","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;Nachson (&lt;span&gt;2025&lt;/span&gt;) provides a clear and logical review of the scientific literature about the repressed memory controversy, concluding that there is no credible scientific evidence which supports the concept of traumatic repression: “the theory cannot be empirically validated, and it therefore has no scientific value” (p. 5). We endorse this position. As Larry Weiskrantz asserted: “repression is a theory, not a fact” (Weiskrantz, &lt;span&gt;2007&lt;/span&gt;, p. 81).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Nachson adopts a novel approach in attempting to accommodate a middle ground regarding multiple, alternative truths—scientific, legal, and therapeutic—with reference to three cases heard by the Israeli Supreme Court. The Israeli Supreme Court has on the one hand accepted the problematic nature of recovered memories. Yet, on the other hand, it has demonstrated that it will allow recovered memory testimony into evidence, with the caveat that additional corroborative evidence also be present before someone is convicted. This doublethink is concerning because the admission of repressed memory testimony could contaminate a case, and the standard for what constitutes “corroborating evidence” could be low (e.g., it could include testimony contaminated by the repressed memory recovery). There is a real danger that miscarriages of justice can occur (see Felstead &amp; Patihis, &lt;span&gt;2025&lt;/span&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The multiple truths approach outlined by Nachson is concerningly postmodern, though it seems he is advocating at times that the factual truth determines cases. Our position is that there is only one singular objective truth (“factual truth” as phrased by Nachson). This has been the approach of an extraordinarily successful scientific enterprise over a few hundred years. The objective truth is the most important element for all involved. We do not agree that the factual truth can take a back seat to wellbeing in therapy (“therapeutic truth”). We do not agree that judges can change the course of justice by sidestepping the objective truth either (“judicial truth”). If we agree that the concept of repressed memory is unsound, then there is no place in any criminal court for “therapeutic truths.”&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The telling example of Thomas Quick—Sweden's most notorious serial killer who confessed to 39 murders—pinpoints the inherent dangers of accepting “therapeutic truths.” Quick's psychotherapist, the charismatic Margit Norwell, dogmatically assumed that her clients who entered therapy had been abused in childhood. She subsequently helped Quick to recover repressed memories of murder, memories that turned out to be false. Thomas Quick was subsequently wrongfully convicted of eight murders. The last of these convictions was thankfully overturned in 2013, following the largest forensic investigation in Sweden since the second world war (Josefsson, &lt;span&gt;2015&lt;/span&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In conclusion, Nachson valuably informs us of the Israeli openness to repressed memory testimony, and quite rightly suggest that","PeriodicalId":18022,"journal":{"name":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","volume":"30 S1","pages":"86-87"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lcrp.2_12275","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143836445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Debate is still going on: A comment on “British False Memory Society: Caseload and Details by Year (1993 Onwards)” by Lawrence Patihis and Kevin Felstead","authors":"Israel Nachson","doi":"10.1111/lcrp.1_12274","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lcrp.1_12274","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;Unfortunately, the picture drawn by Patihis and Felsead regarding the unconditional belief in repressed memories on the part of clinicians, academics and legal authorities in the U.S. and in Europe looks familiar, as it resembles the one in Israel. In the first trial in Israel that involved alleged recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse a clinician expert testified on behalf of the prosecution, arguing that the plaintiff's memories, which have allegedly been repressed for many years and finally recovered, constituted a valid description of the sexual abuses that she had undergone during childhood. Once this testimony was accepted by the court, it has been considered precedence in all subsequent cases, despite the fact that the judges have been aware of the fact that the “recovered memory hypothesis” lacks scientific validation. Presumably, that is because lay people, as well as professional judges (in Israel there is no jury system), tend to believe the plaintiff's emotion-laden narratives of sexual abuses, rather than the defendant's straightforward denial of the criminal accusations (cf. Nachson et al., &lt;span&gt;2007&lt;/span&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;It is important to point out, as Patihis and Felstead do, that outright acceptance of allegations of childhood sexual abuse on the basis of recovered memories – which the authors convincingly demonstrate its continuing prevalence in the U.K. – might lead to miscarriages of justice by wrongfully convicting innocent defendants. This likelihood transforms the issue at hand from an academic debate into a social and legal problem.