2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)最新文献_第4页

HoRStify: Sound Security Analysis of Smart Contracts HoRStify:智能合约的可靠安全性分析

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2023-01-31 DOI: 10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00023

Sebastian Holler, Sebastian Biewer, Clara Schneidewind

{"title":"HoRStify: Sound Security Analysis of Smart Contracts","authors":"Sebastian Holler, Sebastian Biewer, Clara Schneidewind","doi":"10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00023","url":null,"abstract":"The cryptocurrency Ethereum is the most widely used execution platform for smart contracts. Smart contracts are distributed applications, which govern financial assets and, hence, can implement advanced financial instruments, such as decentralized exchanges or autonomous organizations (DAOs). Their financial nature makes smart contracts an attractive attack target, as demonstrated by numerous exploits on popular contracts resulting in financial damage of millions of dollars. This omnipresent attack hazard motivates the need for sound static analysis tools, which assist smart contract developers in eliminating contract vulnerabilities a priori to deployment. Vulnerability assessment that is sound and insightful for EVM contracts is a formidable challenge because contracts execute low-level bytecode in a largely unknown and potentially hostile execution environment. So far, there exists no provably sound automated analyzer that allows for the verification of security properties based on program dependencies, even though prevalent attack classes fall into this category. In this work, we present HoRStify, the first automated analyzer for dependency properties of Ethereum smart contracts based on sound static analysis. HoRStify grounds its soundness proof on a formal proof framework for static program slicing that we instantiate to the semantics of EVM bytecode. We demonstrate that HoRStify is flexible enough to soundly verify the absence of famous attack classes such as timestamp dependency and, at the same time, performant enough to analyze real-world smart contracts.","PeriodicalId":179870,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131394208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

OblivIO: Securing Reactive Programs by Oblivious Execution with Bounded Traffic Overheads 用有限的流量开销通过遗忘执行来保护响应程序

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2023-01-19 DOI: 10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00014

Jeppe Fredsgaard Blaabjerg, Aslan Askarov

引用次数: 0

Cross-Chain Swaps with Preferences 具有偏好的交叉链互换

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2022-10-21 DOI: 10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00031

Eric Chan, M. Chrobak, M. Lesani

引用次数: 0

Smart Contract Synthesis Modulo Hyperproperties 智能合约合成模超性质

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2022-08-15 DOI: 10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00006

Norine Coenen, B. Finkbeiner, Jana Hofmann, Julia J. Tillman

引用次数: 2

Securing Optimized Code Against Power Side Channels 针对电源侧信道保护优化代码

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2022-07-06 DOI: 10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00016

R. Tsoupidi, Roberto Castañeda Lozano, E. Troubitsyna, Panos Papadimitratos

{"title":"Securing Optimized Code Against Power Side Channels","authors":"R. Tsoupidi, Roberto Castañeda Lozano, E. Troubitsyna, Panos Papadimitratos","doi":"10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00016","url":null,"abstract":"Side-channel attacks impose a serious threat to cryptographic algorithms, including widely employed ones, such as AES and RSA. These attacks take advantage of the algorithm implementation in hardware or software to extract secret information via side channels. Software masking is a mitigation approach against power side-channel attacks aiming at hiding the secret-revealing dependencies from the power footprint of a vulnerable implementation. However, this type of software mitigation often depends on general-purpose compilers, which do not preserve non-functional properties. Moreover, microarchitectural features, such as the memory bus and register reuse, may also leak secret information. These abstractions are not visible at the high-level implementation of the program. Instead, they are decided at compile time. To remedy these problems, security engineers often sacrifice code efficiency by turning off compiler optimization and/or performing local, post-compilation transformations. This paper proposes Secure by Construction Code Generation (SecCG), a constraint-based compiler approach that generates optimized yet protected against power side channels code. SecCG controls the quality of the mitigated program by efficiently searching the best possible low-level implementation according to a processor cost model. In our experiments with twelve masked cryptographic functions up to 100 lines of code on Mips32 and ARM Thumb, SecCG speeds up the generated code from 77% to 6.6 times compared to non-optimized secure code with an overhead of up to 13% compared to non-secure optimized code at the expense of a high compilation cost. For security and compiler researchers, this paper proposes a formal model to generate power side channel free low-level code. For software engineers, SecCG provides a practical approach to optimize performance critical and vulnerable cryptographic implementations that preserve security properties against power side channels.","PeriodicalId":179870,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127231825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Basilic: Resilient-Optimal Consensus Protocols with Benign and Deceitful Faults Basilic:具有良性和欺骗性错误的弹性最优共识协议

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2022-04-19 DOI: 10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00002

