2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)最新文献

SoK: Delay-Based Cryptography SoK:基于延迟的密码术

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00028

Liam Medley, Angelique Faye Loe, Elizabeth A. Quaglia

引用次数: 5

Proving Unlinkability Using ProVerif Through Desynchronised Bi-Processes 通过非同步双进程使用ProVerif证明不可链接性

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00022

David Baelde, A. Debant, S. Delaune

引用次数: 1

Towards End-to-End Verified TEEs via Verified Interface Conformance and Certified Compilers 通过验证接口一致性和认证编译器实现端到端验证tee

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00021

Farzaneh Derakhshan, Zichao Zhang, Amit Vasudevan, Limin Jia

引用次数: 0

Extending the Authentication Hierarchy with One-Way Agreement 用单向协议扩展身份验证层次结构

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00025

Johannes Wilson, Mikael Asplund, N. Johansson

引用次数: 0

A Generic Framework to Develop and Verify Security Mechanisms at the Microarchitectural Level: Application to Control-Flow Integrity 在微架构级别开发和验证安全机制的通用框架:控制流完整性的应用

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00029

Matthieu Baty, Pierre Wilke, Guillaume Hiet, Arnaud Fontaine, Alix Trieu

{"title":"A Generic Framework to Develop and Verify Security Mechanisms at the Microarchitectural Level: Application to Control-Flow Integrity","authors":"Matthieu Baty, Pierre Wilke, Guillaume Hiet, Arnaud Fontaine, Alix Trieu","doi":"10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00029","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, the disclosure of several significant security vulnerabilities has revealed the trust put in some presumed security properties of commonplace hardware to be misplaced. We propose to design hardware systems with security mechanisms, together with a formal statement of the security properties obtained, and a machine-checked proof that the hardware security mechanisms indeed implement the sought-for security property. Formally proving security properties about hardware systems might seem prohibitively complex and expensive. In this paper, we tackle this concern by designing a realistic and accessible methodology on top of the Kôlka Hardware Description Language for specifying and proving security properties during hardware development. Our methodology is centered around a verified compiler from high-level and inefficient to work with Kôlka models to an equivalent lower-level representation, where side effects are made explicit and reasoning is convenient. We apply this methodology to a concrete example: the formal specification and implementation of a shadow stack mechanism on an RV32I processor. We prove that this security mechanism is correct, i.e., any illegal modification of a return address does indeed result in the termination of the whole system. Furthermore, we show that this modification of the processor does not impact its behaviour in other, unexpected ways.","PeriodicalId":179870,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124177394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Copyright and Reprint Permissions 版权和转载权限

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/csf57540.2023.00040

引用次数: 0

On the (De) centralization of FruitChains 论水果连锁店的(去)集中化

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00020

Aikaterini-Panagiota Stouka, T. Zacharias

{"title":"On the (De) centralization of FruitChains","authors":"Aikaterini-Panagiota Stouka, T. Zacharias","doi":"10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00020","url":null,"abstract":"One of the most important features of blockchain protocols is decentralization, as their main contribution is that they formulate a distributed ledger that will be maintained and extended without the need of a trusted party. Bitcoin has been criticized for its tendency to centralization, as very few pools control the majority of the hashing power. Pass et al. proposed FruitChain [PODC 17] and claimed that this blockchain protocol mitigates the formation of pools by reducing the variance of the rewards in the same way as mining pools, but in a fully decentralized fashion. Many follow up papers consider that the problem of centralization in Proof-of- Work (PoW) blockchain systems can be solved via lower rewards' variance, and that in FruitChain the formation of pools is unnecessary. Contrary to the common perception, in this work, we prove that lower variance of the rewards does not eliminate the tendency of the PoW blockchain protocols to centralization; miners have also other incentives to create large pools, and specifically to share the cost of creating the instance they need to solve the PoW puzzle. We abstract the procedures of FruitChain as oracles and assign to each of them a cost. Then, we provide a formal definition of a pool in a blockchain system, and by utilizing the notion of equilibrium with virtual payoffs (EVP) [AFT 21], we prove that there is a completely centralized EVP, where all the parties form a single pool controlled by one party called the pool leader. The pool leader is responsible for creating the instance used for the PoW procedure. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that examines the construction of mining pools in the FruitChain system.","PeriodicalId":179870,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122586924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

From Bounded to Unbounded: Privacy Amplification via Shuffling with Dummies 从有界到无界:用假人洗牌放大隐私

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00034

Shun Takagi, Fumiyuki Kato, Yang Cao, Masatoshi Yoshikawa

{"title":"From Bounded to Unbounded: Privacy Amplification via Shuffling with Dummies","authors":"Shun Takagi, Fumiyuki Kato, Yang Cao, Masatoshi Yoshikawa","doi":"10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00034","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, the shuffling model has been garnering attention in the realm of differential privacy (DP). This study focuses on the fact that the shuffling model follows bounded DP rather than unbounded DP. This characteristic causes a privacy issue in which participation itself is not protected. To address this issue, we propose a framework, called unbounded shuffling, which follows unbounded DP in addition to bounded DP under the trust assumption of the shuffling model. The main difference from the conventional shuffling model is the inclusion of dummies, which some users add to pose that perturbed records are sent by other users. We also analyze the privacy and utility of our proposed framework. The analysis shows that our framework achieves almost the same utility and privacy as that of the traditional shuffling model while guaranteeing unbounded DP. Additionally, we apply the technique of individual privacy accounting, which is built solely on unbounded DP, to stochastic gradient descent (SGD) using our framework. This approach approximately halves the value of $varepsilon$ of a baseline.","PeriodicalId":179870,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134025585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

Zero-Knowledge in EasyCrypt 零知识在EasyCrypt

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00015

Denis Firsov, Dominique Unruh

引用次数: 4

On the Incoercibility of Digital Signatures 论数字签名的不可强制性

2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) Pub Date : 2023-07-01 DOI: 10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00018

Ashley Fraser, L. Garms, Elizabeth A. Quaglia

{"title":"On the Incoercibility of Digital Signatures","authors":"Ashley Fraser, L. Garms, Elizabeth A. Quaglia","doi":"10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00018","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce incoercible digital signature schemes, a variant of a standard digital signature. Incoercible signatures enable signers, when coerced to produce a signature for a message chosen by an attacker, to generate fake signatures that are indistinguishable from real signatures, even if the signer is compelled to reveal their full history (including their secret signing keys and any randomness used to produce keys/signatures) to the attacker. Additionally, we introduce an authenticator that can detect fake signatures, which ensures that coercion is identified. We present a formal security model for incoercible signature schemes that comprises an established definition of unforgeability and captures new notions of weak receipt-freeness, strong receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance. We demonstrate that an incoercible signature scheme can be viewed as a transformation of any generic signature scheme. Indeed, we present two incoercible signature scheme constructions that are built from a standard signature scheme and a sender-deniable encryption scheme. We prove that our first construction satisfies coercion-resistance, and our second satisfies strong receipt-freeness. We conclude by presenting an extension to our security model: we show that our security model can be extended to the designated verifier signature scheme setting in an intuitive way as the designated verifier can assume the role of the authenticator and detect coercion during the verification process.","PeriodicalId":179870,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127972457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0