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;An interesting case in point is the legislation regarding corroboration in cases of rape, which was mandatory in the U.K. until its removal in 1994. The purpose of the removal sounds good, as it was supposed to help the victims of sexual abuse. However, in cases of alleged recovery of memories of sexual abuse, the removal might be harmful, because it might facilitate uncorroborated acceptance of an invalid theory and practice. According to the authors, the theory is invalid because in principle it does not exclude any behavioral responses (thus violating an imperative condition for scientific theory), and the practice is invalid because the false memories are often constructed during therapy (thus raising the suspicion that they are implanted by the therapist).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;I share with the Patihis and Felstead (Nachson, &lt;span&gt;2025&lt;/span&gt;), the distinction between the legal and the factual truths. As they point out, the former, which is based on legally admissible evidence, might not correspond with the latter. Some or many of the convicted defendants might therefore be actually innocent.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The debate regarding recovered memory has been called “a war”, yet the authors consider it as “just a metaphor of a fierce debate”, since “unlike a real war, in this case the probable harm is being done in psychotherapies that tell clients that they may have hidden trauma, and then engage in digging ","PeriodicalId":18022,"journal":{"name":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","volume":"30 S1","pages":"70-71"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lcrp.1_12274","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143835763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Comment on Otgaar et al.: The neuroscience of dissociative amnesia and repressed memory: Premature conclusions and unanswered questions","authors":"Gianmarco Convertino,&nbsp;Danilo Mitaritonna,&nbsp;Mara Stockner,&nbsp;Michela Marchetti,&nbsp;Jessica Talbot,&nbsp;Giuliana Mazzoni","doi":"10.1111/lcrp.2_12272","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lcrp.2_12272","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;Otgaar and colleagues admirably highlight the strengths and weaknesses of past research, while proposing strategies for studying ‘psychogenic amnesia’ and its related concepts, along with their neural correlates. They argue convincingly for redefining psychogenic amnesia as ‘amnesia of uncertain etiology’, considering various potential causes, like unclear origins or feigned memory loss (Mazzoni, &lt;span&gt;2019&lt;/span&gt;; Vannucci et al., &lt;span&gt;2015&lt;/span&gt;). The prevalence of feigned dissociative disorders as a form of malingering and symptom exaggeration, as noted by Mittenberg et al. (&lt;span&gt;2002&lt;/span&gt;), underscores the importance of investigating such factors in research contexts.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;A central point of Otgaar's contribution, which we extend in this commentary, is the statistical concept of correlation. As already stated elsewhere (e.g. Convertino et al., &lt;span&gt;2022&lt;/span&gt;), the concept of correlation is quite different from the concept of causation, just as the concept of statistical correlation is remote from the concept of statistical causation. Despite many advances in data sciences for the development of robust causal inferential strategies (Peters et al., &lt;span&gt;2017&lt;/span&gt;), not all neuroscientific studies in the literature adopt these options, amplifying biases especially at the data interpretation stage, which in turn distort results and lead to erroneous conclusions.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Moreover, sometimes readers may inadvertently misunderstand, interpreting honestly reported data of associations as evidence of causation. In the clinical setting, also due to problematic overlapping of concepts and debates (e.g. definition and characteristics of ‘repressed memory’ vs. ‘criteria/diagnosis of dissociative amnesia’; see Battista et al., &lt;span&gt;2023&lt;/span&gt;; Mangiulli et al., &lt;span&gt;2022&lt;/span&gt;), professionals fall for the easy conceptual fallacy (Fukuzako et al., &lt;span&gt;1999&lt;/span&gt;) of inferring a cause, for example ‘traumatic experiences’, from the observation in a patient of DSM-5 symptoms that merely correlate with trauma.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;In cognitive neuroscience, scientists are aware of these limitations: in fact, the presence of a relationship between the &lt;i&gt;observed&lt;/i&gt; variable (e.g. reporting having suffered a trauma) and the measured outcome (e.g. dissociative amnesia) is not sufficient in determining the causal relationship between two phenomena. Only counterfactual data derived from direct manipulation can suggest causation. In this sense, major advances have been obtained through the implementation of invasive and non-invasive brain stimulation techniques capable of experimentally &lt;i&gt;manipulating&lt;/i&gt; brain functioning and measuring the consequent behavioural outcomes. As rightly pointed out by Otgaar and colleagues, functional and/or structural brain imaging studies investigating amnesia of uncertain aetiology are unable to reach conclusions with causal value, lacking counterfactual evidence.