Alejandro Ranchal-Pedrosa, V. Gramoli

{"title":"Basilic: Resilient-Optimal Consensus Protocols with Benign and Deceitful Faults","authors":"Alejandro Ranchal-Pedrosa, V. Gramoli","doi":"10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00002","url":null,"abstract":"The problem of Byzantine consensus has been key to designing secure distributed systems. However, it is particularly difficult, mainly due to the presence of Byzantine processes that act arbitrarily and the unknown message delays in general networks. Although it is well known that both safety and liveness are at risk as soon as $n/3$ Byzantine processes fail, very few works attempted to characterize precisely the faults that produce safety violations from the faults that produce termination violations. In this paper, we present a new lower bound on the solvability of the consensus problem by distinguishing deceitful faults violating safety and benign faults violating termination from the more general Byzantine faults, in what we call the Byzantine-deceitful-benign fault model. We show that one cannot solve consensus if $nleq 3t+d+2q$ with $t$ Byzantine processes, $d$ deceitful processes, and $q$ benign processes. In addition, we show that this bound is tight by presenting the Basilic class of consensus protocols that solve consensus when $n > 3t+d+2q$. These protocols differ in the number of processes from which they wait to receive messages before progressing. Each of these protocols is thus better suited for some applications depending on the predominance of benign or deceitful faults.","PeriodicalId":179870,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126471928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 2

Robust Safety for Move 坚固的移动安全性

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2021-10-11 DOI: 10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00045

Marco Patrignani, Sam Blackshear

{"title":"Robust Safety for Move","authors":"Marco Patrignani, Sam Blackshear","doi":"10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00045","url":null,"abstract":"A program that maintains key safety properties even when interacting with arbitrary untrusted code is said to enjoy robust safety. Proving that a program written in a mainstream language is robustly safe is typically challenging because it requires static verification tools that work precisely even in the presence of language features like dynamic dispatch and shared mutability. The emerging Move programming language was designed to support strong encapsulation and static verification in the service of secure smart contract programming. However, the language design has not been analysed using a theoretical framework like robust safety. In this paper, we define robust safety for the Move language and introduce a generic framework for static tools that wish to enforce it. Our framework consists of two abstract components: a program verifier that can prove an invariant holds in a closed-world setting (e.g., the Move Prover [16], [47]), and a novel encapsulator that checks if the verifier's result generalizes to an open-world setting. We formalise an escape analysis as an instantiation of the encapsulator and prove that it attains the required security properties. Finally, we implement our encapsulator as an extension to the Move Prover and use the combination to analyse a large representative benchmark set of real-world Move programs. This toolchain certifies >99% of the Move modules we analyse, validating that automatic enforcement of strong security properties like robust safety is practical for Move. Additionally, our results tell that security-centric language design can be effective in attaining strong security properties such as robust safety.","PeriodicalId":179870,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132964204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Towards a Game-Theoretic Security Analysis of Off-Chain Protocols 链下协议的博弈论安全性分析

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2021-09-15 DOI: 10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00003

Sophie Rain, Zeta Avarikioti, Laura Kov'acs, Matteo Maffei

{"title":"Towards a Game-Theoretic Security Analysis of Off-Chain Protocols","authors":"Sophie Rain, Zeta Avarikioti, Laura Kov'acs, Matteo Maffei","doi":"10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00003","url":null,"abstract":"Off-chain protocols constitute one of the most promising approaches to solve the inherent scalability issue of blockchain technologies. The core idea is to let parties transact on-chain only once to establish a channel between them, leveraging later on the resulting channel paths to perform arbitrarily many peer-to-peer transactions off-chain. While significant progress has been made in terms of proof techniques for off-chain protocols, existing approaches do not capture the game-theoretic incentives at the core of their design, which led to overlooking significant attack vectors like the Wormhole attack in the past. In this work we take a first step towards a principled game-theoretic security analysis of off-chain protocols by introducing the first game-theoretic model that is expressive enough to reason about their security. We advocate the use of Extensive Form Games (EFGs) and introduce two instances of EFGs to capture security properties of the closing and the routing of the Lightning Network. Specifically, we model the closing protocol, which relies on punishment mechanisms to disincentivize parties to upload old channel states on-chain. Moreover, we model the routing protocol, thereby formally characterizing the Wormhole attack, a vulnerability that undermines the fee-based incentive mechanism underlying the Lightning Network.","PeriodicalId":179870,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":"131 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126883738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 4

Optimally Hiding Object Sizes with Constrained Padding 最佳隐藏对象大小与约束填充

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2021-08-03 DOI: 10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00004

Andrew C. Reed, M. Reiter

引用次数: 1

Formalizing Stack Safety as a Security Property 将堆栈安全性形式化为安全属性

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2021-05-02 DOI: 10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00037

S. Anderson, Roberto Blanco, Leonidas Lampropoulos, B. Pierce, A. Tolmach

引用次数: 0