Can highly arousing traumatic Experiences be repressed?

Abstract

Reading Mazzoni et al.'s paper, I was glad to find out that their and my own paper (Nachson, 2025) are in agreement with each other in terms of both, the issues involved in the concepts of repression and of recovered memory, and their solutions. Although our conceptual perspectives differ from each other—as evident by the differential bibliography lists—the similarity between our analyses is indeed striking, so as to render them complementary.

We similarly delineate the difficulties involved in the very definition of the concept of repression which is not operationally defined, and hence cannot be scientifically validated. Thus, while ‘soft-minded’ clinicians find the concept useful for treating clients who have allegedly recovered memories of childhood sexual abuses, ‘hard-minded’ researchers find it misleading.

The latter also shy away from the notion that a given behaviour may be considered an exception to a rule. Therefore, the special properties assigned to memories of traumatic events (such as resistance to distortion over time) cannot be entertained without solid evidence, and indeed, cognitive scientists tend to reject the notion of a special nature of traumatic memories.

The insistence on a special nature reminds one of other failing attempts to postulate an explanation of a given behaviour in terms of exceptional processes; for example, the original, ‘frustration-aggression hypothesis’ (Dollard et al., 1939), which was based on the notion that, unlike other behavioural responses which are learned, aggression is exceptionally caused by a single factor, namely frustration.

Mazzoni et al. make it clear that evidence showing that memory of traumatic experiences is less accessible and less retrievable than that of non-traumatic experiences does not prove that it is repressed, and in-fact, it might even be enhanced rather than impaired. The studies showing detrimental effects of trauma on memory in animals, and those performed on intentional suppression, do not constitute, according to the authors, evidence for repression in humans.

The authors' conclusion that each of the two opposing opinions regarding recovered memories entails a partial truth reminds one of the American Psychological Association's decision to accept both of them as valid (Howard & Tuffin, 2002), and of my discussion on multiple truths (Nachson, 2025).

As a solution of the on-going debate regarding recovered memories, the authors suggest a ‘middle ground hypothesis’, according to which only traumatic memories of highly arousing, negative experiences might be repressed. However, this suggestion begs the question, since the debate focuses on memories of sexual abuses which are clearly ‘highly arousing, negative experiences’; so we are back on square one.

Finally, I wholeheartedly agree with the authors that further research on recovery of memory is called for, and that the clinical and legal communities should be fully informed about the issues involved with the theory and application of the concept of recovered memories, so as to avoid their uncritical acceptance.