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Despite these challenges, the neuroscientific literature","PeriodicalId":18022,"journal":{"name":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","volume":"30 S1","pages":"49-50"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lcrp.2_12272","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143836420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Comment on Nachson: Alternative “truths” of repressed memories: Views of judges of the Israeli supreme court","authors":"Michela Marchetti,&nbsp;Jessica Talbot,&nbsp;Gianmarco Convertino,&nbsp;Danilo Mitaritonna,&nbsp;Mara Stockner,&nbsp;Giuliana Mazzoni","doi":"10.1111/lcrp.1_12275","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lcrp.1_12275","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;Multiple “truths” in criminal trials represents the main idea proposed in this article. Typically, this rather arguable, albeit intriguing, concept refers to a relativistic approach on the concept of truth. But relativism is not what the author suggests; he claims that “truth” remains a correspondist construct, in which corroborating evidence is necessary.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The author refers to the debate on memory repression, presenting evidence for and against this concept, differences that stem from the difficulties to empirically measure repression. Experts can have very different and at times opposite opinions on the same legal case, and all are presented and received as “truths.” Multiple “truths.” More specifically, attention is focussed on the Israeli Supreme Court, and examples of allegations of child sexual abuse in children who have recovered memories of sexual abuse after years of no memory. In certain Israeli court cases, it is accepted that repressed traumatic memories are remembered after years, a stance mainly fuelled by professionals believing in repression.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Such issues are not unique to Israel. As the author documents well, they have been very common in other countries as well, for many years, not just countries often reported about (e.g., Battista et al., &lt;span&gt;2023&lt;/span&gt;), and it is easy to draw parallels between Israel and the situation in Italy (Convertino et al., &lt;span&gt;2022&lt;/span&gt;; Magnussen et al., &lt;span&gt;2013&lt;/span&gt;), where many controversial examples on the topic of memory repression in childhood sexual abuse exist (Mazzoni et al., &lt;span&gt;2025&lt;/span&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The law in Israel admits recovered memories as evidence of abuse. It is surprising to learn about such perspective of the Israeli Supreme Court, given that in Israel the knowledge of judges on these topics is rather well researched, and, as in other countries (Magnussen et al., &lt;span&gt;2008&lt;/span&gt;; Magnussen et al., &lt;span&gt;2010&lt;/span&gt;), judges are aware of this controversy and the problems deriving from memory recovery techniques. Israeli courts then can fall easily victim to “multiple truths”, i.e. differences between paradigms defined by clinical viewpoints.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Interestingly, the author also highlights another problem all legal systems have in common, the fact that “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence”, an intriguing topic on how evidence is dealt with in court. This is a highly debated issue by philosophers of the law, addressed usually by proposing standards of proof to weigh presence vs. absence of evidence (e.g. Ferrer Beltran, &lt;span&gt;2021&lt;/span&gt;). In criminal cases, the &lt;i&gt;standard of proof&lt;/i&gt; represents the degree to which a party (prosecutor/defence) must prove its case to succeed. It is linked with the &lt;i&gt;burden of proof&lt;/i&gt;, i.e. the requirements to satisfy that standard. In many legal systems, including nowadays the Italian system, the standard of proof, for the prosecutor's arguments, is to prove the case against the defendant “beyond any reasonab","PeriodicalId":18022,"journal":{"name":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","volume":"30 S1","pages":"84-86"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lcrp.1_12275","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143836429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dissociative amnesia – A valid construct for repressed memories","authors":"Hans J. Markowitsch,&nbsp;Angelica Staniloiu","doi":"10.1111/lcrp.12276","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lcrp.12276","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Dissociative amnesia or psychogenic amnesia are established diseases in psychiatry, but their existence and aetiology are sometimes questioned by researchers working primarily in experimental fields of psychology. The validity of the diagnoses is defended by (a) pointing to the for centuries existing tradition of the disease conditions, (b) their likely aetiology in the context of (repeated) situations of learned helplessness, stress, and trauma, and (c) and a downregulation of emotional reactivity. Dissociative amnesia is defined as a memory blockade, usually induced by an adverse environment for which appropriate coping strategies are lacking. The influence of a lack of psychic wellbeing on the brain is worked out by pointing to results from structural and functional brain imaging and by using the examples of Takotsubo-cardiomyopathy and transient global amnesia. Concomitant psychiatric disease conditions and specific personality traits of patients with dissociative amnesia are discussed. It is concluded that dissociative amnesia is a valid concept with distinct neural correlates that withstands the criticisms of a few experimental psychologists.</p>","PeriodicalId":18022,"journal":{"name":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","volume":"30 S1","pages":"5-21"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143836391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Repressed Memory and Dissociative Amnesia: The Unidentified Anomalous Phenomenon of Memory Loss","authors":"Henry Otgaar,&nbsp;Mark L. Howe,&nbsp;Lawrence Patihis,&nbsp;Ivan Mangiulli,&nbsp;Olivier Dodier,&nbsp;Rafaële Huntjens,&nbsp;Elisa Krackow,&nbsp;Marko Jelicic,&nbsp;Steven Jay Lynn","doi":"10.1111/lcrp.1_12276","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lcrp.1_12276","url":null,"abstract":"&lt;p&gt;Renewed interest in UFOs, now called Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP), gained traction in 2017 when The New York Times published three videos captured by pilots purportedly demonstrating UAPs showing manoeuvres exceeding human technology.1 The Pentagon investigated these UAPs and, recently, reports and hearings have begun to unravel the origin of these strange sightings. These investigations have shown that only a small percentage of these UAPS does not “resolve into readily explainable sources” such as weather balloons or planes.2 Moreover, these investigations have not revealed any convincing proof for an extraterrestrial origin. In this commentary, we will show that this story bears a striking resemblance with the controversial discourse of repressed memory and dissociative amnesia.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;An important first task that the Pentagon undertook was to decipher whether UAPs could be explained by plausible alternative accounts. In the same vein, in the field of (alleged) memory loss, before a convincing case can be made that memory loss has a traumatic cause, other science-based explanations should be sought first (Otgaar et al., &lt;span&gt;2019&lt;/span&gt;). For example, research has revealed that reported memory loss of autobiographical experiences can be produced by organic causes (e.g., head injury, Jelicic, &lt;span&gt;2023&lt;/span&gt;) or malingering (Zago et al., &lt;span&gt;2023&lt;/span&gt;). This issue is important as Markowitsch and Staniloiu (&lt;span&gt;2025&lt;/span&gt;, p. 6) provided examples of triggers leading to dissociative amnesia such as “a head concussion” and “banged with his head against a metal door.” These are perfect examples that the memory loss might not be dissociative in nature but has a plausible cause: an organic one.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The examples described in Markowitsch and Staniloiu (&lt;span&gt;2025&lt;/span&gt;) are reminiscent of a recent review by Mangiulli et al. (&lt;span&gt;2022&lt;/span&gt;). In this review, the authors critically examined 128 case studies of dissociative amnesia. An important finding was that in about a third of case studies, an organic antecedent was present thereby leading to the possibility that the reported memory loss might have nothing to with a dissociative origin. Therefore, the authors proposed that because it is oftentimes challenging to rule out other mechanisms (e.g., organic causes, malingering), a neutral label would be the best route to describe the memory loss such as &lt;i&gt;amnesia of uncertain aetiology&lt;/i&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;To conclude, we argue that just like UAPs, repressed memory and dissociative amnesia should be first tested against plausible explanations such as organic amnesia or malingering memory loss. Moreover, even when these explanations cannot account for traumatic memory loss, concepts such as repressed memory and dissociative amnesia are, by default, difficult to reconcile with philosophical and evolutionary points of view (De Brigard, &lt;span&gt;2023&lt;/span&gt;; Patihis, &lt;span&gt;2023&lt;/span&gt;). Of course, we remain open to new data to document whether","PeriodicalId":18022,"journal":{"name":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","volume":"30 S1","pages":"22-23"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2025-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lcrp.1_12276","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143836379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}